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Eighth Meeting of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy

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Sesiones plenarias

Keynote Speakers
Rational Action, Rational Belief and Falsehoods

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That falsehoods can be rationally believed is the received view in epistemology. Indeed, that falsehoods can be rationally believed was, until very recently, seen as an adequacy condition on epistemological views. If, for instance, a view had the consequence that a pre-Einsteinian belief in the additivity of speed is irrational, then that view was seen as inadequate in virtue of having that consequence. That traditional view has been attacked in two stages. The first stage consisted in arguing that although we can of course be rational in believing falsehoods, they cannot have some other preferred epistemic property, like justification. The second stage consists in claiming that we do not need that distinction after all, and that falsehoods cannot be rationally believed. In this paper I will deal primarily with this latter view. Many of my arguments, however, can be applied to the view that although falsehoods can be rationally believed they cannot be justifiably believed. My main argument for the claim that falsehoods can be rationally believed is simple: rational action requires rational belief, and we can sometimes act rationally on the basis of false beliefs. The main work done in this paper is in the refinement and development of that simple argument.
Two ideas structure the literature on shame. One is the idea that when we feel shame we construe ourselves as having failed to meet the demand of one’s own personal ethics and ideals. The other is that shame is occasioned by no more than consciousness of oneself as exposed to another. In this talk I argue that we need not choose between these ideas. I go on to propose a view of shame on which it is a form of consciousness of oneself as being expelled or degraded by the social group of which one is a part.
Some authors have recently diminished the relevance of aesthetic value in literature. That is partly due to a formalist-perceptualist conception of the aesthetic, which holds that, given the relative insignificance of visual or aural properties of written natural language, the aesthetic experience of literature must be irrelevant—except in the case of poetry. The reader is considered to care about the content and not the form of the work: she seeks to engage in a story and, perhaps, to think on the themes that are implicit in the story, without caring for aesthetic matters.

My aim in this talk is to challenge this conception of the aesthetic and the literary, and to defend that the aesthetic appreciation of literature is related to the enjoyment of the mimetic capacity of language. As a specific mimetic art, literature creates characters and stories, and is capable of bringing to representation aspects of the human experience that are inaccessible to other media. In this sense novel has been properly considered the finest artistic medium to represent human minds, and therefore, to make sense of human actions, and ways of perceiving and conceiving the world. It is this potential of language to give shape to human experience, making it present to the reader’s mind, that warrants the aesthetic experience of literature.
Empiricist Pragmatism

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I outline an account of truth that proceeds by specifying the rules that govern the practice of assessing certain conscious episodes as true or false, in contrast with representationalist accounts, which seek to explicate the notion by identifying the property that we ascribe to one of these episodes when we assess it as true. The rules that govern the practice are formulated in terms of the phenomenon of conviction, as a conscious, reidentifiable reaction produced by some conscious items. I compare this proposal with the rationalist versions of pragmatism advocated by Robert Brandom and others.
Comunicaciones

Contributions
Significado sin referencia

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1. La pasada década ha sido testigo de un ataque sostenido a la posibilidad de elaborar una teoría del significado de las lenguas naturales en cuyo núcleo se encuentre una teoría de las relaciones entre lenguaje y mundo. El objeto del ataque era la denominada Semántica Referencial \([= sr]\); y adopta la forma de un argumento: el Argumento contra la Semántica Referencia \(= Contra\). El objetivo de esta comunicación es el de llamar la atención sobre el clamoroso silencio que envuelve a Contra. Para ello se darán tres pasos: (i) identificar sus premisas; (ii) señalar qué réplica daría el partidario de la \(sr\); y (iii) llamar la atención sobre un argumento presentado por Wittgenstein en el segmento inicial de Investigaciones filosóficas que bloquearía esa réplica. Aunque desde Lewis (1970) y Soames (1987) los partidarios de \(sr\) raramente han tomado Contra en serio, el argumento cuestionaría esa actitud.

2. Contra consta de tres premisas principales:

[A] Las oraciones de la clase \(O\) son materia de análisis semántico.

[B] Una teoría del significado de una lengua natural tiene como componente central un conjunto de principios que asignan valores semánticos a aquellas de sus expresiones que pasan los correspondientes filtros sintácticos.

[C] Los valores semánticos de los designadores y predicados de una lengua natural son entidades extralingüísticas que existen independientemente de la mente de sus usuarios.

La combinación de [B] y [C] es el rasgo característico de la Semántica Referencial. De estos principios se derivaría la siguiente conclusión:

\[\sim C\] No existe ninguna relación referencial entre designadores y partes del mundo que existen independientemente de la mente.
El argumento depende de la especificación de una clase de oraciones Or (según su premisa [A]). Entre sus miembros se contarían las siguientes:

(1a) Francia es hexagonal
(1b) Francia es una república
(1c) Francia es una república hexagonal
(2a) El banco ardió
(2b) El banco bajó los tipos de interés para evitar quedarse sin fondos
(2c) El banco, que había bajado los tipos de interés, ardió de la noche a la mañana
(3a) El libro que está planeando escribir tiene una trama original
(3b) El libro se amontonaba en las librerías
(3c) El libro, que se amontonaba en las librerías, se gestó durante una década
(4a) Al-Quds es Jerusalén
(4b) La autoridad palestina considera si trasladar Al-Quds fuera de Jerusalén


3. La idea del argumento es que, si éstas oraciones son materia a procesar por el análisis semántico, los referentes con que algunos de sus constituyentes (p. ej., 'Francia', 'el banco', 'el libro', 'Al-Quds') contribuyen a su significado han de ser entidades (p.ej., Francia, un determinado banco, la ciudad de Al-Quds) con un estatuto metafísico cuestionable (p. ej., cosas de forma hexagonal que tienen sistemas políticos; tramas narrativas que se amontonan en las librerías). Puesto que no pueden existir entidades así, se concluye que no existe ninguna relación como la de referencia. Es decir: [~C]. <Cf. Chomsky (2000); Pietroski (2003), (2005); Ludlow (2003).>

4. Finalmente, se presentan dos maniobras, opuestas entre sí, que ayudan a medir mejor el alcance de Contra. En primer lugar, se considera la opción del partidario de sr de evitar la conclusión [~C]. Su principal opción es rechazar la premisa [A]. Las oraciones de Or (p. ej., (1c)) no son materia de análisis semántico. (Por ejemplo, la teoría del significado no tiene por qué fijar sus condiciones de verdad.) En ausencia de [A], [~C] es inalcanzable; y [A] se neutraliza mediante alguna de entre una variada gama de maniobras: multiplicar subíndices; sustituir oraciones por paráfrasis supuestamente apropiadas; elegir como referentes no continuantes completos, sino algunos de sus segmentos temporales, y demás. Aunque parezcan
maniobras exclusivamente técnicas, tras el rechazo de [1] hay un compromiso filosóficamente significativo.

5. En el último tercio de la comunicación se reinterpreta material presentado en Wittgenstein (1953/2001: §§ 17-21) con el objetivo de recuperar un argumento que cuestiona el rechazo de la premisa [A]. La conclusión del argumento es incompatible con análisis de los miembros de Or según los cuales, digamos, (1a) significa que (o bien que es verdadera si, y sólo si) la forma del territorio de Francia es hexagonal; o bien que (2a) significa (es verdadera si, y sólo si) el edificio que aloja la empresa dedicada a operaciones financieras ardió. Es igualmente incompatible con análisis que entienden que entre los miembros de Or los hay que deben entenderse como formas resumidas de oraciones que sí tendrían significado (o a las que sí podría asignarse condiciones de verdad). La idea que gobierna el argumento, y con ello la defensa de [A], es que el significado de una expresión lingüística es una posición en un espacio de opciones, un espacio articulado en sus detalles en función de la ocasión de uso. (Recientemente, esta propuesta ha sido defendida de formas distintas en Travis 2008 y Stalnaker 2014.)

Referencias


What Is the Relation Between the Content of the Emotions and the Content of the Appraisals?

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Many theories of emotions advanced by philosophers and psychologists assume that emotions require causal appraisals, e.g., Griffiths, (1997), Ellsworth & Scherer (2001) and in this talk I will assume that this is correct. Appraisals are particular kinds of evaluations of the impact of the situation on the subject’s well-being (Lazarus, 1991). They are called “causal” when they cause one emotion to activate. Depending on the kind of causal appraisal that occurs, a different emotion is triggered. The appraisal of the danger of falling off the edge of a cliff, for instance activates my fear, whereas the appraisal of your remark as offensive triggers my anger.

Emotions have been also widely regarded as intentional states, directed towards object, e.g. Goldie (2002), Nussbaum (2001), Prinz (2004), Deonna and Teroni (2012). Intentional theories of emotion assume that, as our way of speaking suggests, emotions are directed towards objects, e.g. a dog, the proposition “Matt is angry at John”, etc. They also assume that emotions represent the word as being a certain way, e.g. Matt’s anger represents John as doing an offence to him. I will also assume that emotions are intentional state.

Given the close relation between causal appraisals and emotions, it seems plausible to think that the information emotions give to us is strictly related to the information embedded in causal appraisals. To date, however, there has been little discussion about the contribution of the information carried by causal appraisals, i.e. the content of causal appraisal, to the content of the emotions. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, exploring one possible relation between the content of the emotion and the content of its causal appraisals.

Distinct theories of emotions endorse different accounts of appraisals, i.e. cognitivists like Martha Nussbaum and Robert Solomon thinks that appraisals are very similar to evaluative beliefs (Nussbaum, 2004; Solomon, 1988); non-cognitivists think that appraisals may be mere associations between an object
and an evaluative term, e.g. danger, loss, unexpected (Griffiths, 1997). The lack of consensus between researchers on the nature of emotions render this enterprise more complex and intricate.

In this talk, I will examine the relation between the appraisal and the emotional content, offering an account of the content of the emotion and advancing two central theses: (1) the content of the emotion is not identical to the content of the appraisal(s) which activated it, and (2) the content of the emotion supervenes on the value presented in the appraisal(s).

My argument for the distinction between the emotion content and the appraisal content proceeds as follows: I will present certain circumstances where the cause of emotion does not coincide with the object of the emotion. When this is the case the content of the appraisals and the content of the emotion diverge. Therefore, even if only part of the content of the emotion were identical to the content of the appraisal, we would obtain a bad result.

In this abstract, I will only consider the following situation.

**OFFENSIVE REMARK:** Sarah overhears Alison making an offensive remark about herself. As a result, Sarah is angry at Alison.

In this situation, Sarah’s emotional system appraises the remark as offensive. The appraisal content in this case is “this remark is offensive”. This immediately triggers anger in her at Alison. Now, assume that the content of emotion was identical to their causal appraisals. Under this assumption, Sarah’s anger has the content “this remark is offensive”. However, this outcome does not look very compelling. This is because even if Sarah’s anger is caused by Alison’s remark, Sarah’s anger is not directed at the remark. In this situation, his anger seems to be directed at Alison. Therefore, the intentionality of emotion cannot be identical to Sarah’s causal appraisal.

If appraisals are causes of emotion, but the content of the emotions cannot be identified with them, do they intervene in determining the content of emotions? In the talk, I will answer affirmatively: the axiological properties that figure in the appraisal’s content have a particular kind of relation with the content of emotions. More precisely, causal appraisals intervene in the selection of which type of emotion to activate. In other words, which emotion fires depends on the kind of causal
appraisal that takes place. This is because there is a particular relation between the emotion activated and the content of the appraisal.

I propose that the content of emotion is related to the content of the causal appraisal, but cannot be identical, nor partly identified to it. In particular, I think that causal appraisals determine part of the content of emotion. More specifically, I argue that the formal object of the emotion supervenes on the type of value $V$ that occurs in the content of the causal appraisals.
Cognitive Systems and Characters: The Process of Cognitive Integration

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The process of Cognitive Integration (CI) has become an issue of increasing interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Among the recent literature, we can differentiate two dimensions associated with this process: one concerns the identification of the cognitive architecture necessary to talk of integration at the level of the system (Rupert 2004, Palermos 2014, among others); the other concerns the kind of harmony with which the cognitive system needs to work in order for beliefs to attain the status of knowledge (Greco 1999, 2013 and Breyer and Greco 2008, among others). On the one hand, cognitive science and philosophy of mind explore how different cognitive mechanisms are intertwined with each other to give rise to a cognitive system; on the other hand, in the epistemological literature, the interest lies in the way in which different cognitive abilities are interconnected and cooperatively interact with each other forming what has been called an agent’s cognitive character. This second dimension plays a crucial role in agent reliabilism. The spirit of this view is that knowledge is true belief grounded in a (virtuous) cognitive character. The general idea is that the process of CI restricts the cognitive processes that can be considered knowledge-conducive. By reducing these processes to abilities, a necessary interrelation between knowledge and agency is revealed: when certain process is integrated among the rest, it can be considered a cognitive ability and as a result it enters the scope of the cognizer’s agency. CI warrants that knowledge is not the result of mere luck but that there is some degree of agency on the part of the cognizer and under this view that makes it more epistemically valuable than mere belief.

It has been argued that CI plays a crucial role in the individuation of cognitive systems and cognitive characters, offering an interesting theoretical bridge between epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The key relies on the extent to which we can refer to this process as a single or the same process of integration. For that to be the case, we would need to posit a psychological device
that can operate both at a personal level (character) and at the subpersonal level of mechanisms (components of a system). In order to determine whether that is possible, in this paper I begin by exploring two accounts of this process: agent reliabilism (AR) and a dynamic approach to the program of Extended Cognition (EC). My choice of these two views is not unsupported. A recent observation of the fact that virtue reliabilism and EC treat CI in essentially the same way, has been crucial to the debate concerning the epistemological ramifications of EC. By offering a systematic analysis of CI at the level of system and at the level of character I hope to contribute to the prospect of this program.

In order to do so, first of all, I begin by assessing CI in AR. The central mark of AR (opposed to mere reliabilism of processes) is to place the seat of reliability in the agent herself rather that on the process. As I have just sketched, the moral is that when we assess whether some agent knows, we should not focus on the reliability of isolated (cognitive) belief-forming processes, but rather on the reliability of the overall agent. According to this view, epistemic evaluation has an objective component (de facto reliability) and a subjective component (proper motivation to attain the truth and agent disposition). The central question points to the conditions that need to be satisfied in order for a process to be properly integrated in an agent’s character, her integrated web of stable and reliable abilities. In this regard, CI is invoked to explain cognitive character. Greco (2010) defines cognitive integration as a function of cooperation and interaction, or cooperative interaction with other aspects of the cognitive system. The most important factor is that by looking at the epistemic agent as a whole integrated web of abilities, provides for agent realibilists a minimal criteria for epistemic justification: the fact that a process is integrated among the rest other processes makes its outcome justified even in cases where the agent does not have reflective access to the source of the reliability (which in some cases would be psychologically implausible). This provides a kind of Occam’s razor that maintains a healthy economy of epistemic evaluation in tune with real life knowing.

After reviewing CI in agent reliabilism, I proceed to analyze Palermos (2013, 2014) account of CI at the level of systems. Shifting away from commonsense functionalist criteria for integrating an external resource into one’s cognitive system, Palermos defends a more dynamicist approach to the mind based in Continuous Reciprocal Causation (CRC) or Feedback Loops. The motivation for this program
comes from dynamical systems theory and the basic idea is that non-linear relations give rise to an overall non-decomposable system that consists of all the contributing parts. By this feedback and feedforward relations the components of a system are integrated and as a result each component mutually constricts the other. All system components contribute (nontrivially) to the behaviour of the system. By attending to this chain of mutual affectation we can individuate a cognitive system (whether extended or not, that does not concern me here).

My third step is to synthesize the two positions by offering a systematic and comparative analysis. While it seems some kind of truism that epistemic cognitive integration (integration of epistemic abilities, virtues, or dispositions) must depend in the functioning and cooperation between the different cognitive mechanisms, explaining the connection between integration at the level of system and at the level of character is needed if one is going to talk about the process of CI as a single process. A very suggestive attempt is offered by Palermos. In his 2014 paper he suggests that CRC is essentially the same condition for epistemic CI in agent reliabilism. He puts forward an argument in which he states that ultimately the same condition is required for a process to be integrated into an agent’s cognitive system and an agent’s character.

I analyze his argument and I conclude that although his postulation of a single mechanism underlying CI that can work as a bridge between systems and characters is very promising, CRC is not enough for the kind of CI needed in agent reliabilism. I find some relevant discontinuities that need to be taken into account. First of all, the idea of control and autonomy are entangled with the epistemic dimension of CI, and it is not clear how they relate to his condition. Second of all, factors such as normality, social normativity and stability play also an important role in epistemic CI and they are not captured by CRC. If only stable and reliable features in the cognitive life of the subject must be taken into consideration when determining a process that is integrated, CRC is not a condition strong enough. Lastly, epistemic CI involves a kind of sensitivity (whether explicit or implicit) to the reliability of one’s evidence, which is not necessary for integration at the level of mechanisms based on CRC. As a result, I conclude that not only that “system outstrips character” (Menary, 2007) but that system and character have different conditions for integration. With this, I don’t intend to question the prospects of the debate concerning the epistemological ramifications of HEC, but I just state that
given that CRC is not sufficient for an integrated character. I end up by pointing to a possible contribution that could help elucidating the two dimensions of this process. Perhaps apart from cooperation (in terms of mutual causal affectation) among different components of the system, we should add in our model of architecture a component of a metacognitive competence. Following Broncano and Vega (2011)’ suggestion that cognitive integration could depend on the capacities of metacognition, that is, the capacities to evaluate one’s own cognitive performance, it could be considered that something like a monitoring psychological device could be a necessary component of the architecture of a well integrated agent. This could have the personal effect of fluency or “psychological comfort” (Greco and Breyer, 2015) which seems key to the subjective justification defended by agent reliabilism, while at the same time play a crucial role in the architecture needed to explain the behaviour of an (intelligent) system.

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Representations are Necessary but Minimal Causes

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1. Introduction

The aim of this essay is to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to qualify as a representation. In other words, it will provide a set of conditions such that when a state or process satisfies them, then it should be said to be representation. More precisely, I will rely on the most popular naturalistic theories of representation (teleological theories) and I will add an original condition: a state qualifies as a representation only if it is a minimal but necessary cause of the fitness increase. I will explain this idea and argue that it is an adequate and principled additional condition that should be added to the classical teleological framework to deliver a satisfactory theory of representation.

2. Functional sender-receiver systems

What is a representation? Teleological or teleosemantic theories define representations by appealing to the notion of function (Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1995). Representations are states with certain functions. This is supposed to be only a necessary condition. Fingers and bycycles have functions, but they do not represent any other items, so an appeal to function cannot be sufficient. A popular way of raising the standards for a state to qualify as a representation is to resort to sender-receiver systems. A sender-receiver system is composed of two mechanisms; the first one delivers a set of outputs given certain inputs, and the second one takes the first mechanism’s outputs as inputs and delivers a further output. Accordingly, the main strategy of teleosemantic theories is to combine the notions of sender-receiver structure and function in order to provide a naturalistic theory of representations. Representations are states produced in sender-receiver structures, in which the function of the sender is to produce a state (the representation) when certain worldly affairs hold, and the function of the consumer is to act in certain ways when these states are produced. To be a representation is just to be an intermediate state in such a structure.
More precisely, given the sets of states $M = \{M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n\}$, $S = \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n\}$ and $A = \{A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_n\}$:

**Tel:** $M_i$ is a representation if:
1) $M_i$ is an intermediate state within a sender-receiver system.
2) The sender’s function is to emit $M_i$ when a state $S_i$ is the case.
3) The receiver’s function is to produce $A_i$ when $M_i$ is emitted.

This approach is much more restrictive than merely appealing to functions. Stones are representations because they don’t have functions. Likewise, fingers don’t qualify because, even though they have functions, there is no sense in which they stand between a sender-receiver structure. However, strands of DNA or neurons probably qualify. Thus, some of the clear cases of representations and non-representations are satisfactorily classified as such.

Unfortunately, there are more problematic cases. For instance, Sterelny (1995, p. 256) argued that ‘production of saliva in the mouth adapts the digestion system to the receipt of food. So it mediates between our mechanisms of ingestion and digestion: our digestive systems can only fulfil their function normally, if saliva is correlated with food, but they should not count as representations’. More generally, many interactions between different parts of an organisms seem to satisfy the conditions for being a representation. Indeed, counterexamples are not restricted to bodily parts: it could be argued that feeding or cross-generational traits (e.g. sperm) satisfy the conditions laid down in **Tel** (there is a sender, a receiver, and both have functions), but intuitively shouldn’t count as representations.

I will suggest that the solution to this problem will come from paying more attention the differential causal contribution that signals and referents make to fitness. More precisely, I will argue that representations are necessary but minimal causes.

### 3. Representations are necessary but minimal causes

The intuition behind the proposal is that representational states are causal, but only minimally so. On the one hand, they causally contribute to the success of the behavior of the mechanisms they interact with. Signals are not epiphenomenal or causally inert. They do cause the receiver to perform certain actions. Indeed, they seem to be necessary for the receiver to act in **normal conditions** (where ‘normal
conditions’ should be understood as the evolutionary or developmental conditions that account for the stabilization of the mechanism). However, despite the fact that representations are necessary causes, their contribution is minimal, in the sense that it is restricted to initiate the right behavior at the right circumstances. What actually explains the fact that the behavior was fitness enhancing is the referent (rather than the representation). In other words, if food calls increase fitness is basically because of the presence of food, rather than because of the presence of the signal.

These are the intuitions behind the account. However, spelling out in detail the idea of necessary but minimal causation is far from straightforward. To provide a precise formulation of this suggestion, in what follows I will use Woodward’s (2003) interventionist framework.

**Modeling Representations**

To apply the interventionist framework, we need first to establish a set of variables and their possible values. Let ‘M’ stand for the presence of the alleged signal (which can take the values \{M₀, M₁\}), ‘C’ for the alleged referent (which can take a range of values from \{C₀, ..., C_i\}), ‘R’ for the response or behavior (which can take a range of values from \{R₀, ..., R_i\}) and ‘F’ for the fitness the contriubution of the response (which can take a range of values from \{F₀, ..., F_i\}). Figure 1 represents the relationships between these variables.

Within this framework, there are two conditions that signals must satisfy. First of all, we saw that in normal conditions (defined as evolutionary or developmental success conditions), the signal was necessary for the action to be performed. Now, let us suppose that in normal conditions M has value M₁, C has value C₁, R has value R₁ and E has value F₁. A cause is necessary if the following holds:

\textbf{NC:} If an intervention were to set M to M₀, R would be in R₀ (or significantly close).
The idea is that if there was no signal, then there would be not behavior (or, at least, the behavior would be significantly different). This captures the sense in which in normal conditions signals are necessary.

Secondly, although signals are necessary causes, their fitness contribution is minimal. This idea is much more difficult to model, but I think it can be captured by assessing whether in normal conditions the following condition holds:

**MC**: If M were in M₀, a small intervention could still set R to R₁ (or very close to R₁) and F would still be in F₁ (or significantly close to F₁).

In plain English, what this condition claims is that if there was no signal, but the receiver acted as if there was a signal, then the behavior would still significantly increase the fitness. For instance, if there is food and no hen actually performs a food call, *but we led chicken act as if there was a call*, then this behavior would still increase their fitness.

Thus, the account I suggest is the following:

**TEL***: Mᵢ is a representation if
1) Mᵢ is an intermediate state within a sender-receiver system.
2) The sender’s function is to emit Mᵢ when a state Sᵢ is the case.
3) The receiver’s function is to produce Aᵢ when Mᵢ is emitted.
4) Mᵢ is a necessary but minimal cause (i.e. it satisfies NC and MC).

Crucially, note that saliva does not satisfy these conditions: On the one hand, it is not necessary because the absence of saliva does not stop the process of digestion and, on the other, in the absence of saliva, the stomach would not digest food in the same way it does in normal conditions (it would work significantly worse). I think that other classical counterexamples to teleosemantics (feeding, sperm,..) can also be dealt in a similar way.

In conclusion, for a state to qualify as a representation it has to be a necessary but minimal cause. I think this is a principled and promising way of addressing the liberality problem for teleosemantic theories of content and it provides a satisfactory and naturalistic definition of representation.
Presuppositional Rule Pluralism:  
A New Account of the Assertion Conditions of Taste Predicates  

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1. Introduction  
John MacFarlane (2014) defends that the rule determining the assertion conditions of taste predicates is the T(aste) P(leasing) Rule: ‘If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it “tasty” just in case its flavor is pleasing to you, and “not tasty” just in case its flavor is not pleasing to you.’ (MacFarlane 2014, p. 4).

The aim of this paper is to argue for presuppositional rule pluralism for assertion conditions of taste predicates. I acknowledge that TP is the default rule, but I will defend that other rules, such as ethical, social or cultural rules, can introduce exceptions to TP that shift it into a different rule, say TP*. In order to explain how speakers introduce these changes, I will follow those theories that conceive context as common ground. According to Stalnaker (2014), the notion of common ground has been understood in two different ways: as the central component of the score of a language game (Lewis 1979), and as a complex state definable in terms of the propositional attitudes of the participants in a conversation (Grice 1989). In this paper I will take the Lewisian route, defending that the set of exceptions to the rule for asserting that something is tasty is a component of the score of a conversation. Besides, I will provide the Specifications of the kinematics of rules determining the assertion conditions of taste predicates as well as the Rule of accommodation for exceptions to rules determining the assertion conditions of taste predicates.

2. Tastes, rules and exceptions  
Contrary to MacFarlane, I will argue that other rules can make an impact on the assertion conditions of this type of predicates. Depicting the rule as a component

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1 My proposal follows other presuppositional accounts that rely on presuppositions to account for hardly-tractable cases. See Presuppositional epistemic contextualism (Blome-Tillmann 2014), or Presuppositional indexical contextualist relativism (López de Sa 2015).
of the score of a conversation will allow us to account for a wider range of scenarios: those cases in which the rule in command changes because of the speakers’ actions. Consider two speakers, Mike and Pedro, eating the typical dish of Cañete’s gastronomic festival:

(1) Pedro: Umm, it’s really tasty. It’s been a long time since the last time I’ve tried it.
(2) Mike: Yes, it’s really tasty. What kind of meat is in the dish?
(3) Pedro: You don’t know it? It’s cat meat.
(4) Mike: Cat meat? Are you kidding me? This is the most disgusting thing I’ve ever tried.

Pedro and Mike agree in (1) and (2) that the dish is tasty. The rule that is in command is $TP$: the flavour of the dish is pleasant for both speakers, so both of them are willing to express their approval of the dish calling it ‘tasty’. Suppose that Mike is presupposing that it is rabbit or chicken meat and Pedro is presupposing that it is common ground that the dish is made of cat meat. Mike’s question in (2) presupposes that he does not know what meat is in the dish, and then it is common ground that he does not know the type of meat in the dish. After that, since Pedro knows that Mike does not know which type of meat is, Pedro asserts (3). Now it is common ground that it is cat meat. Once Pedro “updates” the context in (3), Mike has two options: i) he can accept as common ground both that the dish is made of cat and that $TP$ is the rule at stake; or ii) he can refuse to accept both as common ground. In this case, Mike opts for this second option, expressing his disapproval of the dish in (4). If Mike had not said anything, Pedro would have taken for granted that $TP$ continues to be the rule at stake.

Stalnaker (2014) identifies three ways for speakers to accommodate these situations. Following with the example, after Mike’s utterance of (4), Pedro has several options. Firstly, he may accommodate by changing his belief and taking it to be common ground that eating cat meat in Cañete’s gastronomic festival is disgusting. One consequence of this move is that the rule that is in command now would be a different one, say $TP^*$: call something ‘tasty’ if its flavour is pleasing to you and you know first-hand how it tastes, unless it is pet meat that you are eating.

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1 Since the third option is a variation on the first, I will confine myself to the first and second strategies: change my own belief, or try to change the belief of the other party.
However, he can try to challenge Mike’s point. Consider the following possible development of the conversation:

(5) Pedro: Wow, this is unbelievable, you didn’t even check what kind of festival is this. Ok, I’ll tell you the story. I don’t know exactly why cats are eaten in the festival, but I think it isn’t so important. The festival is a distinguishing mark for Peruvians with African ancestry, not a majority in Peru, as you may guess.

(6) Mike: That’s a story that makes all the difference. I knew nothing about the importance and significance of the festival. Now, I understand why the fact that it is cat meat that we are eating didn’t pose a problem for you. At the end, eating cats is just a way to strengthen group cohesion in a discriminated minority. I think I’ll have to give it another chance.

In (5)-(6) another exception has been introduced, making TP* to shift into TP***: call something ‘tasty’ if its flavour is pleasing to you and you know first-hand how it tastes, unless it is pet meat that you are eating, with the exception that it was a significant part of a tradition that favours social cohesion. This last change has shifted the conditions under which it is permitted to say that the dish is ‘tasty’. Now, one rule is accepted by both speakers, so, at the end of the conversation, both speakers accept TP** as the rule in command, because, among other things, TP** capture the exception introduced by Mike and the exception introduced by Pedro.²

3. References


¹ One possible interpretation is that TP** was the rule that was presupposed from the beginning of the conversation, and part of the conversation was a way to inquiry into it.
² Este trabajo ha sido parcialmente financiado por el proyecto Naturalismo, Expresivismo y Normatividad (FFI2013-44836-P).


Descriptivists (e.g. Thomasson, Davies, Kania) think that our art ontology should respect the conceptions of artworks emerging from our critical and appreciative practices. Revisionists (e.g. Wolterstorff, Kivy, Dodd) disagree. Dodd (2013) argues that Kania (2008), who defends a revolutionary fictionalist ontology of music, gives unsatisfactory motivations for his descriptivist metaontology. I consider whether, if we accept Dodd’s criticisms, there is any room left for fictionalist approaches in the ontology of music, which do not subscribe to descriptivism or revisionism. I argue that an alternative approach, inspired by Yablo’s hermeneutic fictionalism on folk number talk, can be developed. Yablo (e.g. 1998: 245ff.) argues that the function linking literal content and real content of folk mathematical statements can be identified in terms of ‘principles of generation’ in ‘games of make-believe’ (Walton 1990; 1993). A principle of generation, such as ‘According to the fiction $F$ iff $G$', is a function that links what is true in the real world (what is true about the props of the game) to what is true in the fictional world (the content of the game). In prop oriented games of make-believe we take advantage of the fact that, basing on our knowledge of the principles of generation, we can say things about the real world by means of saying things within the make-believe world. According to Yablo (e.g. 2001), folk talk about numbers is a case of prop oriented make-believe: by means of talking about make-believed objects (numbers) we manage to say things about the real world. By saying ‘The number of the apostles was 12’ we manage to say that there were 12 apostles. Yablo remains non-committal as to the existence of numbers, since this doesn’t make any difference to the understanding of folk number talk. To sketch a hermeneutic fictionalist account of the ontology of music I first look at Levinson’s realist view. Levinson claims that if a subject selects and writes down or plays certain notes in a certain order, with the intention that they have a normative role, i.e. that of “establishing a rule to reproduce the sounds [referred to by such
notes] in a certain way following the indications of a particular, historically-
situated musical mind [i.e. her own mind]” (2012: 54), then a tonal-instrumental
structure is created in the real world – i.e. a work of music (a generic entity that
can have instantiations) is composed. My idea is that what Levinson describes as
the steps necessary to the creation of a work of music can be reinterpreted, by the
hermeneutic fictionalist, as principles of generation in the game of make-believe
where we talk of musical works. I argue that when we talk about musical works
we are non-committal to their existence, and are instead interested in describing
aspects of other things (sounds, scores, instruments, etc.) that it is expressively
effective to talk about in fictional terms. My view isn’t descriptivist, since it does
not let folk music talk shape musical ontology.

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The Grounding Problem and the Problem of Cheap Indeterminism. Can They Be Solved Simultaneously?

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This paper is concerned with the relation, which Thomas Sattig has brought to light in Sattig (2014; 2015), between:

Constitutionalism: this view states that, for example, a statue and the piece of clay of which it is made are two different coincident objects (as they have different properties), which, while they coincide, stand in the constitution relation.

The grounding problem affecting this view (in terms of the example of the statue and the piece of clay): While the statue and the piece of clay are coincident they share many properties (their material, shape, configuration...). However, they do not share their modal and sortal properties. How can this be so?

Determinism: After rejecting additional ways to understand the thesis of determinism Sattig proposes to understand it as follows

Strong Qualitative Determinism (sqd)
A possible world $w$ is deterministic iff for all times $t$, and for all objects $x$ in $w$, there is no object in any possible world with the same laws of nature as $w$, which matches $x$ in its qualitative description up to $t$, but which does not match $x$ in its total qualitative description.

Next, Sattig argues that if constitutionalism is correct, then our world is indeterministic just in virtue of ordinary facts about ordinary objects. However, embracing indeterminism just in virtue of such ordinary, mundane facts, does not seem correct. This is the problem of cheap indeterminism. Here is Sattig’s argument:

Suppose that an artist creates, at the same time, $t_0$, a statue and the piece of clay of which it is made and that later, at $t_1$, he flattens the piece of clay thus also the statue. As the piece of clay is a piece of clay and the statue a statue, the piece of clay survives the flattening process, but the statue does not. Constitutionalists claim that they are
different objects which stand in the constitution relation till \( t \). Sattig claims that it seems reasonable to add that the piece of clay matches the statue in its qualitative description up to \( t \), but not after \( t \). But then, according to SQD the actual world is indeterministic.

After presenting the problem of cheap indeterminism Sattig states that, in fact, he believes constitutionalists can solve it, but at the price of having to abandon a very promising way to solve the grounding problem. That is to say, constitutionalists cannot solve both problems at once. The following is his argument.

Sattig considers the possibility that the two coinciding objects do not match qualitatively before \( t \). In fact, he claims, they seem to differ in their modal properties. Even if the piece of clay can survive a flattening process, the statue cannot. Moreover, modal properties can be seen as properties that an object has at a given time and whose instantiation does not depend on facts regarding the object at other times. That is to say, modal properties can be understood as properties intrinsic to a time, as temporally intrinsic properties. This makes modal properties adequate for differentiating qualitatively the statue and the piece of clay at \( t \) without having to appeal to facts about the objects occurring after this time. In this way the problem of cheap indeterminism can be solved.

Now, why does Sattig claim that this solution is incompatible with a promising strategy to solve the grounding problem?

Sattig claims that the modal difference offered to solve the problem of cheap indeterminism stands in need of explanation. This is the grounding problem, formulated in terms of modal differences. Now, Sattig explains that to solve the modal grounding problem, philosophers have usually appealed to sortal differences: the piece of clay is a piece of clay and the statue a statue. The problem with this solution is that, again, this sortal difference is in need of explanation.

In fact, Sattig believes that constitutionalists can also offer an answer to this new version of the grounding problem but that it will be in terms of absolute properties of the objects (properties that objects have at any given time of their existence).

The problem is then, that this makes modal properties inadequate to solve the previous problem of cheap indeterminism. As we have seen, Sattig’s proposal on behalf of constitutionalists presupposes that modal properties are temporally intrinsic. However, Sattig argues that solving the sortal grounding problem in terms of absolute properties of objects implies that modal properties are not temporally
intrinsic properties. This is why Sattig claims that constitutionalists cannot solve both problems simultaneously.

In the second part of the paper I present a new proposal to solve the grounding problem and defend that this allows constitutionalists to solve the problem of cheap indeterminism without having to abandon this new solution to the grounding problem. Prior to this however I argue, against what Sattig claims, that in certain cases temporally intrinsic properties can be determined by absolute properties of objects.

Broadly speaking, this new solution to the grounding problem claims that the processes of coming into existence of two objects which stand in the constitution relation, O₁ and O₂, are always different in their sortal-determining constituents. Therefore, the two objects come into existence as a result of such processes already having different sortal properties. Then, this is my solution to the grounding problem: the fact that O₁ and O₂ have different sortal properties is grounded in the fact that O₁ and O₂ have relevantly different processes of coming into existence.

This answer entails that O₁ and O₂ have their sortal properties determined from the very beginning of their existence, independently of their future properties. I will argue that this allows constitutionalists to legitimately appeal to O₁’s and O₂’s different sortal properties for solving the problem of cheap indeterminism without having to abandon the proposed solution to the grounding problem.

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Symbiotic Persistence, Special Laws and Mechanistic Explanations

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Mechanistic talk has become very popular in recent philosophy of science, and it’s claimed to have provided a new framework for addressing traditional questions. One of these questions concerns the nature of scientific explanation. Defenders of the mechanistic view of explanation argue that to explain a phenomenon consists in providing the mechanisms that are responsible for the phenomenon to come about (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007). In general, mechanisms are taken to be “entities and activities organized in such a way that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up conditions to finish or termination conditions” (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000: 3) or, expressed in clearer terms, “a set of entities and activities organized such that they exhibit the phenomenon to be explained” (Craver 2007: 5). The general idea is that mechanisms can explain a phenomenon by virtue of showing how the organization of the entities and their activities those entities are engaged in can causally brought about the phenomenon that has to be explained. The necessity of mechanisms in scientific explanation has been criticized by many, the main arguments coming from the field of evo-devo, where explanation does not seem mechanistic at all (McManus 2012; Austin 2016). In this talk, we will address and criticize the importance of mechanisms in scientific explanation from the perspective of symbiosis. We will argue, particularly, that the explanations given for the phenomenon of the persistence of certain biological associations –i.e. the fact that certain associations are maintained through time both ontogenetically and phylogenetically and the presence of cheaters is prevented– are non-mechanistic at all. Indeed, we will contend, these explanations appeal to a sort of scientific law that we have called the “symbiotic law”, and consists in arguing that these associations constitute cases of symbiosis, plus the principle of natural selection. Finally, we will suggest that this example favours the recent account of scientific explanation
developed by Díez, according to which “to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable on the basis of non-accidental regularities” (Díez 2014: 1414).

The point of departure from the problem of association persistence comes from the realization that, despite the existence of a few cost-free biological associations – for example, the association of *Symbiodinium* with corals and sea anemones (Tanaka et al 2006), or that of *Tetraselmis* in certain flatworms (Douglas 1983) –, biological associations usually has a cost for the partners involved in them. In fact, as it has been frequently argued, the fact that associating biologically normally has a cost makes biological associations ecologically unstable by Lotka-Volterra equations, which makes the problem specifically more acute: if biological associations are ecologically unstable, why is it that biological associations are a pervasive biological phenomenon? (Douglas 2010, Zilber-Rosenberg & Rosenberg 2013) The point of departure for explaining the persistence of biological associations consists in, first, assuming that there has been a selective overlap between the organisms involved, and arguing that for that reason they will tend to reduce their actual and potential conflicts. The necessity of reducing the possible conflicts among partners is a consequence of the possibility of the existence of *cheaters*, organisms that benefit from the relationship without conferring benefit to their partner.

In order to reduce such conflicts different routes have been explored by different organisms (Douglas 2010: 56-124): for example, increasing the overlap selective interests of the partners by controlling the mode of transmission (in cases where transmission evolves from horizontal acquisition to vertical transmission); by the host imposing a politics of sanction and rewards on its symbionts, for example by controlling the supply of nutrients and reducing it in cases where the symbionts do not behave properly; by the host developing certain physical barriers to the symbionts, such that the maximal degree of growth and parts of the host they can “invade” is made minimal; by genetic assimilation, in cases where the host acquired genes or parts of genes from the symbionts and thus can control its replicability; finally, in cases of horizontal acquisition, it is also possible to develop particular mechanisms that guarantee that the symbionts which are acquired every new generation are always the same beneficial symbionts, and possible cheaters are prevented to “enter” into the symbiotic association.

The existence of such a multiple array of manners in which partners involved in biological associations can deal with the possible existence of cheaters and thus
these associations can become permanent suggests that there is no possible unified response to the question: “why certain biological associations are permanent?”. However, biologist usually appeal to the very concept of symbiosis plus the principle of natural selection, by arguing that there is a higher level entity, often called the holobiont, which is responsible of the convergence of the different selective pressures acting on the organisms involved in the association. In that sense, symbiosis is taken to be explanatory of the existence of a permanent biological association in any given context, i.e. irrespective of particular modes by which potential conflicts are resolved. We will claim that this is a consequence of a special law that we have called symbiotic law, according to which

Symbiosis occurs when organisms of different species evolve into a new level entity, the holobiont, where all their selective pressures converge.

This said, then realizing of the existence of a symbiotic association and of a holobiont would be explanatory of the fact that these associations are phylogenetically persistent and ontogenetically constant (Suárez, forthcoming). But symbiosis is not a mechanism at all, but only the realization of the nature of certain, very specific, biological associations. Symbiosis, we claim, it is not a mechanism because: (1) it is not clear at all which are the entities and activities involved and that bring about the phenomenon of persistence; (2) they are multiple realizable, as we have argued, and their realization would depend on the entities involved in the association under investigation; and (3) even the general models presented for conflict resolution are not mechanistic either, since in every single case of biological association a new story had to be told about the particular reasons why the persistence is reached in the manner how it is reached. We believe that the mechanisms would be the particular ways in which persistence is realized in every particular biological association.

Finally, we will argue that the necessity of appealing to the symbiotic law plus the principle of natural selection and the impossibility of explaining the general phenomenon of persistence by appealing to mechanisms which, as said, would only be explanatory of particular cases, suggest that the presence of non-accidental regularities is an essential component of scientific explanation, and particularly favours Díez’s model of scientific explanation.
Reason-Giving and the Trouble with Self-Deception

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This paper addresses the role of mental agency in self-deception. In particular, it is concerned to show that a view about mental agency can explain the intuition that some cases of self-deception, and perhaps self-deception quite generally, involves the violation of a non-epistemic norm. The paper should be of interest to those who work on self-deception, self-knowledge, and mental agency. Although there has been a great deal of interest in the ideas of mental and epistemic agency in recent years, that literature has not yet taken on the issue of self-deception in detail.

There is a strong intuition that it is a bad thing to be self-deceived. We use “self-deceived” as a term of criticism and abuse. Interestingly, the term is used to convey more than epistemic criticism. We all know that, somehow or other, the self-deceived believe what they do because they want to and that they are not to be trusted. But at least sometimes when we criticize someone as self-deceived we seem to have something more in mind than that they are epistemically irresponsible or give unreliable testimony. Yet it is hard to say exactly what this something more is. Why is it bad to be self-deceived? More specifically, what non-epistemic norm does the self-deceiver violate?  

My goal in this paper is to argue that there are cases of being self-deceived about one’s reasons for action and belief that manifest a non-epistemic failure. Being self-deceived about one’s reasons is importantly different than being self-deceived about other features of the world because some beliefs about reasons are importantly unlike beliefs about other features of the world. Following Adam Leite, Richard Moran, and others, I’ll argue that some of our beliefs and assertions about our reasons are issued from the agential perspective. A subject takes up this

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1 By an epistemic norm I mean any standard for evaluating beliefs insofar as they contribute to knowledge. I take this to include norms governing testimony. To say that self-deception violates a non-epistemic norm is just to say that it fails by the lights of some standard that does not have to do with the acquisition or transmission of knowledge.
perspective on her reasons when she is asked by others (or herself) to justify her action. Believing or saying “I intend to do A because p” or “I believe p because q” from this perspective is constitutive of intending or believing for that reason. Put another way, the activity of justifying one’s actions and beliefs involves deliberation about the reasons in their favor and determining what one’s reasons are. It is a feature of our practice of giving reasons and justifications that we expect subjects to occupy the perspective of the agent, to give direct expression to their reasoning. However, not all of our claims about reasons are like this. It is possible for one take a third-personal or, in Leite’s terms, “spectatorial” perspective on one’s reasons. In speaking from this perspective one is simply trying to accurately represent a feature of the world, in this case the events leading to the onset of an action or belief. When we speak about our reasons we can do so from either the agential or spectatorial perspectives.

My proposal is that, in an important class of cases, self-deception about reasons involves a confusion about from which perspective one is speaking. A subject who is self-deceived about her reasons or motives is called upon to speak from the agential perspective and presents herself as doing so. However, instead, she falls into the spectatorial perspective, forming a belief about her reasons caused by her desires. The subject self-deceived about her reasons fails to meet the demands placed on her by the practice of giving reasons. Regardless of the harm or benefit of self-deception generally, these cases are troublesome since they violate a constitutive norm of the practice of reason-giving.

Thus, I argue that if we accept a particular picture of mental agency, then we can explain the intuition that self-deception is troublesome for more than epistemic reasons. This also serves, then, as indirect support for that picture of mental agency. This view has other benefits as well. It allows us to explain how self-deception harms others in a distinctive way. The focus on giving reasons is useful here because it allows us to make sense of the harms of self-deception in terms of the effects on others engaged in joint deliberation. Furthermore, the account offered here may be able to explain why self-deception quite generally is objectionable. That is because we should expect that a subject who is the victim of garden variety self-deception (i.e. not about her reasons) will be disposed to be self-deceived about her reasons as well.
A Plea for Abstracta as the References of Theoretical Terms

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We may distinguish at least between three main proposals in the philosophy of science that have dealt with the issue of what kind of objects are taken to be the references of theoretical terms and which theoretical terms do have reference. According to the first kind of proposal, the reference of theoretical terms is given through spatio-temporally existing entities and either only the theoretical terms of correct theories have reference, leading to some difficulties of interpretation in the case of sentences involving terms of incorrect theories (see, for example, Psillos 1999), or it is appealed to problematic ideas such as those of “indeterminacy of reference” (Field 1973) or “heterogeneous reference potential” (Kitcher 1993) with the aim of providing an analysis of the reference of theoretical terms of incorrect theories. A second proposal, which is often called fictionalism and may in its turn comprise different versions (see Vaihinger 1911, Duhem 1916, Fine 1993, Suárez ed. 2009), holds theoretical terms to be nonreferential as the alleged entities they are supposed to refer to are just useful fictions and, usually but not always, considers the sentences that include them to be literally false (another possibility would be to say that they lack truth-value). The fictionalist analysis, which has been mainly developed as an approach to scientific models (see Frigg 2010, Toon 2012), is typically complemented with a view that allows for either a metaphorical or a make-believe reading of those sentences, but must face several difficulties related to the interpretation of metafictional and transfictional sentences.

The third kind of proposal, the one we aim to defend here, takes abstracta to be the immediate references of theoretical terms. This has several advantages, among them that of allowing for a homogeneous ontological treatment to account for the

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entities that are thought to be the references of the theoretical terms of incorrect theories (such as ‘phlogiston’ or even ‘Newtonian mass’) as well as for the entities that are the references of the theoretical terms of theories that, from our current perspective, are thought to be (approximately) correct. Another important advantage becomes evident when we consider different kinds of sentences involving theoretical terms (even those that, intuitively, seem to be empty in the sense of not corresponding to anything in the real concrete world –according to the proposal that is going to be defended in the present contribution, they would not be empty, i.e. denotationless, but would always refer to a certain abstract object). Think of sentences like (1) “Priestley thought to have isolated phlogiston”, (2) “The Michelson-Morley experiment served to refute the existence of aether”, (3) “Newtonian mass is invariant in all inertial frames”, (4) “Molecules in a gas crash with perfectly elastic collisions”, or (5) “Planets are spherical celestial bodies in hydrostatic equilibrium”. To assess the truth value and the semantic content of all these sentences turns out to be an easy job if we consider that the theoretical terms that figure in them refer to abstract objects instead of being (some of them) empty or of referring to real concrete objects (in the other cases). Certainly, a realist that embraces the first position could treat sentences like (1) –which is a propositional attitude attribution– as involving quantification with narrow scope and sentences like (4) and (5) as approximately true. But, then, how to treat the intuitive truth of (3), given that the Newtonian theory is false? The view that we defend immediately offers a single and simple answer that serves to treat uniformly all these apparently different cases.

Furthermore, the view we aim at defending would account for an important fact related to scientific theories, namely, that they are the product of many idealizations, fictions and highly idealized assumptions. As Cartwright (1983, 4) once put it, “fundamental laws are true only of objects in the model”. But what does this mean? It cannot mean that the target objects, which are allegedly instantiated in the concrete real world, satisfy the ideal conditions by means of which a theory represents them. Precisely of these objects we cannot predicate with truth all those ideal and theoretical descriptions. Usually none of the properties a theory takes to be relevant are directly, and without idealizations, attributable to them. If there are attributable to anything, then can only be attributable to certain abstract objects that belong to the domain of the models and, hence, are part of the complex abstract
entity, which constitutes the kind of structure (model) in terms of which the theory can be defined (according to Suppes’s approach and the German structuralist School). Does this mean that theories only speak of abstract objects and cannot speak of the real concrete world? This is by no means acceptable. Theories are intended to apply, at the end, to the real concrete world, and objects in the model are in some way related to real concrete objects out of the domain of our theories. The relation between the objects in the model and the real concrete objects that, in the best cases, the theory succeeds in correctly describing (i.e. succeeds in predicting and in accounting for the properties we observe or confirm they have) must be one of similarity in different degrees. This is to be understood in the sense that the kind of concrete object that is a final target object of the theory may have more or less properties from those attributed to them by the theory and with a higher or lower degree of idealization. In any case, there would be a clear ontological difference between the objects in the model, which qua abstract objects cannot be instantiated spatio-temporally, and the real concrete objects that they allegedly represent. An object in the model would always remain an object in a model and as such an abstract object, not being possible for it to be concrete (in this sense, we accept Zalta’s (1983) exclusionary modal distinction between abstract/concrete). Consequently, we will try to defend the abstract objects view as the most adequate account for capturing the difference between what theoretical terms directly refer to and the kind of entity in the concrete world that are supposed to stand for.

According to this, the objects directly referred to by our theoretical terms are fictional objects (thus making sense of the idea that models and theories are fictions), but this does not mean at all that they cannot stand for concrete entities in the world. That theoretical terms refer to fictional objects (here intended to be a kind of abstract object) is always the case no matter if the theory has been rejected or is currently accepted. From this point of view, a theory is a kind of fictional story given by a certain intensional content and having the intended function of accounting for its final target systems through certain ideal systems. Theories intend to account for their targets through ideal situations and their fictional objects, so that what the theory asserts is how objects in the concrete world that we experience should behave if the world were exactly as the theory says of the fictional objects that directly speaks of. As usually scientists know that actual objects cannot behave in that way, the explanation is frequently only counterfactual.
From this point of view, then, theoretical entities are abstract objects (though we can consider them more as abstract artifacts in the sense of Thomasson (1999) than as Platonic entities), but not fictions in these sense of nonexisting entities. To say that they are fictional or nonexistent because they are the product of fictions is a non sequitur. This shows that fictionalist positions like those defended for models (see, for ex., Frigg 2010) are not the most reasonable to be held. To commit to the existence of theoretical entities as the direct reference of theoretical terms, although as abstract objects, has the advantage of allowing us to provide a uniform treatment of the sentences mentioned above as well as of the fact that they are the product of idealizations.

References

My aim in this talk is to answer an objection against Plantinga’s proper functionalism theory of warrant. This objection tries to show that proper function is not a necessary condition for warrant. I hold that this objection is unsuccessful, not giving us good reasons to give up the proper function condition.

By “warrant” Plantinga means the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In other words, it is that quality or quantity which, in due measure and together with truth and belief, is sufficient for knowledge. But, what is that which fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge? What is the nature of warrant? According to Plantinga (1993, 2012), an adequate analysis of warrant must involve the notion of “proper function”. As such, Plantinga thinks that the best theory of warrant is “proper functionalism” which can be defined as follows:

Proper functionalism (PF) =df a belief p has warrant for a person S iff

(1) p is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction). [The “proper function” condition]

(2) p is formed in an appropriate epistemic environment (one sufficiently similar to that for which S’s cognitive faculties were designed). [The “environmental” condition]

(3) S’s cognitive faculties, which produce p, are operating according to a design plan reliably aimed at truth (rather than some other cognitive goal). [The “reliability” condition]

(4) S has no defeaters for p. [The “no-defeater” condition]

(5) The more firmly S believes p the more warrant p has for S. [The “degree of belief” condition]

For our purposes, we need to focus only in condition (1): the proper function condition. But, more rigorously, what does it mean to say that a cognitive faculty
is functioning properly? Plantinga holds that a cognitive equipment functioning “properly” is not the same thing as it functioning “normally” (in a statistical sense), or functioning “perfectly” or even “ideally”. Instead, a cognitive equipment is functioning properly (i) when it works in accord with its design plan (in other words, when it works just the way it was designed to work) and (ii) when it works in such a way as to fulfill its purpose or function (i.e. when it does what it was designed to do). By “design plan” Plantinga means a set of specifications according to which a thing (artifact, organism, or faculty) is supposed to work. And this design plan can be the result of conscious design (like God) or simply of unconscious design (like natural evolution).

However, Sosa argues that (i) is not a necessary condition for warrant. To show that, Sosa (1996) uses Davidson’s Swampman as a counterexample, as well as a variation on that example, the Swampbaby, in which a subject seemingly has warrant but has no design plan (because he arises by mere chance, without any conscious or unconscious design) and, for that reason, also lacks proper function. The original counterexample is the following:

Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my physical replica. My replica, The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature it departs the swamp, encounters and seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in English. It moves into my houses and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the difference. But there is a difference (Davidson 1987: 443-444).

According to (PF), it is impossible for there to be someone with warranted beliefs who has not a design plan. Nevertheless, Sosa argues that it seems logically and metaphysically possible that there may be a Swampman who knows an abundance of things, having thus warranted beliefs but no design plan. And since the Swampman has no design plan (because he was generated by mere accident), we can assert that he is not functioning properly and yet he has warranted beliefs. Therefore, condition (i) is not necessary for warrant.

There are some ways to cope with this objection: (i) showing that the Swampman is not clearly metaphysically possible; (ii) denying that Swampman’s beliefs have
warrant; or (iii) arguing that the Swampman has indeed a *design plan*. Strategy (i) was deployed by Plantinga (2012) and Graham (2012), but it seems problematic: even if the Swampman is not clearly possible, Sosa may still hold that the Swampman scenario is not clearly impossible and, as such, condition (i) of (PF) is not clearly necessary for warrant. Strategy (ii) was used by Bergmann (2006) and McNabb (2015), but it also seems problematic to me: if the Swampman S1 is an indiscernible replica of a person S2, and if S2 has warranted beliefs in circumstances C, then it seems plausible to claim that S1 has also warranted beliefs in C. At least their cognitive systems or faculties are the same.

I think that the best way to meet Sosa’s objection is to follow strategy (iii), trying to show that the Swampman in fact has a *design plan*. But how can he acquire a *design plan*, given that he comes into existence by accident? My proposal, and what I wish to elaborate on, is the following: maybe he does not have a new *design plan*, but it may well be that he acquires by chance a *design plan* which is exactly like the *design plan* of an original person. After all, if the Swampman S1 is an indiscernible replica of an original person S2, and if S2 has a specific *design plan* D at time t, then it seems plausible to state that S1 also has D at t. Thus, if this reasoning is correct, and on the assumption that S1 is an indiscernible replica of S2, we may conclude that the Swampman has a *design plan* and, for that reason, his cognitive faculties can satisfy the conditions for proper functionality.

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Narrativity and Propositional Attitudes: Beyond an Expressivist View of Folk Psychology

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For several decades, folk psychological capacities have been understood as an intellectualized capacity involving mechanisms of theorization or simulation bringing out meta-representations of others’ inner states (Nichol and Stich, 2003; Goldman, 2006). Some dissonant voices have attacked this centrality that the orthodoxy has assigned to mentalizing in social cognition (Gallagher, 2001; Hutto and Ratcliffe, 2007; Leudar and Costall 2009). In spite of the success of those approximations, mentalizing is an important part of human socio-cognitive capacities which demands an explanation. Thus, those views require accounting for mentalizing in order to be a complete alternative to the orthodoxy.

In this line, the Folk Psychological Narratives Hypothesis (FPNH) aims to explain our ability to understand others’ behavior in terms of mental concepts without the questionable assumption that “We ascribe causally efficacious inner mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control” (Hutto 2004; see also Hutto, 2007; 2008). FPNH is based on two ideas. Firstly, predicting behaviors do not require postulating mental entities causing behavior, rather than generating expectations about what others ought to do in familiar social situations. Narratives “shape our expectations by making us familiar with a vast stock and wide range of ‘ordinary’ situations and the sorts of actions normally related to them” (Hutto, 2004: 559). Secondly, when a target violates normative expectations, the interpreter or the target himself can justify the counter-normative behavior by appealing to non-obvious relevant events of the background situations that help to elucidate the anomalous behavior. Elucidating and normalizing behaviors imply attending to non-obvious events and circumstances that make the behavior standard. According to FPNH, propositional attitude ascriptions emerge in those contexts of justifying contra-normative behaviors.

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NFPH provides a straightforward account of explanations regarding reasons involving enabling factors surrounding circumstances or values without appealing to mental entities. For instance, we can say that the reason why gaining weight is explanatory of refusing a dessert is because creatures immersed in a background of normatively mediated social practices usually react to the fact of gaining weight by acting in particular normalized ways (refusing eating caloric food, practicing some sport and so on). According to Hutto, propositional attitude ascriptions are framed into reason explanations of this type. However, propositional attitudes ascriptions still raise a problem for FNPH. On the one hand, Hutto’s commitments with narratives as an explanatory tool have tended to be interpreted as a sort of fictionalism (Andrews, 2007), which have several undesirable consequences for his view. On the other hand, refusing fictionalism seems to force him to embrace certain kind of realism: “folk- psychological narratives that actually explain—those that are true—are precisely unlike fictions; they seek to get at facts that are a matter of historical record and, if successful, they get a handle on a person’s actual attitudes” (Hutto, 2013: 600); which it would imply abandoning FNPH as a real alternative to the orthodoxy.

The aim of this paper is to provide a way out for FNPH by considering an expressivist alternative. By maintaining the core expressivist maneuver (Carter and Chrisman, 2011; Gibbard, 2003), I defend that propositional attitude ascriptions are not descriptive in nature, that is, they do not refer to fictional or real inner states of the subject. Thus, propositional attitude ascriptions do not carry the ontological load that fictionalism and the orthodox view have supposed. On the contrary, I argue that mental predicates function as expressive devices that indicate to the speaker how to evaluate a particular content. Paradigmatically, in explanatory contexts, belief and desire ascriptions indicate to the hearer that certain relevant facts or values normalize a particular pattern of behavior, which however the speaker does not subscribe.

To favor expressivism, I discuss three basic motivations behind fictionalism that Hutto (2013) have attempted to accommodate from FNPH: Firstly, the necessity of defending the autonomy of mental vocabulary to avoid eliminativism. Secondly, the coherence with empirical literature concerning confabulation and post-hoc interpretations that indicate mental ascriptions are not necessary ‘real’ explanations. Thirdly, the under-determinacy of propositional attitude ascriptions which imposes
an interpretation gap that makes propositional attitude impossible to settle in certain situations (Dennett, 1978). After arguing against Hutto’s interpretation, I maintain that expressivism can account for those intuition without abandoning the FNPH framework; but also, without subscribing ontological commitments of any type. As a result, the expressivist approximation provides a way to solve the tensions between considering the folk psychological narrative hypothesis as a type of fictionalism or a re-interpretation of the orthodoxy.

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In a reference theory a distinction is usually made between a theory of reference fixing and a theory of reference borrowing or transmission. According to a purely causal theory of reference borrowing, like Kripke’s, the reference of a term – proper name and natural kind term – as used by borrowers is exclusively determined by its membership into a causal chain regardless of the descriptions or properties they could associate with the term, since these do not play any role in the reference determination of the term as used by borrowers. Although Devitt and Sterelny in (1999) plead for a descriptive-causal theory of reference fixing for proper names and natural kind terms they advocate for a purely causal theory of their reference borrowing.

The question arises as to whether a borrower’s linguistic competence with a word is compatible with large ignorance or error about its referent, and in case he is required to know “very little” about the referent, what is the descriptive element that the competent borrower has to associate with the term. My proposal will be that the descriptive element required will be at least a categorial term that indicates the sort or type of entity referred to. Thus, I could claim that a causal theorist should maintain a descriptive-causal theory of reference borrowing, which involves a causal chain in addition to some associated descriptive element, at least some categorial term. In the following I will deal indistinctly with the reference of proper names and natural kind terms.

It is noteworthy that K. Donnellan, one of the main advocates of the historical-causal theory, does not question the necessity to incorporate descriptive elements in a borrowing reference theory for proper names, whose claims should extend likewise to that sort of theory concerning natural kind terms. Donnellan concedes that it is a necessary condition – although not a sufficient one – for an entity to be the referent of a term as used by the borrowers, that such entity satisfy some description that they associate with the term. However, he considers that it is too strong a
requisite to demand that this description should be an identifying description, i.e., a description sufficiently specific to uniquely identify one individual.

Another advocate of the causal theory, in this case of a social-causal theory, namely, Putnam, holds more definitely the requirement that the borrower must associate some descriptive elements with the borrowed term. Taking into consideration Putnam’s claims for the competence concerning natural kind terms, all competent speakers will have to associate with the term, implicitly or explicitly, the syntactic markers, the semantic markers and the stereotype of the term. The most relevant of these factors to this paper are the last two, although Putnam concedes concerning some natural kind terms that the stereotype may coincide with the semantic markers. In the cases in which the stereotype is different from the semantic markers, the main feature to distinguish the second from the first is that the semantic markers are “category-indicators of high centrality” and hardly revisable, although semantic markers as well as the properties included in the stereotype are not analytically associated with the natural kind term in question. However, according to Putnam these properties must be associated with the term for the speaker to be competent concerning that term. And this claim also applies to the reference borrowers, as far as they are a sort of competent speakers.

Devitt and Sterelny in (1999) have questioned the necessity of including descriptive elements in the reference borrowing. However, in later works, Devitt, somewhat reluctantly, concedes that the reference borrowing may include some small descriptive elements although he avoids entering into such question. Nevertheless, Devitt hesitantly gives as an example of the descriptive element required for the reference borrowing of a word or of its corresponding concept that of the type of entity to which the referred entity belongs: “Perhaps there is some small epistemic burden on the person’s conceptual competence so that the concept has some non-linguistic determiners; for example, perhaps the concept ‹ Aristotle › has to be associated with the concept ‹ human ›.” (2006: 40).

According to the assertions by Donnellan, Putnam, and more hesitantly by Devitt – despite Devitt’s and Sterelny’s asseverations in (1999) to the contrary – I claim that it is plausible that borrowers will have to associate some descriptive element which applies, or at least approximately applies, to the referent of the terms, proper names and natural kind terms, which they borrow, and that the minimum descriptive element is very general, i.e., the type of entity referred to,
which will be expressed by a categorial term. If the speaker is completely ignorant or wrong about that sort of entity, the borrower’s competent speaker status can be questioned. In this regard speakers can be divided into different sorts. On the one hand, the grounders of a term, who associate different descriptions with the term to sort out the *qua* problem concerning proper names and natural kind terms; on the other hand, the borrowers of the term, who associate with the term some general properties that are true – or approximately true – of the referent, at least the type of entity referred to. Lastly, those speakers who, although having – apparently – borrowed the reference of the term are completely ignorant or absolutely wrong concerning the properties, even the most general ones, possessed by the referent of the term. Only the first two sorts of speakers are competent. Concerning the latter it could be claimed that it is doubtful they have really borrowed the reference of the term, or it could be said regarding them that even if they were to refer by the use of a term to an entity, they would have no idea about the sort of entity they refer to and so in this sense they would have no idea of what they refer to.

Thus, my conclusion is that a causal theorist should maintain a *descriptive-causal theory of reference borrowing* that involve a causal chain in addition to some associated descriptive element, at least, some categorial term.
La desconocida alianza entre Russell y McTaggart

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Gracias a lo que confesaron sus propios protagonistas —Moore y Russell— y al trabajo de historiadores de la filosofía, con Nicholas Griffin a la cabeza, está muy bien documentado el comienzo de la reacción contra las posiciones idealistas de Bradley y McTaggart en la Inglaterra de finales del siglo XIX. Sin embargo, se ha pasado por alto la continuidad de la relación intelectual y la coincidencia de Russell con McTaggart respecto a los últimos propósitos de la filosofía; una relación que se prolongó hasta la segunda década del siglo pasado. El propósito de esta comunicación es contribuir a una corrección en la valoración de esa situación histórica y localizar de manera más precisa cuándo y cómo comenzó el camino de la filosofía analítica. Se trata pues de una corrección a lo que considero que es una imagen distorsionada de la evolución del pensamiento de Russell a finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX y espero mostrar que esta corrección ayuda a esclarecer el primer paso de la tradición analítica en filosofía.

Tal y como he dicho, parece que el abandono de Russell de las doctrinas idealistas está bien documentada y estudiada. Podemos tomar como ejemplo a Griffin 1991 y 2003, quien después de tachar de ‘idiosincrática’ la fase de Russell como hegeliano, traza todas las influencias intelectuales de éste, desde las principales figuras como Bradley a las secundarias como Ward y explica cómo las doctrinas idealistas como el pluralismo o la incoherencia del concepto de relación fueron aceptadas y después abandonadas por Russell.

Sin embargo, si los aspectos doctrinales de Russell respecto a su abandono del idealismo se han trazado con precisión, lo mismo no se puede decir con respecto a su idea sobre los últimos propósitos y valor de la filosofía —algo que está ligado de manera profunda con los aspectos metodológicos en filosofía—. Por razones de brevedad podríamos llamar a todo ello el “carácter” de la filosofía.

Inspirado por McTaggart, uno de los más prominentes ‘idealistas ingleses’, Russell concibió una filosofía que abordaba cuestiones últimas, como por ejemplo,
si el universo en su conjunto es bueno o malo y el lugar del hombre en él. Defendía además que la metafísica podría proporcionar soluciones que alentasen a la humanidad y la consolara. En palabras de McTaggart:

La importancia práctica de la filosofía consiste... en la posibilidad de que pueda contestar la cuestión suprema [si el universo es bueno o malo] de una manera positiva, que pueda proveer alguna solución que será un consuelo y ánimo. (McTaggart, 1907: 151)

En esta comunicación mostraré en detalle cómo hay evidencia convincente de que sobre estas cuestiones, no es entre 1897-98 que la influencia de McTaggart sobre Russell finalizó —tal y como los principales estudiosos sobre Russell afirman repetidamente—, sino mucho después. Defiendo que, de hecho, ocurre en 1914 con la publicación de los artículos “Mysticism and Logic” y “Scientific Method in Philosophy” por parte de Russell.

En el primero de estos textos Russell no menciona en absoluto a McTaggart aunque es precisamente donde habría más razón para hacerlo puesto que —tal y como mostraré— el artículo es casi una réplica punto por punto del artículo de McTaggart “Mysticism” publicado en 1909. Puede decirse pues que esta sorprendente supresión ha contribuido a pasar por alto la conexión y a afianzar el pensamiento dominante —expresado por Griffin— según el cual la influencia de McTaggart sobre Russell cesó definitivamente en 1898.

En el segundo de los artículos mencionados, “Scientific Method of Philosophy”, Russell avanzó, como es bien sabido, un punto de vista sobre el papel de la filosofía —que practicada de la manera correcta denomina (“filosofía científica”)—. Esta nueva configuración de lo que debe ser la filosofía es radicalmente contraria a los puntos de vista de McTaggart sobre el “carácter” de la filosofía, mientras que no hay evidencia que los puntos de vista de Russell sobre este tema hubieran cambiado anteriormente a 1914. Con posterioridad a 1914 ya no hay rastro que permanezca y no se muestra en ningún momento ni el más mínimo interés de Russell por los puntos de vista de McTaggart. Se podría especular con la posible influencia que pudo tener en ello el extremadamente serio incidente que resultó en la expulsión de Russell de Cambridge poco después y el activo y conocido papel que jugó McTaggart a favor de ella. En todo caso, es solo a partir de 1914 que puede afirmarse
que las ideas de Russell sobre el carácter de la filosofía se han alejado drásticamente de las de McTaggart y por ende del propósito y carácter de la filosofía idealista.

En este aspecto, Russell contrasta claramente con Moore. Moore continuó considerando a McTaggart como un filósofo cuyos puntos de vista específicos y argumentos debían ser tomados seriamente, aunque fuera para replicarlos y rebatirlos (cf. Baldwin, 1990). Al llevar a cabo esta tarea, y de manera general en todo su trabajo filosófico, el estilo filosófico de Moore fue el de un análisis de los problemas de forma detallada y cuidadosa; estilo que compartieron tanto Russell como McTaggart. Con todo —lo que es importante para mi propósito— la clase de filosofía que Moore estaba desarrollando contra el idealismo carecía ya, a diferencia de la de Russell, de una idea sobre el carácter general de la empresa filosófica que McTaggart y Russell compartieron hasta 1914. Es cierto que, en el frente doctrinal, fue Moore quien en época tan temprana como 1887 lideró la revuelta contra el ‘idealismo inglés’ según admitió el propio Russell pero defiendo que fueron los escritos de Russell de 1914, motivados por su ruptura en su acuerdo persistente con McTaggart respecto al ‘carácter’ de la filosofía, la que podría decirse que fue la contribución definitiva en la configuración del camino de la filosofía analítica.

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Biologists sometimes claim that downward causation (DC) is involved in certain developmental processes, although this is thought to be a controversial notion. Perhaps the best candidate for a case of DC is the well-studied process of segmentation in Drosophila, in which the cell structure (higher-level) is key in the regulation of gene expression (lower-level) in a way that brings about a specific patterning in the embryo. However, skeptics could doubt whether in this case there is a genuine DC relationship, as opposed to mere same-level causal relationships. In this contribution, we intend to explore this question in order to determine to what extent, if any, is there DC in morphogenetic processes, taking as a case study the process of axis formation in *Drosophila*.
Expressivism and self-knowledge
Second Person Relations and the Spokesperson

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This work focuses on the role that the second person has in self-knowledge. I will follow *Avowal expressivism* to explain the relation between expression and self-knowledge. My aim is to highlight an aspect of the, so-called, ‘second person relations’ that has not been sufficiently analysed. I will explore the situation in which a given individual can speak for another, i.e., can become the spokesperson of other’s mental states. I will defend that someone who becomes the spokesperson of other can enable that person to be aware of some aspects of her mental states with regard to which she is wrong. I will argue that a spokesperson’s ascriptions can constitute self-knowledge for the ascribee, much like her own avowals do.

Avowal expressivism is the view that ordinary first-personal present-tense adscriptions – avowals like “I have a headache” or “I want coffee” – express the very mental state they avow rather than a second-order self-ascriptive belief. Although originally avowal expressivism was a deflationary view on self-knowledge, contemporary philosophers working on the issue consider avowals as manifestations of knowledge (see Bar-On 2004, Finkelstein 2003). Avowals, in contrast with ordinary reports, enjoy a special security and appear to represent privileged self-knowledge we have ourselves. In this view, unlike in *introspectionist* views, the security of avowals is not the result of any special epistemic method of acquiring knowledge of one’s mental states. Rather, it is by the act of expressing an avowal as we know the mental state in which we are. That doesn’t mean that for an individual to express a mental state she needs to avow it out loud. She can also avow it silently, to herself.

The security of avowals protects them against challenges. But this doesn’t imply they are *always* protected and that it’s impossible to challenge them. Although that is

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normally the case, there are occasions in which it is legitimate to challenge avowals. These are cases of *expressive failures* in which a subject avow a false self-ascription, i.e., cases in which a subject expresses a mental state but not her mental state.

In this talk I argue that it is in these cases in which the spokesperson can correct her and enable her to be aware of some mental aspects with regard to which she is wrong. I maintain that the ascriptions of the spokesperson in these cases are, automatically, cases of (self-) knowledge for that person.

Let’s imagine the following situation: Suppose I say to a closed friend “I am feeling bored with this movie” and she corrects me “no, you are not, you are just tired and when you are tired everything seems boring to you”. I can instantly realize that I’m tired and to avow silently “I’m tired, it is true”. It is the ascription of my friend that makes me realize about my tiredness and to know that I was wrong. In the same way that I know that I’m tired when I express my tiredness I know that I’m tired when my friend ascribes this to me. Moreover, the fact that my friend ascribes this to me makes me know something about myself that I didn’t know until this moment. I know that when I’m tired everything seems boring to me. I can say that she speaks for me in this moment, that she is the spokesperson of my mental state.

For someone to act as somebody else’s spokesperson several conditions have to be met:

First, they have to know each other well. If my friend does not know me well, she will hardly be able to tell me something about my mental states with regard to which I’m wrong. We must have an intimate link that allows the ascription of my friend to make me realize any error regarding my own mental states. We must have emotional involvement, trust and sincerity between us. I can talk every day with the storekeeper, without knowing him if I we do not care about each other.

There must have been face-to-face interactions between us in quite a number of cases. My friend cannot correct me if she doesn’t know when I am wrong about myself and she cannot know this if we have had just a few face-to-face interactions. It is extremely significant they are face-to-face interactions. Knowledge can be propositionally communicated but not all knowledge is propositional. I can tell a lot of things to my friend about myself and she can get a lot of knowledge about me in this way. But she can also get a lot of knowledge from my natural expressions. Facial expressions, gestures, and bodily demeanour may show my tiredness, happiness, excitement, discomfort, even when I don’t realize it. My friend can know how I feel even when I am too distracted, or engrossed, to recognize the state in
me. These face-to-face interactions are the so-called second person relations. As a minimal definition I will follow Eilan (2014), who calls “instances of the relation in which two people stand to each other, in virtue of which use of the second person [pronoun] is possible and appropriate, ‘second person relations’” (Eilan 2014: 266).

To share second person relations in many and diverse contexts is also required. We humans are very complex. Although when we are in the same type of mental state we can behave in different ways depending on the context. Maybe we behave always in a way when we are tired or perhaps we do not. My friend cannot know how I deal with the situations that I face when I’m tired if we have not had enough second person relations in a large number of different situations. She can neither ascribe tiredness to me nor correct my avowal if she doesn’t know how I behave when I’m tired in different contexts.

Time is also a relevant factor. Some of the second person relations must be relatively recent. Unlike propositional knowledge about, for example, the capital of France, my friend cannot assert to know me if we has not had any second person relation in the last ten years. This kind of knowledge will lapse after time. Even if she remembers our past second person relations it would be difficult to understand how she still knows me in the sense required for self-knowledge. People change a lot over the years.

References


Implicit Attitudes as Unconscious Imaginings

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Implicit attitudes are mental states that sometimes to cause subjects to respond in ways that seem to suggest that they believe that $p$ despite the fact that the subjects sincerely assert that not-$p$, assent to sentences that mean that not-$p$ and ascribe the belief that not-$p$ to themselves (Bayne and Hattiangadi 2013, Borgoni 2016, Levy 2015). Given that there is a range of evidence suggesting that implicit attitudes may cause racist and sexist responses (Fazio et al. 1995, Steinpreis et. al. 1999, Dovidio and Gaertner 2000), and also exert an influence on preferences for owning certain goods, knowing more about their nature is a pressing concern.

Standard accounts of implicit attitudes hold that they are mental states that have merely associative content (Fazio 2007, Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2011). In recent work, Eric Mandelbaum shows that some implicit attitudes are states that have propositional content (Mandelbaum 2013, 2015). For example, he shows that an explanation of the fact that subjects rather own a sweater previously worn by a celebrity that they very much like and admire than an identical sweater that this person has never worn, is that they are in states whose content is that the former sweater but not the latter contains soul-stuff from the celebrity – a conglomerate of subjective experiences, traits and abilities that this person has or had, but also a material substance that causes these phenomena.

How we otherwise should classify implicit attitudes that have propositional content is not obvious. Some writers, including Mandelbaum, claim that the states are irrational beliefs (Egan 2011, Borgoni 2016, Mandelbaum 2013, 2015), others that they are aliefs (Gendler 2008a, 2008b), and yet others that they are patchy endorsements (Levy 2015). In this talk, I argue that some states, including those that explain why people rather own a sweater previously worn by a liked and admired celebrity than an identical sweater never worn by this person, might very well be unconscious imaginings.
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Varieties of Non-Descriptivism Avowals and Attributions

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The inferentialist, external expressivist approach to knowledge ascriptions begins with the question of what an agent has to do to be entitled to attribute knowledge to a subject. The aim of this contribution is to assess the different aspects of this strategy and to extend its scope to give an explanation of what is distinctive of acts of knowledge, belief, and truth ascriptions. Focusing on the meaning of knowledge, belief and truth, the approach is meta-epistemological, i.e. semantic. The aim is twofold: (i) give the meaning of these ascriptions by disclosing the several actions that attributors undertake by using them, and (ii) identify the distinctive features that define attributions of knowledge, belief and truth as different from each other. Besides, the convenience of focusing on third person attributions and not on first person avowals will be defended.

The “expressivist” label in the characterization of the approach suggests a non-descriptivist take on meaning, which would be right, and a non-cognitivist take, which would be wrong. Our approach to the meaning of knowledge attributions subscribes to the standard tripartite elucidation of knowledge as true justified belief, and is thus fully cognitivist. Knowledge, believe and truth are not restricted to descriptive acts but related to assertive acts, defined in terms of the particular responsibilities speakers acquire by them.

Expressivism, in its different versions, is an oblique semantic approach (Stevenson 1936, p. 18, Austin 1961, p. 67, Gibbard 2012, p. 179). It does not address the meaning of terms directly by offering the set of sufficient and necessary conditions of their application but indirectly by unveiling the states of mind an agent expresses by their use. “State of mind” is another of the false friends the expressivist literature is fraught with, for its implementation is compatible with internalist and also with externalist proposals. The appeal to states of mind underwrites the agent’s relevance in the individuation of meanings, something redundant in any, even slightly, pragmatist approach. Only if contrasted with an understanding of meaning as something that
terms possess on their own the insistence of the subject’s states of mind makes a difference.

An indirect approach to the meaning of knowledge and belief requires the identification of their elementary sentences, in Carnap’s sense (Carnap 1932, p. 62). Three options are open: (i) that (first person) avowals and (third person) attributions are equally appropriate as the basis of the semantic analysis of a unique concept, (ii) that avowals take priority over attributions, being the meaning of attributions derivative, and (iii) that attributions take the priority and avowals can only be understood on them. It might be a further question applicable to cases (ii) and (iii): whether the same concept with the same features can occur in avowals and attributions, or else whether knowledge and believe present specific characteristic in the two types of actions. Related to truth, analogous questions arise since the elementary truth sentence could be (i) an exhibitive truth ascription in which the content to which truth is ascribed can be recovered from the sentence (It is true that \( p \)), or else a blind truth ascription compatible with different anaphoric antecedents (what she says is true).

We will argue that, in the cases of knowledge and believe, attributions are more basic that avowals and that, in the case of truth, blind ascriptions are the preferred option.

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El problema de Gettier y la referencia fallida

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El conocimiento ha sido definido tradicionalmente como una creencia verdadera justificada hasta la publicación de un artículo de Edmund Gettier titulado *Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?* El objetivo de este trabajo era poner de manifiesto la inadecuación de la concepción tradicional del conocimiento mediante dos ejemplos. Contrariamente a la mayoría de los epistemólogos, considero que nuestra intuición inicial al rechazar los casos de Gettier como ejemplos de conocimiento es errónea; que en la mayoría de sus ejemplos hay conocimiento; aunque no se trata, eso sí, de ejemplos muy paradigmáticos de conocimiento. Creo que podemos salvar la definición clásica de conocimiento apelando a la distinción establecida en la filosofía del lenguaje entre referente semántico y referente del hablante.
Is Williams’ Relativism of Distance a Truly Relativistic Position?

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A well-informed approach to judging the qualities and effects of relativism requires that we advance a robust notion of what relativism might actually be. More than 30 years ago, the philosopher Bernard Williams attempted to provide such a contribution to our understanding of moral relativism. By advancing a few empirical hypotheses together with some normative intuitions, the British philosopher offered a specific view that he called “relativism of distance” (Williams 1985). In recent years, Williams’ intuitions on the nature of moral relativism have been partly rediscovered by experimental philosophers and psychologists in their interpretation of findings in the study of folk moral judgment. A crucial question to ask about relativism of distance, one not straightforwardly related to its empirical potential, is if Williams’ view is relativistic in the sense assumed by mainstream debates on relativism. The present talk intends to fill this gap by highlighting some features of Williams’ relativism that could enrich mainstream debates on relativism. Our talk is divided in two parts. In the first half we’ll introduce Williams’ relativism of distance. According to Williams, if relativism is true, if we are disposed to limit the scope of our moral opinions, it can be so only when we are located in notional confrontations. In the second half we’ll explore if Williams’ relativism of distance can be understood as a peculiar version of agent-relativism (Lyons 1975. Kolbel 2004. Prinz 2008. Bebee 2010).
Un sentido de re es aquel cuya existencia e individuación dependen de la existencia e individuación de su objeto (McDowell, 1984). John McDowell ha defendido que la activación de sentidos de re en la percepción es necesaria si queremos dar cabida a la idea de que el mundo constricta racionalmente nuestro pensamiento. Con esta estrategia, se evita reincidir en el Mito de lo Dado. Según el Mito de lo Dado, algo no-conceptual podría operar como una razón. El problema de dicho mito es que torna algo oscuro la explicación de cómo el contenido perceptivo puede ser una razón para sostener una creencia. De ahí que McDowell haya afirmado: “el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentran el uno con el otro en el ámbito del sentido” (McDowell, 1996: 276-277).

Pero la introducción de la noción de sentido de re podría ser objetable desde una posición holista, como han señalado Hillan Bensusan y Manuel de Pinedo (2006). El holismo asume un rechazo del dualismo creencia/significado. Asumir dicho dualismo es afirmar que podemos adquirir creencias y significados de manera independiente. La posición de McDowell nos lleva a hacer depender la competencia en el uso de - al menos- algunos conceptos de la capacidad de identificar instancias de re de los mismos. Bensusan y Pinedo (2006: 24) han señalado que este paso nos devuelve a la concepción atomista de la experiencia, recuperando así los dogmas atacados por Willard v. O. Quine, y, con ello, el dualismo creencia/significado (Cf. Quine, 1953). Ciertamente, el propio McDowell ha manifestado su disposición a rehabilitar los dos primeros dogmas del empirismo (McDowell, 1996: 244). Mi tesis, no obstante, consiste en afirmar que la rehabilitación de estos dogmas no nos compromete con el dualismo creencia/significado. Como consecuencia, espero hacer inteligible cómo se podría apelar a la noción de sentido de re sin renunciar a la crítica holista del dualismo creencia/significado.

En su réplica a Quine (1953), Paul H. Grieece y Peter Strawson (1956) aducieron que, en la medida en que podemos distinguir “significar lo mismo” de “no-significar
lo mismo”, podemos también hablar de “sinonimia cognitiva”. Así, no debería haber problema en asumir una distinción analítico/sintético. Ahora bien, aceptar que hay proposiciones -las llamadas “analíticas”- cuyas condiciones de verdad son inmunes a la experiencia no supone admitir su inmunidad absoluta. Sus condiciones de verdad pueden ser revisables en virtud del cambio conceptual. Desterrada la idea de que existan proposiciones con condiciones de verdad irrevisables, no tenemos porqué admitir la posibilidad de una independencia lógica entre adquirir un adiestramiento lingüístico y poseer creencias. Grice y Strawson nos muestran, pues, una vía para recuperar la distinción analítico/sintético que no renuncia a la crítica del dualismo creencia/significado.

Ahora, una consecuencia de la imagen macdowelliana de la relación mente-mundo es que la teoría del significado debe tomar la forma de una teoría del sentido. Esto es coherente con el propósito de explicar cómo el mundo puede proveer razones para nuestras creencias sin reíncidir en el Mito de lo Dado. Puesto que un pensamiento es un modo en que se presenta lo que es el caso (Frege, 1892), una manera de mostrar el pensamiento expresado al usar una oración aseverativa será dar sus condiciones de verdad. Así, las teorías extensionales tarskianas del significado pueden ser el punto de partida de teorías del sentido para una lengua. Si bien, la teoría del sentido impondrá una nueva condición de adecuación material sobre la teoría extensional: rechazar axiomas del tipo

(i) “Hesperus” está por Phosphorus,

en tanto que los nombres que aparecen a ambos lados, siendo co-extensionales, difieren en su sentido (McDowell, 1977).

Aquí se evidencia el paso problemático al que apunta la crítica de Bensusan y Pinedo. ¿En virtud de qué conocimiento estamos autorizados a rechazar un axioma como (i)? Sin duda, el que podamos rechazar un axioma como (i) supone que podamos analizar instanciaciones de Hesperus e instanciaciones de Phosphorus tomadas aisladamente. De este modo reaparecen los dogmas que habían sido objeto de la crítica de Quine. Pero el peligro de incurrir en el dualismo creencia/significado radica en que podamos rechazar (i) apoyándonos en un conocimiento que sea independiente de nuestro aprendizaje lingüístico/conceptual. Ahora bien, conocer cómo se conectan preferencias donde ocurren, digamos, “Hesperus” con
determinadas “situaciones evidenciales” no es sino llegar a ver dichas preferencias como respuestas racionales al entorno (McDowell, 1977: 189), algo dependiente del aprendizaje lingüístico. Dicho de otra manera, se trata de aprender, en el curso de la interpretación radical, cómo la conducta lingüística responde a razones, y no solamente constricciones causales (Cf. Davidson, 1983).

En conclusión, la apelación a la noción de sentido de re nos comprometería con una rehabilitación de los dogmas del empirismo que fueron objeto de la crítica quineana, pero no necesariamente con el dualismo creencia/significado. La apelación a la noción de sentido de re podría ser fructífera en un intento de recuperar la fricción mente-mundo, reteniendo un aspecto central de los enfoques holistas.

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Una justificación no-inferencial de las inferencias básicas

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El objeto de este trabajo es analizar el problema de la justificación del conocimiento lógico básico y ofrecer una solución no-inferencial basada en la noción de justificación en sentido débil (entitlement) de Burge (Burge 1993) y en la noción de garantía racional de Wright (Wright 2004a, 2004b, 2014). El problema de la justificación del conocimiento lógico es que al justificar una regla de inferencia básica como el MPP, inevitablemente nos vemos haciendo uso del mismo principio que queremos justificar. En términos generales, justificar las reglas lógicas inferencialmente supone utilizar principios lógicos, con lo cual se genera un círculo vicioso.

Dado que queremos evitar la circularidad y la justificación empírica de la lógica no lo consigue (Boghossian 2000), optamos por una justificación a priori. Esta debe provenir o bien de una fuente independiente como la intuición o de un tipo de justificación más débil que no conlleve dar razones como la justificación “por defecto”. Ahora bien, ni las teorías de la justificación basadas en la intuición, ni la justificación por defecto resultan opciones viables. Las teorías de la justificación basadas en la intuición como el insight racional no aclaran en qué consiste dicho término o de dónde procede tal fuente de justificación. Así mismo, las teorías de la justificación “por defecto” no llegan a explicar cómo es que hay creencias que en virtud de ellas mismas y sin fundamento epistémico alguno están justificadas correctamente (Wright 2001a). Tampoco explican cuáles son las creencias que caen bajo esta caracterización y cuáles no. No son la mejor opción para defender la objetividad de la lógica.

Por otra parte, las teorías de la justificación a priori basadas en el significado como la de Boghossian, defienden las justificaciones regla-circulares a partir de una semántica del rol conceptual. Boghossian propone como solución a los problemas de las justificaciones regla circulares, una teoría inferencialista basada en el modelo constitutivo, y sortea el problema de la circularidad apelando a una justificación en...
sentido débil: el ‘razonamiento ciego’. Sin embargo, el ser constitutivo de significado basado en un razonamiento ciego no es suficientemente explicativo (Wright 2004b) dado que no aclara cómo las inferencias ciegas confieren conocimiento.

Puesto que las teorías no-inferencialistas basadas en la intuición, la experiencia y la justificación por defecto no resultan opciones viables y tampoco la solución inferencialista de Boghossian, una alternativa posible es una justificación no-inferencial del conocimiento lógico básico basada en la noción de garantía racional.

Según Wright, podemos contemplar un tipo de justificación en sentido débil no-inferencial, una garantía racional que no exige evidencia de verdad y puede evitar tanto la circularidad como la regresión al infinito de las justificaciones. Dicha garantía consiste en la habilitación a asumir las presuposiciones iniciales de un Proyecto cognitivo (PC), siempre y cuando no haya evidencia en su contra, incluso careciendo de evidencia a su favor. De tal modo que si el PC es valioso o indispensable, no contamos con información que ponga en duda la garantía de la presuposición e intentar verificar dicha presuposición nos llevaría a presuposiciones semejantes y no más seguras que esa, y así, sin un final, estamos habilitados a asumir la presuposición inicial del PC. Esta garantía consiste en un modo de aceptación de una proposición, y puede ser racional pero no equivalente a creer (en el sentido importante de creencia). Según Wright, las afirmaciones de conocimiento se basan en una aceptación previa de presuponer que mis capacidades cognitivas funcionan apropiadamente. De esas presuposiciones no hay evidencia (Wright 2004b, 161). La ventaja sobre la justificación epistémica (‘fuerte’) es que en los casos donde no hay nada que justifique, una habilitación, la confianza racional en la que basarse es suficiente. Esta garantía racional dentro de un Proyecto cognitivo es, además, una solución viable para el caso particular de la lógica. Wright plantea que las reglas básicas de inferencia como el MPP son uno de los tipos de presuposiciones iniciales de un Proyecto cognitivo. Estamos habilitados a confiar en la validez de las inferencias básicas y esto, en última instancia, nos habilita a afirmar o enunciar conocimiento de los productos de razonamiento obtenidos mediante aplicación de esa lógica básica (Wright 2004a, 208).

Por su parte, Burge (Burge 1993), sostiene que en ausencia de razones contrarias, un sujeto está racionalmente legitimado a confiar en el razonamiento deductivo, dado que una de las funciones primarias de la razón es la de presentar la verdad (Burge 1993, 475). Esta justificación en sentido débil, que es fundamentalmente a priori, no deriva de la comprensión conceptual, sino que el entendimiento es epistémicamente
básico (Burge 1993, 479). Así, la habilitación fundamental para aceptar algo que se presenta como verdadero, deriva en última instancia del entendimiento (cfr. Burge 1993, 483), ya que, la inteligibilidad es a priori un signo de racionalidad prima facie (Burge 1993, 488). Es decir, antes de cualquier posibilidad de justificación, aquello que se nos presenta como verdadero debe ser inteligible. Esa inteligibilidad es de la que parte Burge como elemento necesario y previo de toda posible justificación.

En el caso del conocimiento lógico, al lógico se le presenta un enunciado como siguiéndose necesariamente de las premisas en la lógica interna a determinado sistema lógico. Si, además, consideramos con Wright (Wright 2014) que las inferencias básicas son acciones mentales básicas que funcionan como normas constitutivas, entonces tendremos que aceptar que el significado de las expresiones lógicas está dado por las reglas básicas; para Wright, la justificación tampoco deriva pues, de la comprensión conceptual, sino que las reglas tienen que asumirse como punto de partida. Estamos habilitados a confiar racionalmente en la validez de las inferencias básicas porque son acciones mentales básicas que funcionan como normas constitutivas, (del mismo modo que confiamos en que nuestras capacidades cognitivas funcionan apropiadamente mientras no nos ofrezcan dudas, y, en ausencia de razones contrarias, confiamos en el razonamiento deductivo, puesto que una de las funciones primarias de la razón, como dice Burge, es la de presentar la verdad). La inferencia básica será una norma de acción racional, de tal modo que solo por la actividad y en conformidad con ella, un sujeto logra intencionalidad. Según este enfoque, cuando un sujeto tenga los recursos para preguntar si una inferencia particular es válida, una garantía para creer que es válida (Wright 2001a, 80) será suficiente para justificar la inferencia. No obstante, la garantía racional es sólo una habilitación al uso de la regla básica de inferencia que no exime de una posterior justificación del conocimiento de la validez de dicha regla. Se trata de una justificación no-inferencial de las reglas generales y, en los casos suficientemente simples, de la validez de las inferencias particulares. Es, por tanto, una justificación en sentido débil del conocimiento lógico básico, cuya garantía, en última instancia, no está mediada por inferencia alguna.

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Names and Name-Bearing:
Referentialism, Predicativism and Circularity Worries

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Metalinguistic descriptivism – a form of descriptivism that Kripke (1980, 68-74) criticizes as circular – is becoming popular these days through its incarnation in predicativism – the view advanced by Burge (1973), Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2008), Fara (2015) and others. Predicativists call our attention to predicative uses of names (pu henceforth), as in (2), in contrast with ordinary referential uses (ru) as in (1) below:

(1) Alfred studies in Princeton.
(2) There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.

Predicativism is the view that names uniformly have the semantic value of predicates (say, they express properties) in all uses, pu and ru alike. When they occur in referential positions as in (1), they are also predicates occurring as arguments of a covert determiner, a suppressed demonstrative (Burge 1973) or definite description (Elbourne 2005, Matushansky 2008, Fara 2015). Which property do they express? To answer this, Fara (2015, 64) appeals to the Being Called Condition, (bcc):

(bcc) When used as a predicate, ‘N’ is true of a thing just in case it is called N.

Notice that the occurrence of ‘N’ after ‘called’ in the schema is not mentioned, but used. Following Matushansky, Fara (2015, 65-9) argues persuasively that ‘called o N’ is a “small clause”, not a construction with a ditransitive verb and two objects (and so are ‘named o N’ and ‘dubbed o N’). How should we understand being called N, though? Putting aside unhelpful even if interesting syntactic nuances about use and mention, when what replaces ‘N’ in instances of the schema being called
(named, dubbed) N is a proper name, it can easily be shown that such instances are to be understood metalinguistically: it is to be a bearer of ‘N’, to have ‘N’ as a name of yours. When it comes to account for how proper names work in \( \text{RU} \), predicativism is thus one more proposal in the *metalinguistic descriptivism* family. What such accounts share is the attempt to deal with Kripke’s (1980) objections to descriptivism by substituting metalinguistic descriptions (the bearer of the name ‘Aristotle’) for “famous deeds” descriptions (‘the disciple of Plato, author of the *Metaphysics*’). I classify them depending on how they answer two questions.

First, how does one account for predicative uses? *Predicativists* take names to be uniformly predicates, *referentialists* take them to be *sui generis* referential expressions in \( \text{RU} \). Second, what are names: i.e., how does one individuate them as lexical items? *Commoners* take Aristotle the philosopher, Aristotle Onassis, and all their namesakes, to literally share the (first) name: i.e., on their view there is a common lexical item applying to all of them in \( \text{RU} \). Using Kaplan’s (1990) terminology, commoners take *generic* names to be the lexical items in all uses of proper names. *Properists* take Aristotle the philosopher, Aristotle Onassis, and all their namesakes to share homonyms: i.e. (in Kaplan’s terms) they take *specific* names to be instead the lexical items in \( \text{RU} \).

In my contribution, I will object to commoner forms of metalinguistic descriptivism. I’ll raise two concerns. The first is that, if generic names are the relevant words (items with phonology, syntax and semantics), as opposed to specific names, and they have an indexical semantics, then it should be indicated what the character is, more particularly what is the contextual feature relative to which the referent is determined in context. And I do not think how this can be done in a plausible way. Pelczar & Rainsbury (1998) appeal to a “dubbing in force”. Now, I take it that when we put a number inside parenthesis beside a sentence/ utterance/proposition, as above, we are dubbing it to use the expression as a name in a specific context. We could be discussing two different claims in two papers both named ‘(i)’, and in doing so, if we are apt communicators, it would be clear what is the salient/relevant/in force dubbing we are taking into consideration. But it is very implausible to think that the same applies when we talk about Kripke, say. Recanati (1993), like other writers, appeals instead to a salient “naming practice”. However, properly spelled out I do not know what a naming convention is, except for a convention to use a specific name to refer to a given entity, so this proposal
in fact presupposes the alternative view. Rami (2014) provides an alternative, more sophisticated indexical story, but, as I’ll try to show, it leads to confusions of semantic and speaker reference.

The second concern has to do with the proper account of ‘Madagascar’-like cases of reference-change. Here I’ll argue that this again requires (along lines suggested by Sainsbury (2005), although he recently has defended an alternative view) to associate referential uses of names with acts of naming instituting naming practices, which assign a semantic role to specific names. In order to do that, I’ll critically discuss the only attempt I am familiar with at dealing with potential circularity problems that this creates for predicativism, after clearly acknowledging the problem, in Gray (2014).

References
External Causal Relations in Trope Theory

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Starting point

It is my view that the nature of tropes, or individual properties, is better understood with the aid of Moorean internal relations. This view includes the thesis (against Moreland (1985), Mertz (1996), Molnar (2003), or Whittle (2003)) that tropes are not individuated by their bearers. Thus, tropes could be transferred from “bearer” to “bearer”; or the same bearer could have two indiscernible tropes. The positive thesis is then, that the individuality of tropes is simply theirs; and their nature is not parasitic upon other beings either. So individual properties are individual natures (a view I share with Ehring (2011) or Campbell (1997)). Internal relations could then explain that different tropes belong to the same kind of property (e.g., when we say that two reds are both red), or the relation of similarity among them (e.g., when we say that this red is more similar to that red or to this orange than that yellow), or their excluding other properties (e.g., when we say that this red is not brown). If these relations, which conform the nature of individual properties, are internal then they come for free, so we avoid familiar problems of infinite hierarchies of determinate properties (as Denby (2001) has claimed), and of infinite regress (famously posed by Bradley (1968), and Husserl).

Main proposal and some arguments

Now, my main purpose here is to argue that not all relations where tropes stand are internal. In particular, causality is not internal, but an external relation between tropes. In this respect, I will offer three main reasons for causal externalism: (i) That properties in the cause come in bundles, and many, if not all, properties in the bundle are external to each other. But if the properties in the causal bundle are external to each other, even if all of them are a necessary part of the whole that is the cause, the effect cannot be internal to any of them. I will also consider Mill’s internalist attempt to solve this difficulty, and Mumford’s proposal for a solution in terms of
causal powers. I will argue that both of them get at incredible and undesirable results (i.e., this would imply that any property, in any possible causal bundle, has included into its essence any other causal bundle of properties into which it could possibly belong, as if any property had written into his AND all other properties with which it can be joined to determine particular causal facts); (ii) The asymmetry of causation (following Russell (1899) against internal relations), and (iii) The temporal distance between cause and effect (again Russell (1913)). Mumford & Anjum (2011) have confronted this last difficulty by claiming that causes and effects are simultaneous; I will argue that simultaneity only adds to Russell’s original problem, and that the case is clearer still when one considers, as it was Russell’s own intention, not only the temporal distance between the cause and its effect, but also their spatial relations. The conclusion is then that causation, if real, must be external.

Main problem

However! if causation is external, the infinite regress (in Bradley’s version) against external relations we seemed to have avoided by proposing that tropes are individual natures and that their fundamental relations are internal, reappears with reinvigorated force for the case of casuation. I will attempt a solution by stopping the regress at the second step and resting my case, precisely, on the idea that individual properties, and relations, are not individuals with a nature, but individual natures. I will also compare my attempt with Strawson’s (1990) “solution”, and explore a different solution by Maurin (2010) for the case of the relation of copresence, and Vallicella’s (2002) and Leerhoff’s (2008) defence of the regress. I think that my solution also goes against their defences. Concerning Vallicela’s influential paper, I will argue that if he were right in his defence of Bradley’s regress, then causation should be internal by definition. But this would beg the whole question. The point, I think, is that Vallicela has chosen the wrong definitions of internal relation, for all his definitions depend on questions of difference and change of properties of the related terms: in his view, the absence of an internal relation implies change in nature, so nothing can change without standing in the appropriate internal relation. This is why I introduced this abstract by mentioning what I take to be a better understanding, the Moorean view, of internal relations: internal relations are such that, not having the appropriate internal relational property implies a change in essence. Thus, you do not get an internal relation each time there is change of,
intrinsic, property. (But you still get that internal relations come for free: they merely supervene on the nature of their terms.)

References


Robin Jeshion presents a new view of singular thought that she calls cognitivism. Underlying cognitivism is the now common idea that we organize our beliefs and thoughts and other attitudes in mental files. These mental files individuate our cognitive perspectives on the individuals they are about. According to Jeshion, one thinks a singular thought by thinking through and via a mental file one has on that object. Essentially, thinking of an object through a mental file is thinking of it with a mental name or a demonstrative. Jeshion claims that cognitivism draws on recent research and information in cognitive psychology and perception. After presenting the basic tenets of cognitivism I will argue that the evidence from cognitive psychology and perception does not support Jeshion's view.

On Jeshion’s view mental files serve three main functions. First, they constitute the agent’s individuation and mode of identification of objects, where each file contains information about what the agent takes to be a single individual. This is what Jeshion calls the identity-function of mental files. Second, mental files provide an economical and efficient means of sorting, retrieving, and adding information on a given individual. This role is furthered by mental names and mental demonstratives that function as labels on their mental files. This is the bundling-function of a mental file. It is the third function of mental files that is crucial to Jeshion’s cognitivism; the singular-function. Thinking about an individual from a mental file is constitutive of singular thinking about that individual, on Jeshion’s account.

Jeshion’s cognitivism groups singular thoughts due to them sharing a significant cognitive function; namely they are thought through a file. It is not important on this account that the object exist. One can think a Vulcan thought through a file just as one can think about one’s spouse through a file. So far Jeshion’s view seems close to that of semantic instrumentalism, according to which it is sufficient for one to have singular thought to introduce a name and subsequently think through that name. However, Jeshion distinguishes her view from instrumentalism with her significance condition:
Significance condition: a mental file is initiated on an individual only if that individual is significant to the agent with respect to her plans, projects, affective states, motivations.

Jeshion clarifies the significance condition:

What distinguishes those instances in which mental names are introduced and those in which their production is stalled? The answer concerns not the individual-to-be-named's epistemic relation, but rather that individual's significance to the subject. A mental name can be initiated only if the individual-to-be-named is in the relevant way significant to the thinker.

A necessary condition for one holding having singular thought, according to Jeshion, is that the significance condition be met. But why should that make a relevant difference to the nature of my belief? How should the difference enable me to have singular thought in one case and not the other? Jeshion provides an answer, namely that we form a file that we think through for one but not the other, but it clear that the intuitions that she relies on are not uncontroversial. Accordingly, Jeshion calls upon additional reasons to support her view.

First, Jeshion calls on Pylyshyn’s recent work on perception to justify her attribution of the singular-function to files. Pylyshyn introduces FINSTs, or fingers of instantiation, which role it is to track objects in the visual field. Jeshion writes:

Because FINSTs, by their very nature, are non-conceptual referencing mechanisms, thinking of an object through its object file is non-conceptual and such thought is, consequently, singular.

Further, Jeshion points out that thinking of an individual from a mental file just is thinking of it with a mental name or a demonstrative. “And, because thought with mental names and demonstratives is ontogenetically rooted in the coupling of them with FINSTs, thinking of an individual with a mental name or demonstrative is essentially singular.” I will argue that FINSTs do not support Jeshion’s cognitivism. First, FINSTs provide a purely causal process that does not load files with content. Second, reference, unlike FINSTs, require an intentional act, and third, FINSTs do not provide an explanation for empty cases.
Instead I argue that if we want to align ourselves closely with recent work in cognitive psychology and the work on FINSTs, then it seems that we need to take very seriously the requirement that acquaintance with an object is required for one to have singular thought. In the typical and straightforward examples of singular thoughts of existing object one is acquainted with the relevant object. However, the significance condition does not play a deciding role in which objects I have singular thoughts about. Conscious attention is, I believe, what we need to focus on rather than significance. It is of course true that if an object is significant to me, then I am more likely to pay conscious attention to it. However, I often pay conscious attention to objects that are not significant to me in the relevant sense. When I am standing on a rocky beach and no single rock on the beach is significant to me I might nevertheless, for whatever reason, fix my attention on the third rock to my left. If I do so, then I can and do have singular thoughts about that rock. I might, e.g., think to myself “this rock is smooth.” In spite of that it is clear that the rock is not significant with respect to my plans, projects, affective states, or motivations. There is a role for FINSTs here since there is a causal perceptual process involved in me initially seeing the rock. However, as Pylyshyn emphasizes, FINSTs do not load files with content. However, if one pays conscious attention to an object then that allows one to think about it with the help of mental demonstratives or names. Once I focus my attention on a particular rock then I can think “that rock” thoughts.
Several authors have claimed that indicative conditionals are sensitive to the epistemic perspective of agents. According to this sort of view, the truth or acceptability of an indicative conditional depends on the background evidence of some relevant agent or group of agents (Weatherson 2009; Gillies 2004). In this paper I argue that the context-dependence of indicative conditionals goes beyond this. Indicative conditionals are not only sensitive to the evidence of agents, but also to contextual factors that determine what is inferable from such background evidence (plus the antecedent of the conditional). In particular, my proposal is that when the inference associated with a conditional is defeasible, the truth or acceptability of that conditional is sensitive to practical stakes (in a similar way that knowledge claims are sensitive to practical stakes).
William James’s View on Attention

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It is an evident fact to anyone familiar with the literature on attention that both in the cognitive neuroscience and recent philosophy of attention, William James’s famous passage in chapter xi “Attention” of *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) according to which

Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in French is called *distraction*, and *Zerstreutheit* in German (p.403-4).

has been widely and almost exclusively quoted, either to be criticized and quickly dismissed as merely pre-scientific (even anecdotal) (see e.g., Posner, 1994; more recently Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015), or to be taken as starting point of philosophical consideration giving way to several views that do justice in different ways to the commonsensical understanding of attention it captures (see e.g., Statzicker, 2011; Smithies, 2011; Watzl, 2011; Wu, 2011). However, James’s view on attention in *The Principles of Psychology* [*TPP*] is much more than this oft-quoted passage, which, though interesting in itself, does not represent what I take to be his true stance on the issue.

In this talk I will argue that William James can be considered part of the philosophers who share the phenomenological intuition that a key contribution of attention to our conscious mental lives is to structure/organize our stream of consciousness according to contrastive relations among the parts of the stream (see e.g., Watzl, 2011). The basis of the structuring intuition is that attention would be presented to us in this manner when we apply ourselves to the task of
understanding and making sense of its contribution to our conscious mental lives from a first-person point of view. In particular, I will show that James wants to argue for the view that the activity of attention—closely related to interests—is necessary for having an organized and thus intelligible conscious experience. In this sense, doing an exercise of imaginative speculation, if we were able to remove attention from our mental lives, he suggests that our experience would be “an utter chaos [...] a gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive” (TPP, p. 402-3). Therefore, according to James, attention is “irremovable” from conscious experience, because it is phenomenologically presented to us as a constitutive element of our conscious experience to the point that we cannot even conceive a conscious experience separated from attention: in examining our own experience, there are no phenomenological indications of the existence of a conscious experience without the activity of attention (which does not mean that there is no conscious experience outside the focus of attention). The question that naturally arises from this is how and to what extent does attention structure the stream of conscious experience?

Regarding the how question, I will argue that one plausible interpretation of his arguments is that attention performs its structuring activity in connection with something in between intellect (or concepts) and imagination—which he calls preferentially “pre-perception” (p.439), but also terms in several different ways—and which is, according to him, an essential property of the intimate nature of attention. According to this possible interpretation of James’s arguments, we enjoy an organized/structured perceptual experience mainly due to the activity of attention understood as preperception or as an ideal construction of the object we are interested in giving our attention to.

Along with the above-mentioned points of this talk, I will concisely consider the question whether an attention-free conscious experience is really inconceivable? In particular, whether there are psychological phenomena/conditions in our mental lives that could be taken as counter-examples to James’s structuring argument? That is to say, cases in which it may seem to us arguably that there is a structured/organized conscious experience without the activity of attention. To this end, I will briefly discuss James’s relevant passages about distraction.

By the end of the talk, I will address (again) the famous “Jamesian” passage that “everyone knows what attention is...” in order to show how it fits with James’s view
of attention as presented here. Finally, I will briefly consider how James’s view on attention is relevant for contemporary debates in the philosophy of attention and its relation to consciousness.

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In his paper “From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action”, Joshua Stuchlik has attempted to refute what I call conjunctive volitionalism in order to defend his own disjunctive view of acts of the will. In this talk I will discuss Stuchlik’s arguments in order to show that conjunctive volitionalism still constitutes a compelling development of traditional causal theories of action (cf. Davidson 1980).

**Volitionalism**—about bodily action—is the view that all bodily actions are preceded by a trying, or act of the will. A trying is a mental action whose occurrence induces that of the bodily movement in terms of which we often characterize the action. I shall call *conjunctive volitionalism* to any view according to which (i) tryings are independent from the movements they bring about in that they can occur in the absence of overt movements—since their relationship with the latter is causal, and thus contingent—, and therefore (ii) they can be identical among successful and unsuccessful attempts at bodily movement—conjunctivism.

According to some critics (cf. Haddock 2005, Grünbaum 2008, Stuchlik 2013), this view yields a distorted picture of the phenomenology of embodied agency. In making agential character so crucially dependent on a mental action—the trying—which is claimed to be independent of the bodily movements it brings about, volitionalists seem to neglect the phenomenological intuition that agency is a phenomenon that takes place “in our bodies”. In Haddock’s (2005) terms, volitionalism treats the relationship between trying and bodily movement as analogous to the relationship between our own bodies and the external tools we operate with them.

According to Stuchlik, this phenomenological inadequacy of volitionalism can be avoided if we reject the third of the three thesis that have traditionally characterized it:

*Omnipresence*: whenever an action takes place, a previous trying has taken place.
Absence: tryings can occur in the absence of any bodily movement following them.

Causation: when tryings are successful, the relationship between trying and overt behavior is causal.

In abandoning Causation, Stuchlik claims that he can accommodate the phenomenological intuition that, when trying is successful, agency is a phenomenon that takes part in the body of the agent—because it is a part and not the independent cause of the action—, thereby avoiding the phenomenological inadequacy problem. Moreover, as opposed to some other critics of conjunctive volitionalism (see Grünbaum 2008), by claiming that when trying unsuccessful it is a merely mental phenomenon—i.e., by embracing Absence—Stuchlik is in a better position to accommodate cases of trying under paralysis. In Stuchlik’s view the category of tryings is disjunctive between successful tryings and unsuccessful tryings in the same way as percepts are, according to disjunctive theories of perception, disjunctive between good cases of actual perception and bad cases of illusions or hallucinations, without there being any explanatory significant common factor between the two of them.

In order to refute Causation, Stuchlik proceeds by responding to two arguments that have been given in support of it. The first of them, Explanatoriness (McCann 1972), appeals to the fact that when an agent acts there is a true explanation of this phenomenon which appeals to the relation between the agent’s trying and her action, and concludes therefrom that such relation must be causal. The second one, Effect (Smith 1988), says that what makes it the case that an action specification describes an action by reference to an effect is that its truth depends on a condition which holds independently of the agent’s being active—the independent condition. Thus, for instance, when we say that a soccer player scored, such specification describes the action by reference to an effect because it could have been the case that the ball didn’t pass through the goal, and yet the soccer player had been active. Tryings under paralysis seem to have this structure, and thus it can be claimed that whenever an action specification appeals to bodily movements, it characterizes the action by reference to its effect.

According to Stuchlik neither Explanatoriness nor Effect succeed in establishing Causation. In the case of the former, because the truthmaker of an explanation that appeals to a certain relation between facts need not be a causal relation among
different events—e.g., the explanation that two cells are moving apart because the cell is undergoing mitosis is true, although it tracks no causal relationship at all. With respect to Effect, Stuchlick claims that the independence condition is not sufficient for the designatum of an action description to be a causal effect—e.g., the description of Jenny’s act of carrying a backpack makes reference to a fact whose occurrence is independent of Jane’s being active (she could have been walking without carrying one), although it does describe Jane’s action by reference to its causal effects.

My main lines of response to these arguments are, firstly, that both of Stuchlick’s counterexamples appeal—necessarily—to cases of synchronous metaphysic determination—supervenience/grounding—whereas any empirically informed view of the relationship between tryings and bodily movements assumes that such events take place at different moments in time. Secondly, I will try to show that the relationship between trying and bodily movement being causal need not involve the phenomenological inadequacies that critics of conjunctive volitionalism have worried about.

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On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance

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Here I apply recent research in the links between belief, truth and pragmatism based on Williams (1970) statement ‘beliefs aim at truth’ to pluralistic ignorance phenomena, in which agents act contrary to their private beliefs because they believe the rest of agents believe the opposite. I consider an epistemic position, a pragmatic position, and a third position that tries to coordinate both in some way, and I apply them to pluralistic ignorance phenomena taking Bjerring, Hansend and Pedersen’ (2014) recent study:

“Pluralistic ignorance” refers to a situation in where the individual members of a group
(i) all privately believe some proposition P;
(ii) all believe that everyone else believes ¬P;
(iii) all act contrary to their private belief that P (i.e. act as if they believe ¬P); and where
(iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their private beliefs about P

I finally defend that a pure epistemic approach is better to understand pluralistic ignorance but at the same time I admit that a pure pragmatic approach which makes no use of the concept of “truth” may apply.

Keywords
Truth, pragmatism, belief, pluralistic ignorance.
Stephen Jay Gould’s (1989) metaphor, replaying the life’s tape, is an interesting one to scrutinize the causality problem in evolution. This metaphor suggests that the evolution would have led to different possible pathways if there had been a chance to replay life’s tape. Gould supports this idea with the examples concerning the improbability of past events through evolution. On the other hand, it could be argued that the improbability of specific causal relations has nothing to do with the discussion of determinism because unique evolution that presumes no necessary law-like patterns and regularities is shown to be coherent with chaotic systems even if the physical determinism were the case.

One of the interesting problems in biology is the role of contingence, which was also central to Gould’s understanding of causality. I argue that contingency is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, given that causal determinism is defined with the statement that same causes would always lead to same effects. It is, however, empirically difficult to prove causal determinism because the existence of unique causal pathways and lack of identical causal relationships makes the testability of determinism impossible. In this sense, we can talk about the similarity of causal pathways, but not the sameness of them, especially in complex causal interactions. Because of this empirical difficulty, it is not easy to differentiate between empirical means of probability on a deterministic ground and ontologically radical approach of nondeterminism. At this point, I argue that parallel evolution can be associated to the latter, the nondeterministic viewpoint in biology.

The unlikeliness of a unique event is something subjective because it refers to our empirical position before the event has occurred. A space-time event could be trivial and actualise without the context of macro-effects or law-like regularities. However, cause-effect relations can actualise in either regular or unique ways, and likewise, the concurrence of physical forces can emerge as a local interaction. Still, a unique
evolution that is scientifically modelled as a monistic system is actually consolidation of the many, and multiple causal interactions that are open to countless possibilities consist the unsolved aspect of the causality problem. Considering the contingency of an effect within the many, scientifically, it is possible to focus on a system as a causally connected unity. However, within the system, causal connections are not always overwhelming, which means, in terms of a specific effect in the system, some of the preceding conditions are identified as causes, whereas some of them are not, since they are neutral. It is argued that required causal background for the emergence of an effect is the existence of necessary causes and the lack of preventing causes (Hitchcock, 1996).

Let us suppose the existence of the causes of $A_1$, $A_2$, and $A_3$ for the effect of $B$. If these causes are met, and the remaining elements of the background conditions are only neutral but not disruptive, we would have a description of the cause-effect relation. However, this approach neglects the emergent character of the interactions between $A_1$, $A_2$, and $A_3$, and its possible role in the making of $B$ as an effect. Sure enough, saying that the causes $A_1$, $A_2$, and $A_3$ lead to $B$ does not exclude the possibility that it is only by way of the emergent characteristics of the relations between them, this cause-effect relation has occurred. Still, I would argue that highlighting the causes of $A_1$, $A_2$, and $A_3$ as individual causes is an abstraction. This abstraction focuses on the individual cause of, say $A_1$, with one possible role through the causal system. However, $A_1$, as an abstracted individual cause, has gained its unique characteristics due to its relation to $A_2$ and $A_3$. In other words, $A_1$ is also an effect of the causal system, since it has materialised with other background conditions. The case in point is not an $A_1$ that it is hypothetically added to the system as an element that was already $A_1$ before it was out of the system; instead, $A_1$ is an idiosyncratic factor that is only $A_1$ when it is in relation with $A_2$ and $A_3$.

Parallel evolution “is the repeated occurrence of similar phenotypic or genotypic features in independently evolving populations” (Lenormand et al., 2016, p. 2). Even under highly restricted experimental conditions with the clones of prokaryotes, an ideal parallel evolution with identical evolutionary pathways is not observed (Arendt and Reznick, 2008). However, similarities of functions and phenotypic traits are widespread in nature. This suggests that similar arrangements of interactions might lead to parallelism, and causality problem could be addressed on this basis, instead of deterministic identicalness of individual causes. Parallel
evolution in experimental evolution studies gives the chance to observe similar cause-effect relations in independent causal spaces. It can emerge as a tolerance to variability in the initial conditions. This implies that causal interactions that lead to similar evolutionary effects would dominate mainstream viability cases with minor variability.

Works Cited


Anti-Criterialism and Duncan’s Challenge

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Anti-criterialists claim, controversially, that there are no criteria of identity over time. In a recent paper, Matt Duncan seeks to discredit that claim and challenges anti-criterialists to meet his opposing arguments. This paper attempts to show that, while anti-criterialism may face significant obstacles, Duncan’s arguments against it fall flat.
Where does Sherlock Holmes live?

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If someone claims that Sherlock Holmes lives in New York, she is wrong. Sherlock Holmes, according to Conan Doyle’s work, lives in London. But wait, there is an American TV series that depicts Sherlock Homes as living in New York. Some people will claim that the series’ character is not Sherlock Holmes, even when he holds that name. We face here the problem of the identity of fictional characters across different works. I suggest a novel approach to the issue.

For the direct referentialist, there are two ways to employ a name, to wit, (i) either the speaker is carrying out a baptismal ceremony (by means of an orthodox protocol or of an internal mental act, recalling the dubbed object in her memory), or (ii) the speaker is subscribing to a causal chain of name-uses originating in a baptismal ceremony where the name has been bestowed upon the object. Now, even though direct referentialism is usually presented as a purely causal theory of reference, I assert that this it is not so. The speaker’s intention plays a fundamental role. Indeed, the above-espoused points should be understood along the following lines: (i)’ The speaker has the intention of bestowing a name upon a particular object and (ii)’ the speaker has the intention of employing a name as referring to an object that was dubbed in a baptism that initiated the causal chain of uses that has reached her.

However, if we endorse – I clearly do – an irrealist approach to fictional characters, there exists no object to baptize mentally or which has been baptized by some other individual, thereby initiating a causal use-chain. Still, I propose considering the relevant literary (or cinematographic, or what have you) sources as the canonical work(s); that is, users of fictional names intend to use the name as it has it has been used in the canonical work(s). We can call “canonical character” a character as it appears in the canonical work(s). Thus, if John is an ordinary speaker, and he claims

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1 The locus classicus of the theory is Kripke 1980.
that Sherlock Holmes lives in New York, he is wrong because he was intending to use the name as it has been used in Donan Coyle’s stories – and in these stories the information associated with “Sherlock Holmes” assumes that he lives in London. However, there is another possibility, to wit, John is not an ordinary speaker, but he engages in fictional creation. He is a script-writer of the TV series where Sherlock Holmes lives in New York. Let me elaborate upon this point.

My suggestion is that, when engaged in the recreation of an already existing fictional character, the speaker’s type of use of the name is a hybrid between (i)’ and (ii)’. The idea may be put by saying that the speaker is “piggybacking” upon an existing use, yet she does not have the intention of using it (exactly) as it has been used in the canonical work. The notion of piggybacking upon an existing use can be further specified by appealing to the notion of recollection: when an author is recreating a fictional character, she does not intend to use the fictional character’s name as it has been used in the community, but she nevertheless requires the hearer (reader, viewer) to recollect (when the character appears) how the name is used in the community – what amounts to saying: what information is associated with the character in the canonical work(s).

On the one hand, it is essential for a fictional character’s “re-creator” that the hearer (reader, viewer) recollect the canonical character when the recreated character appears – the ordinary method of signaling what character must be recalled is the use of the same name. On the other hand, it is essential too that the hearer (reader, viewer) understand that the re-creator’s intention is not to employ the name as it is employed by the community.

The view I propose may also be put in terms of mental files. A mental file is understood to be a “dossier” where the thinker stores the information about an object to be represented. Within this framework, thinking about an object is tantamount to “activating” your file for the object. Bach offers an appealing picture of scenarios of the Clark Kent-Superman kind. Bach claims that he adopted the idea from Forbes, who

suggests... that when one comes to believe an identity, two files . . . come to be merged, but he [Forbes] also points out that after the merging one can, at least for a while,

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1 The mental file framework is thoroughly developed in Recanati 2012.
distinguish what one believed about the individual in question under each of the two modes of presentation. That is the merging does not immediately obliterate the two original files. (Bach 1994, 305).

Recanati (2012, 196) speaks here of “partial merging”.

Now, the situation with the recreated Sherlock Holmes may be viewed as analogue to a situation where one discovers that the objects referred by two files are in fact the same one. Thus, the situation may be described along these lines: you have a mental file for Sherlock Holmes; when viewing the recreated Sherlock you “activate” your file. However, in viewing that you must introduce information that contradicts the one of your file, you open a new file. Yet this new file is treated by the thinker as an “evolution” of the previous one, i.e. as two stages of one single file. Both files are neither fused nor kept as independent.

The question to be posed now is how much contradictory information can be embedded in a file in order for the thinker to be able to treat both files as two stages of the same file. I claim that, assuming an irrealist approach to fictional characters, it not possible to specify neither sufficient nor necessary conditions.

References
On the Fine-Graininess of the Ways Things are Presented in Experience

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Most philosophers of perception nowadays would say that in visual experience objects are presented to us as being certain ways, where what they mean by this is that objects are presented as having certain colours, shapes, sizes, locations, etc., or as having certain apparent colours, shapes, sizes, locations, etc. The standard view, among these philosophers, is that, generally, objects are presented as having properties that are at least as fine-grained as our capacity, in the given circumstances, to discern differences along the relevant dimension (e.g., colour, shape, length, distance). My aim in the talk is to question this standard view. I’ll do so by, first, suggesting an explanation of the naturalness of the standard view, and then questioning the assumptions that figure in the suggested explanation.

My suggestion is that the standard view seems natural due to a number of phenomenological observations and natural assumptions. I focus in the talk on the following three assumptions.

The correspondence assumption: when objects are presented in experience as (synchronically or diachronically) related to each other in a certain way (e.g., as different in shape, darker than, larger than, etc.), the relevant objects (at the relevant times) are presented as having certain properties (e.g., shapes, colour, size, etc.), where the relation between the presented properties corresponds to the presented relation.

The compositional assumption: the presentation of objects in experience as being related to each other in a certain way is due to the presentation, in experience, of each object as having a relevant property (e.g., shape, colour, size, location, etc.), and to the way in which these presented properties are related to each other. For example, according to the compositional assumption, the presentation of one object $x$ as being longer than another object $y$ is due to each of the objects being presented as having a specific length, and to the fact that the length which $x$ is presented as having is larger than the length which $y$ is presented as having.
The constancy assumption: whenever a subject $S$ sees an object $x$, in conditions $C$, and $x$ is presented to $S$ as having a certain property (e.g., a certain shape, location, etc.), there are counterfactual situations which satisfy the following conditions. (i) The way in which $x$ is presented to $S$ with respect to the relevant dimension $D$ (e.g., shape, location, etc.) is the same as the actual one; (ii) there is no change in $C$; (iii) the situation is such that $S$’s capacity to discern differences between $x$ and other objects with respect to $D$, or changes in $x$ with respect to $D$, could be manifested at its finest (that is, a $D$-difference/change that is the finest $D$-difference/change that $S$ can discern in $C$ is visible to $S$ in the counterfactual situation).

The constancy assumption together with either the correspondence assumption or the compositional assumption lead to the standard view. For, given the constancy assumption, if an object $x$ is presented as having a certain property $P_1$ in conditions $C$, then $x$ could be presented in the same way, in $C$, while also presented as different from an adjacent object $y$ (or from itself at a later time) in the relevant respect, where the presented difference is the finest the subject can discern (along the relevant dimension) in $C$. According to both the correspondence and the compositional assumptions, this entails that $x$ and $y$ (or $x$ at $t_1$ and at $t_2$) are each presented as having a (relevant) different property $P_1$ and $P_2$ such that $P_1$ is just noticeably different, in $C$, from $P_2$. $P_1$ thus has to be sufficiently fine-grained to differ from $P_2$, and in this way its fineness of grain is constrained by the subject’s capacity to discern differences along the relevant dimension in $C$.

The first point to note with regard to these assumptions is that it is difficult to maintain that the correspondence and the compositional assumptions are universally true. Specifically, there seem to be cases in which differences along various visible dimensions (e.g., distance relative to oneself) can be presented in experience due to certain visible cues (e.g., occlusion), while the compared objects aren’t each (considered by itself) presented as having a relevant distinct property. As an example consider a pair of CDs hanging on a wall, one of them partly occluding the other. When seen from a distance of, say, 5 meters, the occluder will be presented in experience as being in front of the occluded CD, but the distance information that is available to us in experience from objects that are a few meters away from us seems too coarse for each to be presented as being at a certain distance, where the two distances differ from each other.
There are, however, cases in which the correspondence assumption does seem to hold (e.g. lightness experience), and there are several cases in which it is by no means obvious that it doesn’t hold (e.g., direction, length, etc.). I’ll argue that even if we grant that the correspondence assumption holds in such cases, we need not accept that the standard view holds as well. I’ll do so by outlining an alternative to the standard view which is consistent with the correspondence assumption, but involves rejecting the compositional and the constancy assumptions. I suggest that, at least on the face of it, the alternative isn’t less plausible than the standard view.
Por una nueva interpretación de la transparencia

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Un estado mental es considerado transparente cuando el sujeto tiene que contestar a una pregunta sobre el mundo empírico para auto-adscribírselo. El caso paradigmático es el de la creencia. Para contestar a la pregunta “¿Crees que p?” tengo que contestar a la pregunta “¿Es p el caso?”, a saber, tengo que considerar las razones a favor y en contra del hecho p. La teoría deliberativa, cuyo principal representante es Richard Moran, pretende dar una explicación del autoconocimiento basada en la transparencia. Tengo autoconocimiento de mis estados mentales cuando los formo por medio de un proceso deliberativo acerca de ciertas propiedades objetivas de algún evento del mundo.

El objetivo de esta comunicación es mostrar que la interpretación deliberativa de la transparencia no consigue explicar el autoconocimiento de ciertos estados mentales proposicionales, como las intenciones. Sin embargo, la interpretación neo-expresivista de la transparencia sí es capaz.
Metalinguistic Negation, Metalinguistic Discourse and Context

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In this paper I aim to show that it is possible to answer one major challenge to the semantic (partial function) view of presuppositions, and so, to help defend the adequacy of such a semantic view. In order to attain this aim I will offer what we will call “the fumfling company reply”, I will present and discuss a new kind of data regarding presuppositions, and I will introduce and discuss the usefulness of the notions of “metalinguistic discourse” and of “remake of contexts”. I intend, furthermore, to vindicate the usefulness of the notion of “derived context” (Stalnaker(1979, 2010) by using it to help to account for one new kind of phenomena that lies beyond the kind of data that motivated Stalnaker to first introduce that notion.
The Cognitive Impenetrability of Recalcitrant Emotions

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Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that conflict with your judgements, e.g. fearing flying despite judging that it is safe. Much of the present controversy concerning these emotions has to do with spelling out the precise nature of this conflict, and determining what this, in turn, tells us about a theory of emotions. This debate, however, neglects a crucial feature of these emotions, viz. their recalcitrant, mulish nature. This paper aims to make up for this neglect. In particular, I argue that the recalcitrant nature of recalcitrant emotions can be accounted for by their cognitive impenetrability.
Listen with Your Heart: A Critique of Laurence Thomas’ Account of Moral Deference

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In “Moral Deference”, Thomas states that it is more difficult to understand others’ experiences than our own, especially when such experiences are those that stem from oppressive and negative beliefs about members of diminished social categories and are experienced by persons by virtue of their belonging to a certain social category. Because of this epistemic barrier, Thomas argues in favour of moral deference, an attitude to adopt in order to better understand how others have been victims of social injustice. Though I believe engaging in moral deference is a step into the right direction, I argue that Thomas’ account of moral deference does not account for the ways in which testimonies may be compromised and that it is therefore insufficient for gaining understanding of others’ experiences of social injustice. In arguing this, I will first explain Thomas’ account of moral deference. I will then draw from the works of feminists philosophers Miranda Fricker and Kristie Dotson and explain hermeneutical injustice and testimonial smothering, two epistemic injustices that arise from social inequality. I will provide examples of each to show how a testimony can be compromised, then I will explain how these epistemic injustices are problems when it comes to engaging in moral deference, so as to indicate the deficiencies in Thomas’ account.

According to Thomas, that there are social categories indicates that persons are socially constituted and emotionally configured variously. Social constitution occurs because, as Thomas asserts, our self-perception is largely affected by how others see us. Victims of oppression, e.g., are constituted such that they do not view themselves as “full and equal members of society” because they are not viewed as such by others (p.

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2 Ibid, 359-60.
3 Ibid, 363.
People’s emotional capacities are configured differently in part because of the way they are socially constituted; Thomas refers to this as emotional category configuration (p. 373). In light of emotional category configuration, Thomas argues that moral deference is owed to individuals “of good will” when they share about their experiences of social injustice from the standpoint of an emotional category configuration that others cannot access. The idea of moral deference is to presume that the victim of the social injustice has the most credible account of their own experience. According to Thomas, this presumption is justified because emotional category configuration prevents us from being able to rely on our imaginations to understand the experiences of diminished social category persons charitably. Therefore, moral deference fulfills the purpose of reinforcing that it is wrong to dismiss the testimonies of others, thereby discounting their feelings in light of this epistemic barrier.

Thomas’ account of moral deference does not take into consideration the ways in which a testimony may be compromised. This is a problem because it implies that presuming in favour of the speaker’s testimony may not yield the most robust understanding of an experience. To support this claim, I will indicate and briefly explain two ways in which the content of a testimony fails to be representative of what truly occurred.

A testimony can be compromised when the speaker lacks the conceptual resources to understand and/or articulate her experience of social injustice. I use the example of a woman’s experience of postpartum depression and her inability to understand her own experience because she and her immediate contacts had no conception of it. Such an example is meant to show that persons in diminished social groups can be prevented from having access to a collective understanding of their social experiences—this is characterised by Miranda Fricker as hermeneutical injustice. In such cases, women, e.g., do not understand their experiences because they are not given an equal opportunity to contribute to the pool of concepts that are collectively used in order for people to make sense of their experiences. Therefore, victims of hermeneutical injustice are unable to understand and/or describe their social experiences because they have been excluded from contributing to shared social

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1 Ibid, 373-4.
2 Ibid, 375.
4 Ibid.
While Thomas argues in favour of moral deference, Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice shows that a testimony can be compromised due to the speaker’s inability to describe a social experience sufficiently to her audience or to even understand the experience herself. In this way, engaging in moral deference is insufficient for gaining understanding of others’ pains.

A testimony can also be compromised when a speaker intentionally delivers a suppressed account of her social experience. I use the example of a woman sharing about having been sexually harassed. In this example, the speaker perceives her audience as unable and unwilling to understand a social experience and, as a result, suppresses her account of it—this suppression is characterised by Kristie Dotson as a case of testimonial smothering, a harmful practice of silencing. In cases of testimonial smothering, when a speaker perceives her audience as testimonially incompetent, she truncates her own testimony such that it contains only content that she believes would be intelligible to the audience. Testimonial smothering is another instance of how a testimony can be compromised that is not accounted for in Thomas’ argument for moral deference. If a listener is provided a suppressed testimony, then he may be lacking the resources and information to understand the speaker’s experience in a richer way. Therefore, like in cases of hermeneutical injustice, engaging in moral deference when testimonial smothering occurs is also insufficient for gaining knowledge about others’ social experiences.

Although one can never come to fully understand the experiences of others, moral deference is nonetheless flawed in its failure to account for cases of hermeneutical injustice and testimonial smothering. Therefore, to listen and to defer to a testimony is not enough for gaining understanding of others’ social experiences. This, however, is not to say that we should forgo deferring to persons of oppressed groups, nor should it mean that victims of social injustice are to blame for delivering compromised testimonies. Rather, we should become aware of the additional responsibilities we may bear as we continue to make efforts to understand the pains that others have experienced.

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1 Anita M. Superson, “A Feminist Definition of Sexual Harassment,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 24, no. 1 (1993): 46. In this example, I use Superson’s definition of sexual harassment so as to include instances of sexual that do not involve physical contact/behaviour.


3 Ibid, 244.
How we Understand Through Models in Science.
The Role of Structure

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Models, in science, play two deeply interconnected roles: they are representational devices, on the one side, and they promote our understanding of the object or system they represent, on the other. They are not something conventionally staying for something else: they represent an object or a system of the world in such a way that they make the object or system in question cognitively accessible to us. So, when we ask ourselves how do models in science represent, how do they depict what they depict, how do they relate to reality, we should also ask ourselves which account of representation offers us the best explanation of how models make epistemic achievement possible. Semantics and epistemology call for a combined answer, so to say, when models are at stake. My aim in my contribution is to investigate the connection between representational capacity and cognitive value of models, and to point to what it seems to be a good candidate account of model representation able to offer, at least tentatively, the epistemological explanation in question.

How do we build models, in science? Usually appealing to a system we already partially understood as the one under study. The two systems in question (the one we grasp to in order to build the model and the one we aim to represent through the model) differ in some substantial respects, but they resemble each other to some extent. They share something – and the fact that something is shared between the two makes the model a representation of the target system. The idea I would like to defend is that what is shared between the source system and the target system is some kind of (partial) structure, and that model representation needs to be therefore conceived as some kind of structural representation: the (partial) structural analogies between the source system and the target system are what makes a model a representation of the target system (Bartels 2005 and Tetens 2013).

Why structure? What makes structure more appealing than other notions, like denotation or similarity? I believe that structure (and partial sharing of structure
between different systems of objects) is the notion to be preferred, in light of the fact that the concept of sharing structure enables us to realize the above mentioned connection between semantics and epistemology: it gives us a plausible answer of how models relate to reality, on the one side, and it is a good basis to develop an account of how models make understanding possible, on the other.

Partial sharing of structure, in a nutshell, refers to the possibility of partially mapping, projecting or preserving of systems of relations holding between different domains of objects. Understanding, generally speaking, [i] has to do with grasping relations, i.e. with seeing how discrete elements relate to one another to build a certain system and [ii] it presents a relevant counterfactual aspect – understanding something, say a situation, involves not just the ability to tell causes and to make factual assertions, but also the ability to say how things would have gone, if the situation had been even slightly different (Grimm 2011, Zagzebski 2011). On the basis of this general characterization, I will argue that understanding through models has to do with [i] seeing how and to what extent a mapping of structure is possible among different domains of objects, and [ii] being able to make predictions about how changes in one part of the target system will lead to changes in another part, in light of the above mentioned possibility of partial structural projection.

On models

On structure
ON UNDERSTANDING


Chris Hom (2008, 2012) has claimed that pejoratives express complex, socially constructed, negative normative properties that are determined in virtue of standing in external causal relations to racist institutions. He claims that a consequence of this semantic analysis is that pejoratives have null extensions, and that uses of atomic sentences with pejoratives are false. According to this semantic strategy, the derogatory content of a pejorative like ‘Gothic’ as used until the 18th century is part of its literal meaning, and is expressed in every context of utterance. A consequence of this claim is that ‘Gothic’ as used until the end of the 18th century is a different word from ‘Gothic’ as used henceforth, since ‘Gothic’ as used now is not a pejorative. We should distinguish between ‘Gothic1’, the pejorative, and ‘Gothic2’, the current non-pejorative term that describes an architectural and artistic style. To say that Röttgen Pietà is Gothic1 is to say that it ought to be scorned as clumsy unworthy, inelegant, art, because it is Gothic2.

According to Hom’s Combinatorial Externalist theory, ‘Gothic1’ and ‘Gothic2’ don’t have the same meaning and don’t have the same extension. There are no Gothic1 works of art, because there are no works of art that ought to be the object of negative aesthetic and moral evaluation just because they are Gothic2. ‘Gothic’ is not a word that applies to the same things now as it did in the Renaissance, which was then a pejorative, but has not been one for more than a century. ‘Gothic1’ and ‘Gothic2’ are neither extensionally equivalent nor intensionally equivalent. This view is externalist because the meaning of a pejorative is partly externally determined by the ideology and social structures that are dominant in the society that gave the word its meaning.

However, Hom does not consider the semantic properties of the deontic modal ‘ought’. ‘Ought’ figures in the deontic prescription that is constitutive of a pejorative’s meaning. The content of ‘Gothic1’ would be given in a clause like
Gothic $\lambda x [x$ ought to be the target of negative aesthetic evaluation, because it was produced by northern Europeans.]

Now, modal expressions (like ‘might’, ‘may’, ‘must’ or ‘ought’) function as quantifiers over possibilities, where the domains of quantification are contextually restricted (Kratzer (1977, 1991)). Modal sentences contain parameters that require context to determine a circumstantial accessibility relation on a world of evaluation $w$. This determines a modal base, i.e., a set of worlds accessible from $w$ that are circumstantially like $w$ in relevant ways. Furthermore, context must supply a standard as a function of $w$ – i.e., a standard that orders the worlds in the modal base as better or worse. Context contributes to determine a proposition by determining both a modal base and an ordering standard. Since ‘ought’ contains a parameter that must be filled with contextual values to determine a full proposition, the existence of such a parameter should be reflected in the clause for ‘Gothic’.

Gothic $\lambda x [x$ oughtB to be the target of negative aesthetic evaluation, because it was produced by northern Europeans.]

Generally, a deontic modal sentence, \textbf{must} $\phi$, comes out true just in case all of the best worlds in the modal base are ones in which the prejacent, $\phi$, comes out true. Let us assume that the meaning of ‘Gothic’ corresponds to a complex property like *oughtB to be the target of negative aesthetic evaluation because of its origin*, and that, the relevant modal base and the relevant standard are determined by the ideology of the Renaissance. The meaning of ‘Gothic’ ranks worlds according to the canons of the Italian Renaissance. But there are things in the world of evaluation $w$ (the actual world) – namely Gothic words of art – that oughtB to be subject to certain forms of contempt. Hence, the pejorative ‘Gothic’ does not have a null extension.

It is not possible to hold a strongly externalist view about the meaning of pejoratives as causally determined by social structures and ideologies, while denying that the contextually determined standard of the deontic modal in the meaning-giving clause is that of those social structures and ideologies. This should not be surprising. A legal code or prescription includes norms that are valid only where the code is enforced, and it is reasonable to assume, given the canonical semantic
account of modals, that the standard that is implicit in a norm is that of the legal source of the norm. Insofar as an externalist view of the prescriptive character of pejoratives is correct, the claim that pejoratives have null extension is false. Even if a pejorative and its neutral correlate are not intensionally equivalent, they are nonetheless co-extensional. The individuals or things that ought, according to a given ideology, to be treated with contempt are precisely those that the neutral correlate of a pejorative designates.

REFERENCES
Circular definitions are definitions that contain the *definiendum* in the *definiens*. Common sense has it that circular definitions are ill-formed and have no meaning. However, the revision theory of circular definitions, created by Anil Gupta and developed in the book Gupta-Belnap (1993), showed that it is possible to give content to circular definitions and to use them to solve the paradoxes that affect the truth predicate. Following Gupta’s terminology, let us consider a definition of a monadic predicate $Gx$ as $Gx = \text{def.} A(x,G)$, where $A(x,G)$ is a formula of a first-order language $L$ in which the variable $x$ can be free and also $G$ can occur. Let us give a model $M$ to interpret the first-order language $L$ on a domain of individuals $D$. Then possible extensions for the predicate $G$ are given by subsets of $D$ (which are called hypotheses). Revision theory uses the *definiens* to give a rule of revision on hypotheses: Given a hypothesis $h$, we can consider the set of all the elements of $D$ which satisfy the *definiens* (under the hypothesis that the extension of $G$ is $h$). That set is the revision of $h$ and is denoted as $\delta(h)$. Revision can be iterated, generating the sequence of revision: $h, \delta(h), \delta(\delta(h)), \delta(\delta(\delta(h)))$...that is represented as $\delta^0(h), \delta^1(h), \delta^2(h), \delta^3(h)$...Roughly speaking, the key idea of revision theory is that one can categorically assert that an individual $d$ is $G$ when, for every hypothesis $h$, $d$ eventually stabilises in the sequence of revision that starts with $h$, i.e., $d$ belongs to all the hypotheses in the sequence after a certain ordinal. In the book, Gupta and Belnap develop several different semantic theories for circular definitions, the most important being the systems $S^*$ and $S\#$. These systems are based on extending the revision sequences into the transfinite ordinals and provide circular definitions with a rich content, but the set of sentences that are categorically assertable in them is non axiomatizable.

Gupta (2000) defines a special type of definitions, called *finite definitions*, which overcome the need for transfinite revision sequences. Roughly speaking, a finite definition is a circular definition such that for any model and for any hypothesis the
revision process stabilises in a finite number of steps. Gupta proved that this class of definitions has nice formal properties, for instance, there is a natural deduction calculus $C_0$ (see Gupta-Belnap (1993), ch.4) with special rules for the introduction and elimination of the definiendum that is sound and complete with respect to the revision-theoretic semantics. An interesting application of these tools was given by André Chapuis, who used finite definitions to determine the rational strategy in certain classes of games (for properties of finite definitions, see Chapuis (2000), Martinez (2001), Gupta (2006), Bruni (2015)).

Let us introduce now some definitions. A hypothesis $h_0$ is descending if there is a sequence of hypotheses $h_1, h_2, h_3...$ such that for all $n$, $h_n = \delta(h_{n+1})$. A circular definition is a regressive definition if, and only if, for every model $M$ there is a descending hypothesis. The aim of the talk is to present some results about regressive definitions.

The class of regressive definitions strictly includes finite definitions but still preserve the main advantages finite definitions have over general circular ones, namely, the natural deduction calculus $C_0$ is sound and complete when the definition is regressive. The aim of the talk is to present regressive definitions, define three different subclasses of regressive definitions (called simply regressive, uniformly regressive and bounded regressive) and analyze some of their properties.

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What Does the Zombie-Argument Prove?

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The main structure of the zombie-argument is as follows:

(1) If zombies are possible, then physicalism cannot be true.
(2) Zombies are possible.
Therefore: Physicalism is not true.

Although mainly the second premise has gotten extensive attention, in this talk I would like to question the truth of the first premise, and claim that the possibility of these strange creatures – if the concept of them is consistent – does not imply the falsity of physicalism.

The tenability of the first premise completely depends on how we understand the concept of a zombie. Two things are clear: zombies do not possess any phenomenal properties and are physically identical to us, normal human beings. Therefore phenomenal properties are not physical ones. But it seems entirely not clear, how this ‘physical identity’ to be understood. In the talk I examine three popular candidates to the role of this feature, and argue that none of them conveys to us the truth of the first premise.

a) As for functional organization, if we accept the simple and innocent assumption that conscious experiences or phenomenal properties originate in some way from the state of a person or her brain, then it will be a contradicting characterization to speak of a being who has no conscious experiences, but nonetheless functionally identical to another one, that has. Because of this contradicting characterization, this version of the first premise becomes also contradictory.

b) According to the second interpretation of the first premise ‘physical identity’ means that our zombie counterparts have all those physical properties that we have. However, this formulation of the premise cannot be acceptable for a physicalist.
The defender of the zombie argument should not exclude facts of consciousness from the extension of the concept of ‘all physical properties’ in the definition of the zombies, since this move would obviously beg the question.

c) The third interpretation of ‘physical identity’ alludes to the basic microphysical elements and properties of physics. Although this concept of a zombie contains no plain contradiction, the whole conditional statement, i.e. the first premise is not necessarily true in this reading. If zombies as particle for particle identical twins of us are indeed possible, then we do will have to acknowledge that consciousness is something extra a brute fact about us. However, it does not follow from all this that this brute fact is not a physical fact.

The moral I would like to emphasize via the above considerations is that the defenders of the argument seem to suppose without any further argument, that if there were non-physical properties in the world, they are the phenomenal properties. So the argument does not prove, rather presupposes the non-physical nature of phenomenal consciousness.
Problemática de los casos de estudio de la Novedad de Uso

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En la evaluación de teorías coexisten dos corrientes claramente diferenciadas (Musgrave, 1974). La corriente lógica defiende que en la evaluación de una hipótesis solo debemos atender a las relaciones lógicas que se dan entre H y e. La corriente histórica añade que debemos otorgarle un especial peso confirmatorio a la evidencia que ha sido predicha y, al mismo tiempo, penalizar las acomodaciones. La intuición de que la predicción importa (prediction matters) ha sido utilizada para renombrar esta corriente como predectivismo (Maher, 1990). Esta corriente se enfrenta a un problema de demarcación. A diferencia de la corriente lógica, donde toda la evidencia a favor participa con el mismo peso en la evaluación de una hipótesis, la corriente histórica establece una asimetría y, por ello, debe delimitar qué se entiende por predicción y qué se entiende por acomodación. La respuesta más inmediata para la distinción entre predicción y acomodación atiende a su carácter temporal. En este caso, se entiende predicción como predicción novedosa, es decir, aquella que se deduce lógicamente de la hipótesis y no ha sido previamente observada a la construcción de la hipótesis. Sin embargo, ante esta demarcación surge la siguiente pregunta: ¿Por qué una evidencia conocida debería ser penalizada como una acomodación si no fue usada en la construcción de una hipótesis? (Worrall, 2002)

John Worrall intenta dar respuesta a esta pregunta con el desarrollo de una nueva propuesta que denomina “Novedad de Uso” (N-U a partir de ahora). El autor intenta, por un lado, realizar una nueva demarcación de las nociones de predicción y acomodación que vaya más allá del orden temporal y, por otro, encontrar un punto de encuentro entre la corriente lógica y la histórica. La N-U considera que se debería otorgar el mismo peso a una evidencia conocida previamente al desarrollo de una hipótesis pero que no fue usada en su construcción que a una predicción

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1 Existen otras distinciones pero esta es la menos problemática pues si el fenómeno deducido de la hipótesis nunca fue observado con anterioridad queda garantizado que no fue usado en la construcción de la hipótesis evitando así la acomodación.
novedosa. El autor afirma que el estudio de la heurística puede determinar si la evidencia fue usada o no en la construcción la hipótesis y propone dos estudios de campo que apoyan este nuevo criterio de demarcación.

La estrategia para la defensa de N-U como nuevo criterio de demarcación entre evidencias con mayor peso confirmatorio consiste en comparar una hipótesis antes y después de una predicción novedosa. Si se cumple el escenario predictivista tras una predicción novedosa el grado de aceptación de la teoría debe aumentar algo que no ocurre, según Worrall, en los casos de estudio. De este modo, el autor presenta el caso de la difracción de la luz por la teoría ondulatoria y el caso de la tabla periódica como contrasejemplos a la tesis predictivista. Esta estrategia es la que más adelante se critica pues solo muestra que la evidencia del tipo N-U puede tener el peso confirmatorio suficiente para la aceptación de una teoría por parte de la comunidad científica y no se deriva que la N-U tenga el mismo peso confirmatorio que la predicción novedosa.

El primer caso estudia la teoría ondulatoria de la luz desarrollada por Fresnel. (Worrall, 1989) Worrall defiende que la teoría ondulatoria no obtuvo un apoyo confirmatorio especial por la predicción del punto de Arago y considera que la teoría ya estaba ampliamente aceptada antes de esta predicción novedosa. Worrall defiende que la difracción de la luz encaja en la definición de N-U, ya que el fenómeno era conocido previamente a la elaboración de la teoría ondulatoria, se deduce de la misma, aunque no fue usado en su construcción.

El segundo caso de estudio atiende a la construcción y aceptación de la tabla periódica de Mendeleiev. Worrall y Scerri (2001) argumentan que la aceptación de la estructura de la tabla periódica estaba aceptada antes de que se confirmaran las predicciones novedosas realizadas por la misma con el descubrimiento de los elementos Galio, Escandio y Germanio. Los autores afirman que la ley periódica, que es aquella que se sigue para conformar la tabla y que se basa originalmente en pesos atómicos y propiedades de los elementos dispuestos en columnas, había sido ya aceptada previamente al descubrimiento de estos nuevos elementos que encajaban en los huecos de la tabla que faltaban por completar. Además, afirman que la inclusión tardía de los gases nobles en la tabla es un ejemplo de N-U ya que encajaban en ella y no habían sido usados en la elaboración de la misma.

Según el autor estos dos casos muestran que la N-U debería ser considerada un tipo de evidencia con el mismo peso confirmatorio que la predicción novedosa.
Al observar que el grado de aceptación de una teoría, donde se ha considerado evidencia tipo N-U, no varía tras la predicción novedosa concluye que ambas tienen el mismo peso confirmatorio. Sin embargo, en mi opinión, ambos estudios de campo presentados por Worrall no permiten afirmar que la predicción goce del mismo valor que la N-U. Los casos muestran que se puede lograr un alto grado de aceptación de una teoría o hipótesis a partir de evidencia que responda al criterio demarcado por la N-U, es decir, evidencia conocida pero no usada en la elaboración de la hipótesis. Sin embargo, de ello no se sigue que la predicción novedosa y la evidencia caracterizada como N-U tengan el mismo peso confirmatorio.

Nótese que no se critica la demarcación de la N-U, sino la elección de los casos de estudio. A mi entender, el problema radica en el intento de comparar el peso de la evidencia bajo una misma hipótesis en dos estadios de aceptación diferentes: antes y después de una predicción novedosa. Para dictaminar si la N-U tiene el mismo valor confirmatorio que una predicción novedosa parece más idóneo comparar dos hipótesis rivales que intentan dar respuesta a un mismo fenómeno y que reciben apoyo evidencial distinto. Una de las hipótesis recibe apoyo de predicciones novedosas y la hipótesis rival de N-U.

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I propose to understand by “free will” a capacity or power to make decisions and, eventually, to translate them into actions, with a certain degree and certain kinds of control over the process of decision and the resulting actions. The exercise of this capacity gives rise to free decisions and actions. In my view, the exercise of free will involves four kinds of control over one’s decisions and/or actions, which correspond to four requirements or necessary conditions of free will: voluntariness (volitional control), alternative possibilities (plural control), rationality (rational control), and true authorship (source control).

Benjamin Libet’s experiments have had a big negative impact on belief in free will. What the experiments showed, according to Libet, was that the cause of simple bodily movements was not the conscious decision or intention to perform it. Both the movement and the intention seemed to be mere effects of a neural event totally beyond the subjects’ consciousness. Libet generalized the results of his experiments with simple bodily movements to all human actions and denied that free will was ever the origin of our voluntary actions. Daniel Wegner has performed additional experiments which are also intended to show that conscious will is purely epiphenomenal, which implies the illusory character of free will.

In this paper, I offer a set of critical considerations about Libet’s and Wegner’s skeptical views about free will and the causal inertness of conscious intentions:

Libet’s experiment has problems related to internal coherence, for only if its conclusion, namely the causal inertness of conscious intentions, is false, can the experiment itself be brought about.

The very design of the experiment reveals a dualist view of the relationships between mind and body. However, even if the experiment could refute the causal relevance of intentions and decisions conceived in dualist terms, it would not thereby disprove the
explanatory relevance of intentions and decisions, for a dualist view of them is hardly mandatory.

From a logical point of view, Libet’s and Wegner’s arguments have the structure of a very problematic inductive generalization.

Intentions to perform complex acts are not caused by readiness potentials. Rather, these potentials are activated, if they are, as a consequence of having formed those intentions.

If we distinguish between simple bodily movements and automatic motor processes on the one hand, and complex actions, on the other, the temptation to consider conscious intentions as merely epiphenomenal vanishes. Far from being the case that all our actions are the result of automatic processes, we take for granted the normal functioning of these automatic processes in bringing about complex actions.

Our last argument is an inference to the best explanation: without effective conscious intentions, certain common social phenomena would appear as almost miraculous, whereas, with effective conscious intentions in place, they are easily foreseeable and explicable.

Our general conclusion is that, in spite of their undoubted interest, Libet’s and Wegner’s experiments don’t prove the epiphenomenal character of conscious decisions and the illusory nature of free will.
In this paper I want to show that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing and discarding some alternatives, a paradox is found to be an argument that seems valid — in the sense that rejecting its validity would imply giving up some core intuitions about the notion of logical consequence — but such that the commitment to the conclusion that stems from the acceptance of the premises and the validity of the argument should not be there. Something even stronger can be said to be the case: apparently, there is no commitment at all. Finally, two consequences and two objections are discussed.
Anchoring and Acquaintance

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A fundamental desideratum on a theory of intentionality, and a crucial part of what motivates the doctrine that there is a distinctive kind of singular representation, is the anchoring role. This role can be brought out using the following thought-experiment (originally due to Strawson (1959)):

Suppose that somewhere there is a region at which everything in your environment is qualitatively duplicated. The actual world is a sphere, with each hemisphere a perfect qualitative reflection of the other. Since all and only the qualitative properties instantiated in your local environment are instantiated at this ‘twin’ region, any qualitative description satisfied by your local environment is also satisfied by its twin. What makes it the case that your system of thought is about your immediate surroundings and not this cosmic duplicate? If the truth-values of our thoughts at such a world are to be determined by the region of reality they are intuitively determined by, there must in fact be some non-descriptive kind of intentionality...

In this talk I will examine accounts which characterize the ‘non-descriptive kind of intentionality’ by carving a distinction at the level of semantic content. Such accounts—perhaps the orthodoxy—start from the background claim that what it is for a representational vehicle to be a qualitative description is for it to express a certain kind of content. Anchoring, as a desideratum on a theory of intentionality, is then claimed to entail that representational systems which express contents of only this descriptive variety are impoverished, for a user of such a system would be incapable of entertaining thoughts which are guaranteed to concern her environment at a world of massive duplication.

The first part of the talk argues that there are representational systems which fail to express anything other than paradigm qualitative-descriptive contents (not singular by anyone’s criteria) but which nevertheless succeed in playing...
the anchoring role. In that case, there are reasons for thinking that this ‘non-descriptive kind of representation’ is not individuated at the level of content. In fact, on the rival treatment I articulate, such representation is not even a properly semantic phenomenon.

In the second part I target the following response: While it is a contingent matter whether a representational system which accommodates the anchoring role will do so in virtue of expressing singular content, systems which do not do so while attempting to play the anchoring role are cognitively burdensome, and Nature is unlikely to endow creatures with such systems. I show that this claim is not as plausible as is widely assumed. To the contrary, the advantage of the proposal sketched in the talk’s first part is that it does not complicate the semantic interpretation of basic mental phenomena by assigning oversophisticated contents or by assigning contents which entail disjunctivism. Despite this, it is capable of capturing a cluster of phenomena which have driven the literature on singular thought, including the idea that singular thoughts are subject to a distinctive ‘acquaintance’ constraint.

The proper conclusion, however, is a challenge: proponents of orthodox treatments of singular representation owe us a more rigorous justification for the kinds of contents they attribute to thinkers.
Polisemia y conceptos

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El objetivo de la exposición es argumentar que la tesis sobre codificación y conceptos ad hoc de la teoría clásica de la relevancia —TR desde ahora— tiene problemas para dar cuenta de la diferencia entre polisemia y homonimia. Propongo que los sentidos polisémicos no codifiquen conceptos atómicos, como defiende esta teoría, sino complejos conceptuales. Puesto que la mayoría de las palabras son polisémicas, esto supondría que la mayoría de conceptos léxicos no sean conceptos atómicos separados, sino que se relacionan unos con otros en estructuras complejas.

El plan de exposición es el siguiente: primero, explico la diferencia entre la polisemia y homonimia; segundo, discuto la teoría de la formación de conceptos ad hoc de la TR (Wilson y Carston 2007; Sperber y Wilson 1997; Carston 2002; Falkum 2007) y, por último, propongo que las palabras polisémicas codifiquen complejos conceptuales.

1. Polisemia y homonimia

La diferencia entre la polisemia y la homonimia es que, al contrario que en la homonimia, los significados polisémicos de una palabra están relacionados entre sí. Por ejemplo:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \\
(1a) & \text{El cura del pueblo era querido por todos.} \\
(1b) & \text{María investiga una posible cura contra el cáncer.} \\
(2) \\
(2a) & \text{El manifiesto contra la reforma está firmado por la Universidad.} \\
(2b) & \text{He quedado con Laura en la Universidad para discutir el asunto de las becas.}
\end{align*}
\]

En (2) los dos sentidos de ‘Universidad’ están relacionados de una forma que no se observa en (1) con ‘cura’. (1) es un caso de homonimia y (2) de polisemia.
Algunos estudios (Frisson 2009; Klepostinioytou et al. 2008; Pylkkänen 2006) sugieren que los significados polisémicos y homónimos se codifican de forma distinta: la polisemia no se codifica en paralelo, como sí puede ocurrir con la homonimia. Los significados homónimos compiten a la hora de activarse, mientras que un sentido de un término polisémico facilita la activación de los demás. Esto sugiere que, mientras que los distintos significados de ‘cura’ codifican conceptos separados e independientes, los significados de ‘Universidad’ de (2) no se almacenan como conceptos separados al modo de (1). Una buena teoría sobre el significado de las palabras debe poder dar cuenta de este fenómeno.

2. Conceptos ad hoc

La TR (Wilson y Carston 2007) afirma que el enriquecimiento, el empobrecimiento semántico y la extensión metafórica son distintas formas de un proceso interpretativo que da lugar a un concepto ad hoc formado a partir de la interacción con otros conceptos codificados, la información contextual y principios de expectativas pragmáticas. Siguiendo esta línea, Carston (2013) y Falkum (2007) argumentan que los sentidos polisémicos de una palabra se forman a partir de mecanismos pragmáticos de enriquecimiento, empobrecimiento y extensión metafórica. Los sentidos polisémicos consisten en los conceptos ad hoc resultantes, que pueden convencionalizarse (polisemia semántica) o no hacerlo (polisemia pragmática).

Cuando el concepto se convencionaliza, se codifica en una representación atómica distinta con la misma forma lingüística. Este es el caso de (2).

En general, la TR no puede explicar los resultados empíricos que sugieren que los significados polisémicos convencionalizados se codifican de forma distinta a como ocurre en la homonimia. Este problema deriva del supuesto de que los conceptos codificados son atómicos, es un problema que afecta a cualquier teoría que defienda que las palabras polisémicas codifican conceptos atómicos.

3. Complejos conceptuales

Mi propuesta es que los conceptos codificados por palabras no son atómicos, sino complejos. Son complejos que contienen los distintos sentidos o rasgos de los significados de las palabras derivados de información sobre el mundo. Mientras que los significados homónimos se codificarían en entradas léxicas distintas, los significados polisémicos se codificarían dentro de una misma entrada. En (2)
'Universidad' codifica un complejo conceptual que contiene distintos rasgos de los significados de la palabra (por ejemplo: institución, edificio, lugar en el que hay clases, lugar en el que se investiga, personal investigador, estudiantes, profesorado, etc.). Los sentidos de (1a) y (1b) están incluidos en ese complejo conceptual (son aspectos o conceptos individuales dentro del complejo). En cambio, en (1) los significados (1a) y (1b) están codificados en entradas léxicas separadas (cura,y cura). También en este caso, los dos significados codifican conceptos complejos, aunque distintos, que contienen información relevante acerca de cada una de las categorías a las que se aplican. Esta hipótesis explica los resultados empíricos que sugieren que los distintos sentidos polisémicos no se codifican en paralelo y que los significados homónimos y los polisémicos no se codifican de la misma manera.

La propuesta soluciona los problemas de la TR antes vistos, ya que se puede distinguir entre polisemia pragmática (aquella en la que los sentidos no llegan a codificarse) y polisemia semántica (aquella en la que los sentidos se convencionalizan, generando nuevos aspectos del complejo conceptual).

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REFERENCIAS


Explicación y mecanismos en economía: el problema del anidamiento

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Aunque en la actualidad hay cierto consenso respecto a que el modelo explicativo de cobertura legal (Hempel y Oppenheim 1948, Hempel 1965), a pesar de ser el modelo de referencia respecto del cual se construyen y evalúan el resto de propuestas, es deficiente para dar cuenta de la explicación en economía, no hay ninguna alternativa que goce de aceptación generalizada. Una de las propuestas que actualmente centra el trabajo de los filósofos de la economía es la concepción mecanicista de la explicación. El objeto de esta comunicación es abordar uno de los principales problemas de esta concepción: el problema del «anidamiento» [nesting] de mecanismos. Con respecto a esta cuestión, se tratará de justificar la idea de que por medio de interpretar las reglas de parada como estándares explicativos propios de la economía, puede ofrecerse una respuesta satisfactoria y sistemática al problema del anidamiento.

La concepción mecanicista de la explicación en economía se basa en la idea de que para explicar un evento económico particular (output) hemos de describir los mecanismos causales mediante los cuales, a partir de ciertas condiciones iniciales (input), se ha producido. Una noción de mecanismo que permite dar cuenta de los mecanismos señalados en economía es la desarrollada por Peter Hedström (2005). Según Hedström, un mecanismo sería una constelación de entidades (con sus propiedades) y las actividades que éstas llevan a cabo entre sí y en relación con otras entidades. Los mecanismos a los que generalmente se apela en economía (mercados, mecanismos referidos a la toma de decisiones,...) se ajustan a esta noción de mecanismo. Tienen en cuenta esta caracterización de mecanismo, si definimos un proceso como una actividad de las entidades de un mecanismo, podemos precisar la noción mecanicista de explicación económica de la siguiente manera: explicamos un evento económico particular (output) indicando ciertas condiciones iniciales (input) y señalando aquellos procesos del mecanismo que conecta el input con el
output, a través de los cuales el output se ha producido. Un ejemplo de explicación mecanicista de un evento económico sería explicar la inflación en Brasil entre 1985 y 1995 (output), señalando el incremento de la oferta monetaria en Brasil entre 1985 y 1995 (input) y describiendo los procesos del mercado brasileño a través de los cuales el incremento de la oferta monetaria dio lugar a la inflación.

Los mecanismos económicos están «anidados» [nested] unos dentro de otros. Las entidades y actividades que se consideran básicas en relación a mecanismos de cierto nivel, están a su vez dirigidas o producidas por mecanismos de nivel inferior. Esta situación de anidamiento resulta problemática a la hora de decidir que entidades y actividades han de considerarse como básicas (que nivel de mecanismos es suficientemente profundo) cuando queremos explicar un evento económico de cierto tipo. Diferentes autores, como Harold Kincaid (1996) o Gary King, Robert Keohane y Sidney Verba (1994), han planteado que dada esta situación de anidamiento se produciría un regreso al infinito al tratar de describir un mecanismo (toda entidad que tratáramos de tomar como básica dependería de un mecanismo inferior, el cual habría que señalar).

La cuestión que ha de abordarse es en qué medida el anidamiento de mecanismos afecta a la legitimidad de las explicaciones mecanicistas en economía. La economía tiene ciertos «estándares explicativos propios del campo» [field-specific explanatory standards], entendiendo por ello “those norms about explanation prevalent in a field of inquiry that have come to define a field’s identity and hence become independent from the subject matter for which they were developed in the first play” (Marchionni 2013, 334). Los estándares explicativos pueden o no estar justificados, y solo en el caso de estar justificados constituyen una exigencia para las explicaciones económicas. La justificación de un estándar explicativo puede tener dos fuentes: que el estándar corresponda a una virtud explicativa y que el estándar contribuya a los objetivos prácticos del campo. Los principales estándares explicativos propios de la economía son las «reglas de parada» [stopping rules] (Miller 1987, 87). Las reglas de parada son estándares explicativos qué estipulan a que tipo de entidades ha de apelarse en la explicación de un evento de cierto tipo. Estas reglas plantean que un investigador normal normalmente finalizará su investigación (búsqueda de una explicación) sobre un evento de tipo X, cuando lo explique apelando a entidades de tipo Y.

Para continuar con nuestro análisis, vamos a centrar la reflexión en la explicación de los eventos macroeconómicos. La regla de parada que hace referencia a la
explicación de los eventos macroeconómicos es: para explicar correctamente un evento macroeconómico es necesario apelar a entidades de tipo microeconómico (agentes económicos individuales). Esta regla de parada, en tanto que estándar explicativo, si está justificada constituirá una exigencia para cualquier explicación de un evento macroeconómico. Se trata de una regla justificada porque contribuye a la consecución de objetivos prácticos de la economía (predicción y control de eventos económicos). Además, si se adopta una perspectiva mecanicista de la explicación científica, también representaría una virtud explicativa.

Dado que es un estándar explicativo justificado, la regla de parada que plantea que para explicar un evento macroeconómico es necesario apelar a entidades de nivel microeconómico ha de ser satisfecha. La explicación mecanicista de un evento macroeconómico habrá de hacer referencia a cómo el input y el evento macroeconómico output están vinculados por medio de entidades y actividades de nivel microeconómico. La apelación a la regla de parada justificada permite dar respuesta a la problemática situación de anidamiento de mecanismos, en relación a la explicación de los eventos macroeconómicos. Lo hace por medio de establecer un criterio justificado respecto de que entidades han de tomarse como básicas (que nivel de mecanismos es suficiente) al explicar un evento macroeconómico.

El problema que el anidamiento de los mecanismos representa para las nociones mecanicistas de la explicación económica, la amenaza de regresión al infinito, se ve neutralizado por la presencia de las reglas de parada justificadas. Solo si en un área de la economía las reglas de parada no son estándares explicativos justificados, el anidamiento de mecanismos supone un problema y puede generar una regresión al infinito.

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Expresivismo, relativismo y estados mentales híbridos

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¿Puede alguien pensar que el regaliz no está bueno aun gustándole su sabor? Tal como MacFarlane (2014: 173-174) reconstruye la posición expresivista de Gibbard (2003), una de las principales diferencias entre dicha posición y la del propio MacFarlane —el relativismo— radica en lo que cada una debería decir acerca de la posibilidad de hallarse en estados mentales de este tipo, a los que llamaremos “estados mentales híbridos”. MacFarlane extrapola el tratamiento que debería dar Gibbard del predicado “está bueno” a partir del que explícitamente da para “debe”. Para Gibbard (2003: 11), plantearse qué se debe hacer no es otra cosa que plantearse qué hacer. De forma paralela, sostiene MacFarlane, plantearse si algo está bueno no debería ser para Gibbard otra cosa que plantearse si algo le gusta a uno, y por tanto un agente no debería poder pensar que el regaliz no está bueno sin que le disgustara su sabor. MacFarlane, por otro lado, piensa que “hallarse en un estado (que me guste el sabor del regaliz) pero no en el otro (pensar que el regaliz está bueno) puede ser irracional, pero no parece imposible” (MacFarlane 2014: 174, nuestra cursiva). Este debate es parte de una discusión más amplia acerca de la semántica de los predicados de gusto personal y su encaje con lo que Chrisman (2007; 2012) llama “intuiciones dialécticas”, a saber, nuestras intuiciones con respecto a los desacuerdos, la retractación y la reafirmación (véanse Kölbl 2004; Lasersohn 2005; Stojanovic 2007; MacFarlane 2014). El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que el tipo de casos a los que alude MacFarlane para reivindicar la posibilidad de estados mentales híbridos no presenta ningún problema para el expresivismo, pero sí para el relativismo. El expresivista puede dar cuenta de este tipo de casos y, al

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mismo tiempo, no necesita suponer que haya involucrado en ellos ningún tipo de irracionalidad.

MacFarlane (2014: 174) ilustra la posibilidad de hallarse en un estado mental híbrido a través de la historia de Alex. Alex cree que el regaliz no está bueno porque ha leído que solo las personas no educadas piensan que lo está. Sin embargo, le gusta su sabor. Por tanto, a Alex le gusta el regaliz pero cree que no está bueno. No obstante, supongamos que Alex expresa su estado mental híbrido profiriendo la oración “El regaliz no está bueno, pero me gusta”. Qué estado mental exprese esta oración dependerá del papel que juegue en un intercambio comunicativo. Si a ella respondemos que el regaliz sí está bueno, el desacuerdo que tendremos con Alex será, aparentemente, del tipo que los hechos podrían resolver: podríamos mostrarle estadísticas en las que a la mayoría de los expertos le gusta el sabor del regaliz, quizá convenciéndola de que el regaliz está bueno. Si esto es así, la situación se corresponde con un caso en el que Alex está describiendo el regaliz como algo que cumple los estándares de gusto de las personas educadas. Al proferir la oración, Alex está expresando la misma proposición que si hubiera dicho “El regaliz no está bueno para los expertos, pero me gusta”. Por tanto, Alex no se está contradiciendo y, de hecho, ni siquiera está siendo irracional. Así lo muestra el hecho de que el estado mental híbrido juegue un papel coherente a la hora de explicar por qué Alex aspira a cambiar su gusto. MacFarlane, sin embargo, se ve obligado a considerar irracional a Alex. Esto es consecuencia de su compromiso con la regla TP, que nos permite decir de algo que no está bueno solo si su sabor no nos resulta placentero (MacFarlane 2014: 4).

Al usar “bueno” como “bueno para los expertos”, Alex está aseverando “El regaliz no está bueno” desde una perspectiva exocéntrica (véase Lasersohn 2005: 670-674). Este es el tipo de perspectiva que adoptamos cuando, por ejemplo, alguien nos pregunta “¿Qué le pareció a Bill el paseo?” y nosotros contestamos “Bueno, el tiovivo fue divertido, pero la catarata le dio un pelín de miedo” (véase Lasersohn 2005: 672). Aquí no estamos diciendo que el tiovivo fuera divertido para nosotros, no estamos expresando que nos gusta, no estamos evaluándolo positivamente; solo estamos diciendo que fue divertido para Bill, esto es, que cumplió los estándares de diversión de Bill.

Cuando decimos algo desde una perspectiva exocéntrica, se pierde la relatividad con respecto al estándar y, en el caso que nos ocupa, también el carácter evaluativo. Esto es lo que sostiene Field (2009: 275) con respecto a “deberíamos”, una palabra que puede tener apariciones tanto factuales como no factuales. Por ejemplo, (S)
“Deberíamos retirar nuestras tropas en menos de un mes” es un enunciado no directamente factual, mientras que (S*) “Deberíamos retirar nuestras tropas en menos de un mes de acuerdo con la política $n_S$” es un enunciado directamente factual, puesto que “la sensibilidad a normas se ha perdido por la relativización explícita. Y la sensibilidad a normas es una buena parte de aquello en lo que consiste el desacuerdo normativo” (Field 2009: 275). De forma similar, podríamos decir que, mientras que “El regaliz no está bueno” es un enunciado no directamente factual, “El regaliz no está bueno para los expertos” es un enunciado directamente factual, una vez perdida la sensibilidad a los estándares de gusto personal.

Así pues, cuando Alex dice “El regaliz no está bueno, pero me gusta”, está expresando un estado mental híbrido consistente, por un lado, en una creencia factual y, por otro, en una evaluación. La creencia factual se expresa al aseverar “El regaliz no está bueno” desde una perspectiva exocéntrica, perspectiva que se manifiesta en el tipo de desacuerdo que podemos tener con Alex, que se puede resolver a través de los hechos. De este modo, la creencia de Alex de que el regaliz no está bueno no es incompatible tampoco desde una perspectiva expresivista con que le guste su sabor. Además, desde dicho punto de vista, Alex ni siquiera está incurriendo en el tipo de irracionalidad que MacFarlane está obligado a atribuirle.

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La teoría de Williamson sobre los conceptos y los estados mentales

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Williamson (2000) propone esta definición del conocimiento: saber es el (tipo de) estado mental factivo más general. El verbo ‘saber’ denotaría un estado mental de actitud proposicional; y sería un verbo factivo: ‘S sabe que P’ implica P. Según esa definición, si el verbo ‘F’ denota un estado mental de actitud proposicional y es también un verbo factivo, entonces saber es tan general o más que dicho estado; es decir, ‘Eva F que P’ implica ‘Eva sabe que P’.

Voy a describir una grave dificultad en esa concepción. Por simplicidad (nada relevante dependerá de ello) usemos ‘doxacertar’ y ‘justacertar’ como términos que denotan, respectivamente, los estados de creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero. Son estados factivos; y son más generales que saber. Williamson acepta eso. Pero cree que ello no refuta su definición, pues considera que doxacertar y justacertar no son estados mentales. Propone una teoría sobre los conceptos, los estados y el carácter mental de algunos de ellos, que denominaré \( \text{TW} \). Según Williamson, \( \text{TW} \) hace razonable suponer que estados como doxacertar y justacertar no son mentales. Mostraré que eso es así sólo porque \( \text{TW} \) tiene consecuencias antropológicas muy fuertes, para las cuales Williamson no proporciona una apropiada justificación.

\( \text{TW} \) incluye las siguientes tesis o propuestas:

(a) Distinción entre conceptos y estados (o condiciones, o propiedades). El concepto oro y el concepto Au son dos conceptos distintos del (= refieren al) mismo estado: ser oro. El estado de saber no es el concepto saber. En principio, otro concepto (diferente al expresado por ‘saber’) podría ser también un concepto del estado de saber (= cuya referencia fuera ese estado).

(b) Condiciones de identidad para estados:

\[ E_1 \text{ y } E_2 \text{ son el mismo estado syss necesariamente (x está en } E_1 \text{ syss x está en } E_2) \]
(c) Condiciones de identidad muy finas para conceptos: ser $C$ y [ser $C$ y tal que $T$] son conceptos diferentes, incluso cuando son lógicamente equivalentes (por ejemplo, si $T$ es una verdad lógica trivial).

(d) El estado $E$ es mental y podría haber un concepto mental de $E$ (= cuya referencia fuera $E$).

(e) El concepto de saber que $P$ es mental. Por tanto: saber que $P$ es un estado mental.

(f) Si $P$ es una proposición cotidiana contingente sobre el entorno externo) los conceptos de doxacertar que $P$ y justacertar que $P$ no son mentales. Por tanto, para que doxacertar y justacertar fueran estados mentales, según (d), debería haber otros conceptos que sí fueran mentales y cuyas respectivas denotaciones fueran esos estados. Pero:

(g) Sería una gran coincidencia metafísica (implausible) que existieran esos otros conceptos mentales necesariamente co-extensionales con los conceptos (no mentales) de doxacertar y justacertar.

(h) Si el concepto $C$ es una conjunción de los conceptos $C_1$, ..., $C_n$, y uno de tales conceptos, $C_i$, no es un concepto mental, entonces $C$ no es un concepto mental. Es así aunque $C_i$ sea un factor redundante.

Williamson utiliza la tesis (h) –y ciertos supuestos adicionales– para apoyar el tratamiento diferencial derivado del contraste entre sus tesis (e) y (f). Un punto clave es el siguiente: los conceptos doxacertar y justacertar no serían mentales, debido a su supuesto carácter híbrido: combinan estipulativamente un concepto mental, creer, con uno no mental, verdad (es indiferente si el concepto estar justificado es o no mental; no lo es, según Williamson). Son conceptos compuestos; en su composición intervienen factores mentales y factores no mentales. El concepto saber sí es un concepto mental; no es un concepto compuesto de algo mental y algo no mental.

Consideremos esta hipótesis antropológica:

(1A) Existen comunidades de sujetos cuya lengua dispone de una expresión lingüística, ‘$X$’, que refiere al estado de doxacertar de forma análoga (de forma no híbrida, no artificiosamente combinatoria de un factor mental y otro no mental) a cómo el verbo ‘saber’ refiere al estado de saber.
Que (HA) sea o no verdadera parece una cuestión empírica contingente. Incluso si es falsa, resulta intuitivamente posible: podría haber situaciones en que (HA) fuera verdadera. Williamson afronta este dilema:

1. Sostener que (HA) es imposible. Pero resulta implausible una consecuencia metafísica antropológica tan fuerte.
2. Aceptar que (HA) podría ser verdad, pero sostener que la expresión ‘X’ no expresaría un concepto mental, aunque ‘saber’ sí lo expresa. Sería muy difícil justificar ese diagnóstico diferencial.

Es plausible, pues, suponer que el concepto expresado por ‘X’ (en aquellas situaciones posibles en que (HA) se cumpliera) es un concepto mental, necesariamente co-extensional con el concepto doxacertar, que (según Williamson) no es mental. Así –conforme a la tesis (d)–, doxacertar sería un estado mental. Y sería un estado mental factivo más general que saber (pace Williamson).

Obviamente, todo lo indicado acerca de la hipótesis (HA) sobre doxacertar podría repetirse, análogamente, con una hipótesis similar, (HA*), sobre justacertar.

La discusión precedente concierne a la definición inicial del conocimiento propuesta en Williamson (2000, p. 34). Luego (p. 39) se ofrece una definición más precisa, que invoca una noción técnica de operador de estado mental factivo, FMSO. Por definición estipulativa, los FMSOS son semánticamente no analizables (= no son sinónimos de ninguna expresión compleja cuyo significado se compone del significado de sus partes); cf. Williamson (2009, p. 364).

Es controvertido que ‘saber’ sea un FMSO.

Es controvertido que ‘X’ no sea un FMSO. Aunque ‘X que P’ y ‘(cree que P) y (P es verdad)’ refieren al mismo estado, no es obvio que sean sinónimos. En particular, las comunidades de que habla (HA) no estipulan (ni tampoco lo estipulo yo) que ‘X’ designe al estado de doxacertar (así, la propuesta de Reed 2005, sobre ‘gnows’, difiere sustancialmente de la mía).*

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Should We Construe ‘What Is Said’ As an Intention Based Notion?

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In view of the variety of examples contextualists have put forward during the last decades, it is standardly acknowledged that we need to distinguish the linguistic meaning of a sentence from what an utterance of that sentence, in an occasion of use, says. The distinction applies beyond indexical sentences: in principle, any sentence can be used to say something that, although constrained by its linguistic meaning, is not equivalent to it, and that neither is an implicature. This notion of ‘what is said’ raises interesting questions. In this talk, I will focus on whether it should be understood as a content closely tied to intentions. As an example, a possible way to construe ‘what is said’ as an intention based notion would be to identify it with the thought the speaker intends to communicate by her utterance. Similar views are often assumed but not always scrutinized.

The first step is to see what the purpose of having such a notion is, i. e., what we want the notion for. The standard claim is that communication involves a content that often goes beyond linguistic meaning. ‘What is said’ is thus supposed to ground communication. But how should we understand this talk about communication? Many of the examples used to motivate the need of modulated content show that talk is intertwined with extra linguistic actions. Thus, if someone makes clear that he is hungry (by saying ‘I’m hungry, is there something to eat?’, for instance), and after that a speaker utters the sentence ‘There are some red apples over there’ this utterance will motivate (and justify) certain actions (going to the demonstrated place, grabbing an apple, eating it). Communication involves, among other things, transmission of knowledge, reasons for action, and the acquisition of justifications and liabilities. The notion of ‘what is said’ should make sense of this—for example, it should explain how is it that, if the addressee finds out that the apples were rotten (red in the inside) he is entitled to complain. The thesis I will defend is that if we focus on the actions a certain utterance motivates and what is reasonable to hold speakers liable to, then we should not construe utterance content as determined by speaker’s intentions.
I will explore three possible ways to construe what is said as an intention-based notion. First, ‘what is said’ can be understood as the content the speaker intends to communicate by her utterance. If, in the previous example, by ‘red’ she means red in the interior, then that is the value of that expression in that occasion of use. There is, in that case, a divergence between speaker meaning and the most reasonable interpretation (given the context, in particular, the previous utterance). This is a problem for views that identify ‘what is said’ with speaker meaning, for it seems that the speaker is liable for saying something that motivated the action of eating one of the apples. Given this, should we line up ‘what is said’ with speaker meaning or with the most reasonable interpretation? Although the proponent of a version of ‘what is said’ that is closely tied to speaker’s intentions could try to explain away the liability of this particular example (by distinguishing strictly speaking linguistic liability from prudential liability, let’s say), identifying ‘what is said’ with speaker meaning leaves us with a general problem concerning linguistic liability: the speaker can retreat to the linguistic meaning of his utterance, but not to what he meant by that linguistic meaning.

It seems, then, that we need two notions to account for communicative practices in the previous sense: linguistic meaning and most reasonable interpretation. Interpreters are justified in acting upon the most reasonable interpretation. And speakers are liable for either linguistic meaning or for the most reasonable interpretation, not for what they mean. If we want ‘what is said’ to explain liability and action, speaker’s intentions are not the best way to go.

Second, it might be argued that the relevant intentions here should not be identified with the speaker’s intentions to convey a certain thought but with his intention to answer a question or to contribute to a conversation. In the previous example, the speaker plausibly has the intention to answer the question ‘Is there something to eat?’, and so he has fixed the topic of his utterance deferentially. This, however, is also problematic: now it is the intentions of the speaker who asked the question that might be in conflict with what is going on in the context.

Third, what is said might be construed as being fixed by the shared beliefs of the interlocutors. Instead of the intentions of the speaker, we could focus on the intentions the speaker shares with the hearer. This, however, is too demanding, for it rules out the possibility of having a content that goes beyond linguistic meaning in cases in which, given a group of interlocutors, one of them is wrong about the topic of the conversation.
A possible objection is that I am focusing on cases that are not cases of successful communication—no thought has been transmitted from speaker to hearer. I grant that one can reserve the term ‘communication’ for cases that fit the following model: a speaker in context C has a thought p he wants to share with a hearer, he finds a sentence S that encodes p in C or, in the present discussion about modulated contents, that somehow captures p, utters S, the hearer decodes S and infers (or somehow grasps) p. However, we still need a notion of content that explains social interaction involving language, and this notion should be in play in cases in which the speaker fails to get the thought across. The present discussion provides reasons to doubt that one same notion can play both roles (explaining the transmission of a thought and explaining liability and justified action).
The purpose of this paper is to provide some indirect evidence for moderate epistemic expressivism (Alstrom-Vij 2013), by examining the relationship between disagreement and conflicting attitudes. Evidence will be provided to support the idea that being able to conceive different conceptions of the goals of inquiry is crucial to be involved in an epistemic disagreement scenario. For our case study, we will focus on self-knowledge, and a specific feature of the analysis of avowals. If disagreement concerning avowals is taken to be impossible, this is best explained with the aid of moderate epistemic expressivism, as a case where no alternative conceptions of goals of inquiry are available at least to one of the agents involved in the disagreement. If, on the other hand, avowals are allowed to be sensibly discussed by disagreeing agents, it becomes necessary to introduce the possibility that different conceptions of the goals of inquiry might lead to different sets of epistemic standards. The central tenet of moderate epistemic disagreement appears thus vindicated, as it plays an important role for both sides in an exhaustive theoretical disjunction.

Consider the following schema of epistemic disagreements:

A (with high epistemic standards Sa): “D doesn’t know that p”
B (with low epistemic standards Sb): “D knows that p”

where D’s true belief is not justified according to Sa, but it is justified according to Sb. Epistemic disagreements of this form, and the allegedly evaluative nature of knowledge ascriptions, have played a major role in recent discussions on the meaning of these expressions. Relativism (MacFarlane 2014, 176 and ff.), contextualism (Lewis 1996, but also Cohen 1999, deRose 1992, 1995), and expressivism (Field 2009, Chrisman 2007, 2008, etc.) have emerged as major competitors in the field,
as alternative explanations willing to give an appropriate account of knowledge
ascriptions. These views conceive the discrepancy between A and B as involving
some kind of epistemic standards. A’s epistemic standards are more restrictive than
B’s, and she is therefore forced to deny that D knows that \( p \), given what she knows
about D’s evidence. The epistemic parameters that B accepts, on the other hand,
are more permissive, and he has no problem in attributing to D knowledge that
\( p \). Rather than quarreling on who is right, the goal of relativism, contextualism,
and expressivism is to explain how such a disagreement is even possible. While the
relativist and the contextualist take issue on whether epistemic standards should
belong to the semantic content of knowledge ascriptions, the expressivist is more
concerned with the states of mind that speakers commit themselves to be expressing
while making knowledge ascriptions. The relationship between these *evaluative
disagreements* (cfr. Field 2009) –where making the standards explicit would not
dissolve the dispute– and the attitudes of the agents towards different standards
seems to be at the heart of the debate. Accepting different standards might be a
sufficient condition for disagreement (*suf*), a necessary condition for disagreement
(* nec *), or, as we will defend, none of the above.

Even if coming from very different backgrounds, expressivism and several evolved
vindications of contextualism (see Marques 2015; Copp 2001, 2009; Strandberg
2012; Grajner 2015, etc.) share the assumption that a clash of attitudes is closely
connected with the phenomenon of disagreement. Such varieties of contextualism
seem to assume, together with expressivism, the following insight:

\[ \text{suf. Conflict in attitudes towards the parameters is a sufficient condition to declare} \]
\[ \text{that two agents disagree.} \]

They might try to explain disagreements as a result of conflicting attitudes, no
matter if these attitudes are conventionally implicated, conversationally implicated,
etc. Taking a clash of attitudes to be a sufficient condition for disagreement faces
serious difficulties (see MacFarlane 2014, 192 and ff.), though, since we might end
up having to explain as disagreements almost every conversational exchange, even
those in which speakers seem to be agreeing.

Even if clash of attitudes is not a sufficient condition for disagreement, it seems
to be a necessary condition at least for evaluative disagreements:
Conflict in attitudes towards the epistemic parameters is a necessary condition to declare that two agents disagree.

In moderate epistemic expressivism we find a compelling defense of a somewhat weaker version of NEC. The aim of the paper is to provide some indirect support for NEC*:

NEC*. The conceivability of a conflict in attitudes towards the epistemic parameters is a necessary condition to declare that two agents disagree.

Ahlstrom-Vij offers a defense of a version of epistemological expressivism akin to Field’s, with a substantial modification. Ahlstrom-Vij presents Fields’ epistemic expressivism (with respect to epistemic value) as the combination of the following two theses:

(I) Claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to a particular (set of) goal(s) of inquiry.

(II) There are no constraints on what one’s goal(s) of inquiry can be.

According to Ahlstrom-Vij, thesis (B) is subject to a number of powerful criticisms, and he proposes to replace (B) by

(II*) There are at least two viable conceptions of the goal(s) of inquiry.

He calls his position “moderate epistemic expressivism” and Field’s “radical epistemic expressivism”, though such labels may be confusing: there is an existential commitment in the latter (“there are at least two”) that seems absent from the former and, hence, one is not a radical version of the other. If it were, i.e., if it included all the commitments of moderate epistemic expressivism plus some, our argument in the rest of this paper could offer equal support for both them. But, inasmuch as (II) leaves it open whether there are multiple goals, one goal or no goal at all, we’ll limit ourselves to Ahlstrom-Vij’s proposal. Different conceptions on the goals of inquiry, we take it, go hand in hand with the endorsement of different sets of epistemic standards.
Being (II*) the defining feature of moderate epistemic expressivism, we can come back to our question regarding whether the existence of alternative epistemic standards is, if not sufficient, at least necessary for evaluative disagreement. Ahlstrom-Vij’s is weaker than a claim of necessity regarding the existence of alternative standards. What moderate epistemic expressivism claims is that, necessarily, there must be at least two conceivable sets of epistemic standards (corresponding to different conceptions of the goal(s) of inquiry) for there to be evaluative disagreement. We will center on whether there can be disagreement regarding what the literature on self-knowledge calls “avowals” (i.e., sincere, first-personal, present-tense, non-inferential and transparent declarations or expressions regarding one’s own thoughts, desires or intentions). We use this question as a test case, with the aim of showing that any answer to it can be used to offer support for moderate epistemic expressivism.

Is there a chance to disagree about someone’s sincere knowledge attributions about her own mental states? Let’s try “no” for starters. If we believe that it does not make sense to disagree with someone’s avowals (as many participants in the debate forcefully argue: see, for instance, Burge 1988 or Wright 1998), we can find a nice fit for our conception of avowals in moderate epistemic expressivism. Moderate epistemic expressivism would explain with great elegance the impossibility of disagreement: there cannot be other epistemic standard regarding the correction of propositional-attitude self-ascription than the ones linking the expression of the propositional attitude and the possession of the attitude. This is achieved without the need of any kind of privileged access, or alternative hypothesis about the constitutive nature of avowals. Here the argument for moderate epistemic expressivism is one of parsimony.

Some philosophers, however, argue that the answer is “yes” (for instance, for Moran 2001 the beliefs that I avow are not privileged over those that I self-attribute by means of taking a third-personal approach to myself or, for Davidson (1991), avowals may be trumped by, say, observational knowledge). In virtue of what is it possible to disagree with someone’s avowals, according to these fallibilist conceptions? Again, the explanatory framework provided by moderate epistemic expressivism can be vindicated by the conception: in every case, it is the conceivability of an alternative epistemic standard regarding propositional-attitude self-ascription that makes it possible for there to be disagreement regarding avowals.
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Procesos de epistemología cooperativa en el problema de las otras mentes

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El acceso y comprensión de las otras mentes cabría entenderse siguiendo, al menos, dos modelos: bien como una acción o evento que se realiza de un modo individual, y guiado por una intención racional, bien como una acción que se da a través de un proceso colectivo, de carácter cooperativo, y guiado por intenciones de diversa índole. Este trabajo espera poder contribuir con argumentos en favor del segundo al problema en cuestión.

Dicho modelo se inscribe en la línea que se ha dado en llamar epistemología colectiva (Gilbert, 2004) o epistemología social (Palermos & Pritchard, 2013). Mi intención sin embargo es justificar un punto de partida que señale el carácter cooperativo, y no meramente colectivo o social, en la producción del conocimiento desde el cual dar el salto al acceso y comprensión de las otras mentes.

Para poder dar cuenta de esta posición, en primer lugar se impone la justificación del principio de cooperatividad del conocimiento. En este sentido, mi intención no es depositar la atención en el carácter consensual de los resultados de la epistemología social, sino incidir en el hecho de que el proceso mismo de la elaboración del conocimiento implica una intencionalidad colectiva que se define en virtud de los roles que asume cada individuo (Pichon-Rivière, 1999) en la estructura del grupo epistemológicamente productivo. La definición del grupo según roles supone una tensión de competición y colaboración que sólo se resuelve positivamente (esto es, productivamente) tan pronto como se disuelve el conflicto que mueve todo proceso de producción de conocimiento en favor de una estructura cooperativa. Es por tanto la incidencia en el factor activo en el comportamiento del grupo lo que distancia la concepción de la epistemología cooperativa de la caracterizada únicamente por su faceta colectiva o social.

Una vez resuelta la naturaleza del marco epistemológico que define la estructura cognitiva en que tiene lugar el acceso a las otras mentes, el siguiente paso consiste en
penetrar el modo en que se comporta cada una de las unidades en que se ancla dicha estructura, esto es, en los individuos. En este sentido, parto de tres modelos teóricos para definir otras tantas facetas del proceso cognoscitivo que, por un lado, resuelve la dinámica cooperativa del grupo y, por otro, nos sitúa a la altura de poder afirmar la percepción de las otras mentes.

- El primero de ellos se basa en la interacción entre individuos que se reconocen en acciones y reacciones definidas por su continuidad, y no meramente como eventos estáticos que acontecen en el devenir de dicha interacción, permitiendo a los participantes identificar con precisión las emociones y posiciones de los otros (Stout, 2010).

- El segundo toma como punto de partida las reflexiones acerca de los modelos de acción como modelos de actuación de un actor de improvisación (Velleman, 2010). No obstante, me propongo analizar el alcance de esta propuesta en confrontación con lo que sostiene Stout, según lo cual no opera un factor de empatía en las transacciones de sentido que acontecen durante el proceso de compresión de las emociones ajenas a partir de expresiones o firmas faciales (o comportamientos asociados). En este sentido, mi idea consiste explorar si los modelos de improvisación incluyen la posibilidad de que los individuos implicados puedan situarse en el lugar del otro a partir de la asunción del rol ajeno como si de un personaje que se interpreta se tratase.

- El tercer y último modelo teórico al que recurro se basa en la teoría de la triangulación (Davidson, 2003), según el cual no habría opción alguna de conocimiento si se obvia uno de los tres vértices del proceso cognoscitivo: la mente propia, la mente ajena y el mundo. Apuesto con esto al hecho de que todo conocimiento es conocimiento de algo respecto a algo, esto es, que todo conocimiento es resultado de una negociación o comercio en el que intervienen sujetos interesados en la operatividad de los resultados que de este proceso se deriven; resultados que, en última instancia, implican no sólo el objeto mundano que quede configurado en dicho proceso, sino también la concepción ajena y propia de los propios intervenientes. Ello supondría que la continuidad que acontece durante el comercio epistémico dejaría marcas entre los participantes que, como caballos de Troya, haría posible la percepción y acceso de las otras mentes.

Es importante señalar la dimensión procesual de la cuestión que espera ser defendida aquí. El tránsito es constante, de modo que en la medida en que los tres vértices del triángulo que intervienen en el conocimiento modifican su posición en virtud de una reubicación epistémica respecto a los otros se imponen
las circunstancias para que la operación continúe. Sería por tanto el carácter cooperativo del proceso lo que haría posible una comprensión lo más adecuada posible tanto de las entidades del mundo, de las mentes ajenas y, en última instancia, de la percepción y comprensión de uno mismo.

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Fictionalism vs. Deflationism

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Fictionalism and deflationism are two rival meta-ontological positions. There has been some debate in the recent literature between advocates of the two positions (Thomasson 2013, Contessa forthcoming, Yablo 2014b). The purpose of this paper is to try to advance the debate by reconsidering one objection against fictionalist strategies in meta-ontology presented by Thomasson (2013).

According to deflationists, the existence of entities like numbers, propositions, properties, etc. can be established by ‘easy arguments’ consisting of (i) an uncontroversial premise and (ii) a rule allowing to transform the uncontroversial premise into a sentence entailing the existence of the relevant kind of entities. An easy argument for the existence of numbers, for instance, has this form:

(1) I ate two bagels. (uncontroversial premise)
(2) If I ate two bagels, the number of bagels I ate is two. (transformation rule)
Hence:
(3) The number of bagels I ate is two.
Hence:
(4) There is a number (namely two), i.e. numbers exist.

Deflationist hold that (1) or an analogous premise should be accepted as an uncontroversially true empirical claim. (2) should be accepted by any competent speaker of English because the possibility of transforming a sentence of the form “there are n Fs” into one of the form “the number of the Fs is N” is a linguistic rule governing the use of the world “number”.

Fictionalists reject ‘easy argument’ by distinguishing two readings of the sentence (3) (see Yablo 2010, Introduction). The literal content of (3) is that I ate two bagels and that there is a number, the number 2, numbering the bagels I ate. The real content of (3) is simply that I ate two bagels.
According to fictionalists, the literal content of (3) entails (4), but it does not follow from (1), because from the fact that I ate two bagels it does not follow that the number 2 exists. The real content of (3), on the other hand, follows from (1), being identical to the content of (1); yet, the real content of (3) does not entail that numbers exist: (4) does not follow from (3), if (3) is not taken literally.

Recently Amie Thomasson (2013, p.1039) has challenged the fictionalist distinction between the real and the literal content of sentences like (3). According to Thomasson the fictionalist:

must hold that there is something more it would take for the ontological claim to be literally true than for the undisputed claim to be true [...] [But] What more could it be supposed to take for the literal content to be literally true, than merely for the real content to be true? (Thomasson 2013, p. 103)

One response to Thomasson’s challenge is to argue that the fictionalist can indicate which additional requirement must be satisfied for the literal content to be true, beyond the truth of the real content (Contessa (forthcoming)).

Here I explore a different reply: to argue that the fictionalist need not assign different truth conditions to the literal and the real content in order to distinguish them. The distinction between the real and the literal content should be understood in terms of the two contents being about different subject matters: the real content of (3) is just about bagels, whereas the literal content of (3) is about bagels and numbers.

One way to distinguish the real content of (3) from its literal content in terms of their different subject matters is to characterize contents as directed propositions (Yablo 2014a). A direct proposition is a pair consisting of a set of worlds $|A|$ + a subject matter $<A>$. $|A|$ is the set of worlds where the sentence $A$ is true, whereas $<A>$ might be understood as the sum of $A$’s verifiers and falsifiers, where verifiers and falsifiers are the reasons why $A$ is true or false (I will sketch two ways to characterize verifiers and falsifiers more precisely). The key point is that two directed propositions might have the same truth conditions but different subject matters. In particular, the literal and the real content of (3) can be distinguished on the ground that whether there are numbers is part of the subject matter of the literal content of (3), but not of its real content, because the absence of numbers count as a falsifier of the literal content of (3), but not of its real content.
Thomasson challenged fictionalists to find an intelligible way to distinguish the literal and the real content of typical utterances of mathematical sentences. The aim of this paper is simply to show that Thomasson’s challenge can be answered without assigning different truth conditions to the two contents. This per se does not entail that easy arguments are invalid in the sense of having true premises but a false conclusion. Nonetheless, distinguishing the subject matter of a sentence from its truth conditions allows to distinguish two ways in which an argument can be invalid: the passage from the premises to the conclusion can fail to preserve truth-value, or it can fail to preserve subject matter (Yablo 2014, Ch.7). According to the way of distinguishing real and literal content defended here, easy arguments involve a shift in subject matter and can thus be declared invalid in the second sense. The issue whether they are valid or not in the first sense is left open.

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Perception and Introspection:
Wittgenstein on Gestalt Switches and “Aspect Seeing”

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Gestalt switches.

“Gestalt switches” is the name of a group of well known phenomena in visual perception. It refers primarily to the changes in what a subject seems to “see” when looking at certain drawings. As an example, when one contemplates “the Rubin vase”, one can “see”, alternatively, a white cup against a black background, or else, two profiles in black, separated by a gap in white. The alternative things “seen” are the “forms” (“Gestalten”) and the change between “seeing” one of them to “seeing” the other is what is called a “switch”.

Gestalt switches were historically important in psychology because they were the basis for questioning a key tenet of a very influential school in psychology at the beginning of the XXth century which held that what is perceived remains constant while retinal stimulation does not change. This Constancy Hypothesis was trenchantly critiziced by Wolfgang Kohler in 1913, precisely on the basis of the Gestalt switch phenomena.

The “paradox”.

Wittgenstein held that Gestalt switches give rise to a (at least apparent) paradox; when a Gestalt switch takes place “[w]hat is incomprehensible is that nothing, and yet everything has changed, after all.” (RPP II, §474, emphasis in the original). Wittgenstein was seriously concerned with this “paradox” and the Gestalt switches themselves, as witnessed by numerous passages in PI and RPI. That the paradox may be merely apparent is also intimated by Wittgenstein: “... it has not changed in
one respect but has in another. There would be nothing strange about that ...” (*loc. cit.*), at least —we may here add on Wittgenstein’s behalf— if we could explain the respect in which “nothing has changed”, and the respect in which “everything has”.

Kohler’s “new object” diagnosis.

Kohler thinks that, after a switch, a new object is seen by the perceiver. For example, the perceiver who saw (a drawing of) a cup against a black background, sees now the profiles of two people confronting each other with a narrow separation. Kohler’s explanation of this Gestalt switch is that the subject perceives different “organizational properties” before and after the switch.

Wittgenstein’s argument against Kohler’s diagnosis.

As reconstructed by Eilan, one part of the argument is phenomenological: Kohler’s does not pay justice to the constancy in colour and shapes before and after the switch. The other concerns the claim that we see organizational properties. Since these are different, two different objects to bear them are required; but, since there are actually no two different physical objects involved, the objects Kohler talks about are “inner objects”, “chimeras” — on account of their “queerly shifting construction” (*PI* II, Xi, p. 196).

Wittgenstein’s conceptual solution.

Wittgenstein claims that, when we talk of these phenomena, there are two uses of the verb “see” in play (cf. *PI* II XI, p. 193). On the one hand, we have plain *object-seeing*, which here applies to say that we are always contemplating the same concrete object (a drawing, say, or a print of one). On the other, there is an use of “see” — “seeing as” or “aspect-seeing”— for what in fact is a sort of hybrid of seeing and thinking: “The concept lies between that of seeing and thinking ...” (*RPP* II §462). Thus, we may say that we see “a likeness” (*PI* II xi, p. 193) with, e.g., a cup, or, alternatively, with two confronting faces. Briefly put, we can reason that a likeness is not a concrete object (or genuine properties of it, like colour or shape), but something of an abstract nature, and it is *thought*, properly, which we use in our dealings with abstract entities. Thus, the statement “We see a likeness” betrays the presence of some thought-ingredient involved in such use of the verb.
Separating perception from introspection.

On some views, introspection is analogous to perception, with the difference that, instead of accessing to external, material objects, introspective awareness of perceptual experiences gives us access to some sort of inner objects or qualities. As it is well known, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy contains a forceful rejection of such inner objects, and therefore, of any supposed access to them. But this traditional approach to introspection has been cogently criticized by authors like Shoemaker (1996) and Siewert (2012). According to the positive conceptions of these authors, introspection is in the province of thought, not anything akin to perceptive awareness. In agreement with this perspective, it is open for us to reformulate what we say about “aspect-seeing”. This would be, if one wants, an hybrid concept, but what it more concretely covers is a visual experience and the suggestion of an introspective reflection on that same experience (or an element thereof). A few of Wittgenstein’s claims seem to favour that position: “If you are having the visual experience ...[of a dawning of the relevant sort] you are also thinking of what you see” (*PI*, II xi, p.197).

How the “Wittgenstenian” solution agrees with some Wittgenstein’s desiderata.

We can now use the suggested insight to make explicit what it is that changes and what it is that remains the same in a Gestalt switch. The only thing that really changes is the experience. As I will explain in the oral presentation, it goes from having a feature that we can capture introspectively in a thought verbally expressible as “This [the drawing] looks to me now to represent a cup” to have the feature characterizable as “This looks to me now to represent two profiles”. Introspection also says that the drawing or the copy itself —its colours and shapes— has not changed. (Opposition to this sort of analysis will come from those subscribing to a strong formulation of the “transparency thesis”, for the criticism of which cf. Siewert, 2004; Nida-Rümelin, 2007; Soteriou, 2013).

Even if ultimately such an explanation is not congenial with much of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, it will be argued that some important desiderata of a Wittgenstenian explanation have been preserved: *first*, no inner objects are postulated; *second*, phenomenology reveals real constancy (the unchanging drawing); and *third*, there is also real change (in a different respect).
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Explicit vs. Implicit Beliefs in Hyperintensional Algorithmic Semantics

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Frege (1892) famously diagnosed a failure of the Principle of Substitutivity of Identicals (s1) in cases when inferences contain intensional phenomena, pinpointing thus one of the central problems in the intersection of logic, epistemology and philosophy of language. As a cure, he explained (e.g.) beliefs as attitudes towards intensions - called by him Sinne -, not towards mere extensions (Bedeutungen).

A number of scholars, including e.g. Montague (1974), have explicated Sinne in terms of possible worlds. Belief attitudes are then explicated as attitudes towards possible world propositions. On such possible world semantics (pws), an argument such as

\[
\text{Fermat believed } 1 + 2 = 3.
\]

\[
(1 + 2 = 3) = (\forall x \forall y \forall z \forall n ((x^n + y^n = z^n) \rightarrow (n < 3))).
\]

Hence, Fermat believed that

\[
\forall x \forall y \forall z \forall n ((x^n + y^n = z^n) \rightarrow (n < 3)).
\]

is rendered as valid (Fermat’s attitude towards a pws-proposition true in all possible worlds is coincidently reported in its first premise as well as in its conclusion). Nevertheless, the argument is intuitively invalid: an agent cannot infer from the content of his belief its whatever consequence, he is not logically omniscient.

The need of blocking such inferences prompted e.g. Lewis (1970) to offer an alternative solution to these hyperintensional phenomena (as they were coined by Cresswell 1975). Various scholars rehabilitated Fregean semantics to solve
the puzzles of hyperintensionality. Some of them also took an inspiration from Church’s (1951) reconstruction of Frege’s semantic doctrine, sometimes proposing hyperintensions to be *algorithmic entities*, cf. e.g. Moschovakis (1995), Girard (1989), Tichy (1988).

In the talk, we will focus on Tichy’s framework (cf. his 1988, 2004, or e.g. Duzi et al. 2010), in which hyperintensions – modelled as so-called *constructions* – determine *pws*-intensions (or ordinary extensions). Constructions are convenient explicata of *structured meanings* (cf. Cresswell 1985) because they are sufficiently *fine-grained*. Belief attitudes are thus explicated as relations of agents towards constructions of *pws*-propositions. Though various constructions determining the very same *pws*-proposition are equivalent, it is prohibited to replace one for another if one of them is in the scope of an agent’s belief.

In Tichy’s Transparent Intensional Logic, the (say) first premise of the above argument is analyzed by the construction

$$\lambda w \lambda t \text{Believes}_{wt} \circ [\lambda w \lambda t [([1 + 2] = 3)]]$$

where $\circ X$ is a direct ‘mode of presentation’, i.e. an immediate construction, of the object or construction $X$.

The attitude of an agent is an *explicit belief* (as aptly called by Levesque 1984): the agent believes just $[\lambda w \lambda t [([1 + 2] = 3)]$, presented by $\circ [\lambda w \lambda t [([1 + 2] = 3)]$, not the *pws*-proposition constructed by $[\lambda w \lambda t [([1 + 2] = 3)]$: thus, an inference to any sentence reporting his belief to any other construction equivalent to $[\lambda w \lambda t [([1 + 2] = 3)]$ is blocked. The agent is thus modelled as *logical idiot*. 

Especially among modal logicians trying to avoid logical omniscience problem, such solution is condemned as too restrictive. Though not all, at least some inferences to sentences reporting agent’s *implicit beliefs* have to be allowed.

The talk offers a viable proposal which keeps Tichy’s explication of explicit belief because of this is, it is argued, a right approach to belief provided it is understood in *stricto sensu*. On such construal, it is not allowed to switch the content of one’s

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1. But some willingly opposed this strategy, cf. e.g. Jago (2014).
2. Such proposal cannot be refuted by Church’s (1954) translational test as the proposal by Carnap (1947) or by Lewis (1970) because constructions are extra-linguistic entities (independent also on their l-notation).
3. Though constructions are algorithmic entities, the proposal e.g. by Halpern et al. (1994) is dissimilar to Tichy’s because constructions are not logically simple but complex entities.
belief. This golden rule of attitude logic helps us to easily dismiss substitutions which are invalid. Then, we examine the possibility of changes of contents of one’s beliefs, which is intuitively possible.

The above argument is reconstructed as valid if one adds a right premise which states that it is possible for Fermat to derive FLT from \(1+2=3\) in Fermat’s so-called derivation system (a mélange of concepts, axioms and derivation rules; self-identifying reference suppressed).

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What is Forgiveness Emotionally?
Forgiveness as ‘Deciding to Trust’

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In this talk I try to make sense of the claim that forgiveness involves a change of heart towards the wrongdoer, and to spell out exactly what this change of heart consists in. I first examine three influential accounts of forgiveness, which have tried to make sense of the ‘change of heart’ metaphor – Butler 1896, Hampton 1988 and Bennett 2001. All these accounts portray forgiveness as a correction of our negative exaggerated and unjustified feelings towards the wrongdoer. I argue that an account of forgiveness should make room for the possibility that we can also overcome warranted feelings of resentment. I defend the claim that forgiveness involves overcoming retributive emotions or negative attitudes toward the wrongdoer, as a result of having had a change of heart towards the wrongdoer. Drawing on Holton’s (1994) notion of ‘trust’, I propose to understand this change of heart as ‘deciding to trust’ that the wrongdoer will not repeat the moral offense.
Relevancia, actos comunicativos y contextos de ficción

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Según la teoría de la relevancia (TR), para que un acto comunicativo sea relevante, este debe tener implicaciones contextuales garantizadas (u otros efectos cognitivos positivos) en el contexto de las creencias y supuestos sobre el mundo real del receptor (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 260-266). Un efecto cognitivo positivo es aquel que supone alguna diferencia útil en la representación que el individuo tiene del mundo real. Sirva como ejemplo una conclusión verdadera. Esta propuesta junto con el hecho de que las obras de ficción no se presentan como descripciones verdaderas del mundo real lleva a Deirdre Wilson (2011: 69) a plantearse el reto de cómo pueden ser relevantes las obras de ficción.

Para explicar esto, Wilson señala que un autor puede realizar simultáneamente actos de comunicación en dos niveles diferentes: un acto de nivel inferior consistente en describir el mundo de ficción y un acto de nivel superior consistente en mostrar este mundo como ejemplo de lo que es concebible (2011: 77). El acto de nivel inferior logra la relevancia internamente, el tipo de relevancia que toda obra de ficción tiene, y el de nivel superior la logra externamente, el tipo de relevancia que caracteriza a las obras de ficción literarias. La relevancia externa se consigue mediante efectos cognitivos positivos en el contexto de las creencias y supuestos sobre el mundo “al reforzar y reorganizar los supuestos existentes y crear un sentido de afinidad con el autor” (Wilson 2011: 77). Esta relevancia depende del logro de la relevancia interna dado que el mundo de ficción no puede mostrarse como algo conceivable si no se ha descrito mediante el acto de nivel inferior. Además, una obra de ficción genera expectativas de relevancia interna del mismo modo que lo hacen las preferencias normales.

Sin embargo, no pensamos que la interpretación de las preferencias del discurso de ficción pueda explicarse de este modo. En primer lugar, la propuesta relevantista de que una obra de ficción genera expectativas de relevancia interna del mismo modo que lo hacen las preferencias normales es inadecuada. Con una preferencia
normal, el comunicador fomenta en el receptor la presunción de que el esfuerzo de procesamiento merece la pena y de que la preferencia es la más relevante según las habilidades y preferencias del comunicador. Esta presunción de relevancia óptima ofrece un procedimiento práctico para construir las hipótesis sobre el significado del hablante. Desde este procedimiento de comprensión relevantista, los oyentes siguiendo el camino de menor esfuerzo procesan los posibles efectos cognitivos positivos (comprobando las hipótesis interpretativas que involucran desambiguación, asignación de referencia, implicaturas, etc. según el orden de accesibilidad) y paran cuando sus expectativas de relevancia se satisfacen (o se defraudan). Sin embargo, en ficción, no es fácil recuperar las formas proposicionales. La relevancia interna plantea algunos problemas a la TR. Por un lado, si la verdad se suspende abiertamente (Sperber & Wilson 2002), los efectos cognitivos positivos no son posibles en el nivel inferior. Sin el objetivo de la verdad, el procedimiento de comprensión no puede parar por satisfacción de las expectativas de relevancia. Si lo que importa para satisfacer las expectativas de relevancia es la verdad del resultado, entonces la interpretación del acto comunicativo de nivel inferior no puede tener éxito. Por otro lado, si, como muestra el procedimiento de comprensión, la asignación de referencia se necesita para obtener una forma proposicional explícita (desarrollo de la forma lógica), dado que normalmente el autor no intenta referir a nada (incluso si las variables se ligan por cohesión), el acto de nivel inferior deja de expresar explícitamente un contenido completo. Estos dos problemas revelan que la TR no puede explicar la relevancia interna. En segundo lugar y como consecuencia del fallo de la relevancia interna, tampoco se puede explicar la relevancia externa. Si la explicación relevantista no justifica cómo se logra la interpretación de nivel inferior, tampoco le será posible explicar cómo se logra la de nivel superior. La relevancia externa depende de mostrar un mundo como ejemplo de lo que es concebible pero no se puede mostrar un mundo cuya descripción no se logra. El enfoque de la TR no responde satisfactoriamente al reto inicial de cómo pueden ser relevantes las obras de ficción.

Para conseguirlo, la TR tiene que aceptar, a nuestro juicio, que el discurso de ficción comunica solo una presunción de relevancia óptima: la relevancia externa (de autor). Si esto es así, la TR necesita un ajuste adicional. Aunque el autor de la ficción no produce simultáneamente dos actos de comunicación, la interpretación de un acto comunicativo en el discurso de ficción requiere dos contextos con una
única presunción de relevancia óptima. Normalmente interpretamos preferencias desde el contexto, $k$, en el que tienen lugar. Este contexto es

el subconjunto de supuestos mentalmente representados que interactúan con información nueva (recibida mediante la percepción o la comunicación) para dar lugar a ‘efectos contextuales’. En la comunicación ostensiva, este conjunto no está dado de antemano sino que el oyente lo selecciona a partir de la preferencia y su apuesta por una interpretación coherente con el segundo principio de relevancia [el comunicativo]. (Carston 2002: 376)

Pero algunas veces hay que interpretar una preferencia desde un contexto $f$ que se construye desde el contexto $k$ en el que realmente se proferie. Este es el caso de la ficción. La falta de intención de comunicar representaciones conceptuales verdaderas en el contexto $f$ es uno de los supuestos contextuales manifiestos en $k$. Estas representaciones se hacen accesibles para el lector progresivamente conforme se va comprendiendo el texto. A un lector potencial le merece la pena la exposición al conjunto cohesivo de representaciones conceptuales en $f$ si puede derivar efectos cognitivos positivos en el contexto de la vida real, $k$. Son estas implicaciones las que justifican la comprensión concreta del texto. Lo que el autor quiere decir se materializa en la conceptualización de los personajes y de la trama a través de cada aspecto de la narrativa y así los efectos cognitivos positivos se logran de un modo acumulativo en la interpretación del discurso de ficción (Walsh 2007: 36). Como siempre, el autor hace que ciertos supuestos sean manifiestos o más manifiestos al lector sin ninguna necesidad de recurrir a dos actos comunicativos. Lo que importa para satisfacer la relevancia es la verdad del resultado. No importa que las representaciones conceptuales en $f$ no sean verdaderas dado que ellas son solo los inputs para hacer que el oyente gane una comprensión general en $k$ mediante alguna forma de semejanza entre las representaciones conceptuales no-factuales en $f$ y los supuestos contextuales en $k$. La TR puede explicar cómo es posible satisfacer las expectativas de relevancia en el discurso de ficción si el lector puede derivar implicaturas desde el ajuste mutuo de las representaciones conceptuales en $f$ y los supuestos contextuales en $k$. Para incluir implicaciones contextuales que se garanticen en el contexto imaginado que se genera progresivamente por el discurso de ficción, la noción de contexto de la TR necesita reformularse permitiendo que
los supuestos en $k$ y las representaciones no-factuales en $f$ (construidas por el oyente a partir de la proferencia y de su apuesta por la comprensión cohesiva del texto) interactúen con la información nueva para dar lugar a efectos cognitivos positivos. Solo de este modo, el procedimiento de comprensión relevantista puede servir para interpretar el discurso de ficción.

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In his 2009 “On What Grounds What”, Jonathan Schaffer develops an Aristotelian account of ontology that parts way with the dominant Neo-Quinean account. According to Neo-Quineanism, ontological questions are primarily questions about existence. Thus, the ontology of the Fs, let us say, amounts to determine whether the Fs exist or not. Neo-Quineans maintain that the best way of addressing existence questions is reading off the ontological commitments from our best theories of the world. And the ontological commitments of such theories would be best expressed by the existential quantifier of First-order Logic.

In contrast, Schaffer believes that ontological questions as thought of by Neo-Quineans are trivial questions. Whether number exists or not, whether there is a God, whether there are ordinary material objects such as tables and chairs, are all questions that can be positively answered without much effort. When we do ontology, we do not argue for or against the existence of numerical entities, the existence of God, or the existence of tables and chairs. Rather, we argue about whether any of those entities are fundamental or not. That means that everybody who does ontology can trivially accept that there are numbers, a God, or tables and chairs. What we cannot trivially accept is that any of these entities are fundamental.

Schaffer’s concluding section on “On What Grounds What” offers us an applied illustration of his allegedly Neo-Aristotelian metaontological position. Although it is not clear whether this view logically follows from his metaontological and grounding theory or it is simply a development logically consistent with it, Schaffer argues that they converge into a monistic picture of substance. In particular, they would converge, given the addition of a few supplementary theses, in his Priority Monism view (2010, 2010a). Schaffer’s Priority Monism view asserts that “there is exactly one substance, the whole concrete cosmos.” (2009: 378). Against Schaffer, I will argue that Aristotelianism is much more at home with a pluralism about substances than with a monism. That is, I will argue that what we should expect
to find in an Aristotelian picture of the world is a plurality of irreducible material substances, not a single one as Schaffer holds.

The crucial step in Schaffer’s argument to conjoin Neo-Aristotelianism with Priority Monism is the way we apply his Abstraction thesis to material substances. According to the Abstraction thesis, the grounding relations are relations of abstraction (2009: 378). For Schaffer, this thesis would somehow entitle us to claim that the plurality of substances we find in the ordinary world is latent or implicit in the one single fundamental substance there is, namely, the whole concrete cosmos. I will resist this particular application of Schaffer’s Abstraction thesis by showing that for the most part, Aristotelian substances are not latent or implicit in any other more fundamental substance.

More generally, I will stress that to take the notion of ground on board in our preferred metaphysical picture of the world does not suffice *eo ipso* to be in a position to develop a Neo-Aristotelian metaphysical program on substance. In order to do so, the belief in grounding relations needs to be supplemented with other important Neo-Aristotelian theses, such as substance pluralism or the irreducibility of macroscopic substances. For there is nothing distinctively Neo-Aristotelian in the notion of ground (there are plenty of examples of non-Aristotelian philosophers sympathetic to this notion), but there is something distinctively un-Aristotelian in endorsing Priority Monism or any other monistic view along those lines.
Though the topic of my talk will focus mainly on the current debate in metaphysics about the existence of ordinary objects, it will start from a central issue in epistemology over the past thirty years or more: the incompatibility between epistemic transparency and externalism. Roughly speaking, a concept is transparent if there is no significant gap between the concept and what it is the concept of. In other words, what is supposed to make a concept transparent is that, to a first approximation, “it reveals the nature of its referent”. Possessing a transparent concept puts one in a position to know what its referents is, or at the very last, to know what the properties of the referent are. I take it to mean that a concept reveals his referent iff possessing that concept will allow the thinker who posses it to know a priori of what it takes (or might take) for an object to fall under that concept.

Unfortunately, the transparency of concepts seems incompatible with an externalist conception of mental contents. According to such a conception, a “[...] subject’s intentional states are individuated in part by certain sorts of facts about the physical and/or social environment in which he happens to be situated”. Concepts are related to reality by facts external to our a priori grasp, hence it denies that there can be any transparent concept.

It was suggested that, in order to possess a concept, we must know at least an application conditional of the form ‘If x is P, then x falls under C’ (or ‘If x falls under C, then x is P’), where P is some property (or set of properties) of the object. In the light of this, we should understand the claim that a certain concept reveals

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1 Goff, 2011, p. 194.
2 Ivi, p. 192.
3 Boghossian, 1994, p. 34.
what it takes for an object to have the corresponding property along the following lines:

\[(\text{AC}) \text{ “A concept C reveals what it takes for C to be satisfied iff possession of concept} \]
\[\text{C enables the subject to know an ‘application conditional’ of the following form: ‘if x is P, then x is C’ (or ‘if x is C, then x is P’).”}\]

\[(\text{AC}) \text{ simply requires that concepts are transparent when they are } \text{a priori} \]
\[\text{associated with application conditionals and when reflection on the concepts} \]
\[\text{provides access to the application conditionals for those concepts. Therefore, just} \]
\[\text{transparent concepts would satisfy (AC). This could be considered a notion of} \]
\[\text{transparency compatible with externalism, nevertheless externalists could worry} \]
\[\text{that such application conditionals may be satisfied just in ‘trivial’ cases. That may} \]
\[\text{be right, but it does not mean they does not truly count as revealing anything.} \]
\[\text{What I shall try to advocate here is exactly that often application conditionals like} \]
\[\text{these, even though deemed trivial, can count as transparent for a concept C in a} \]
\[\text{substantial and rich way, because ontologically ampliative.} \]

Application conditionals that are trivial correct (in the sense of not requiring

\[\text{substantive investigation) rely on conceptual truths. The conceptual truths made} \]
\[\text{use of in the trivial arguments are articulations of constitutive semantic rules that} \]
\[\text{govern proper use for the very noun terms we master as we acquire language. Rules} \]
\[\text{of use entitle us to make trivial inferences, which can be considered as illustrations} \]
\[\text{of such rules.} \]

A trivial inference of that sort may be ontologically ampliative without being

\[\text{informationally ampliative}. \text{ They are existence entailing (ontologically ampliative),} \]
\[\text{conforming to a minimalist or ‘easy’ approach to ontology, in the sense that} \]
\[\text{beginning from an undisputed claim that makes no mention of a kind of entity} \]
\[\text{F, we end with a claim that there are Fs just by undertaking and making use of} \]
\[\text{trivial inferences. In other words, given an undisputed truth and by engaging in} \]
\[\text{trivial inferences, we can reach a truth that is intuitively redundant with respect} \]
\[\text{to the first one, which yet leaves us with ontological commitments to disputed} \]

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1 David Chalmers speaks of an inference as ‘ontologically ampliative’ if, roughly, “the consequent makes an existential claim that is not built into the antecedent” (Chalmers, 2009, p. 95).  
2 Thomasson, 2015, p. 234.
entities. The point is that we can use such trivial inferences to acquire commitment
to trees, chairs, volcanoes or any ordinary object, if we start (in a metaphysical
dispute, for instance) from an undisputed claim such as ‘there are particles arranged
volcano-wise’. For, if it is a trivial application conditionals (a truth knowable a priori
via command of the concept) that ‘particles arranged volcano-wise’ falls under the
concept ‘volcano’, than the existence of volcanoes is guaranteed whenever there are
particles arranged volcano-wise.

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1 Shiffer, 2003, p. 52.

2 Thomasson, 2015, p. 149 & p. 231.
My Own Experiences of My Own Body: Exploring a Connection

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Bodily sensations typically are mental states suitable to ground *de se* judgments: generally, subjects endowed with a conceptual system or language would express them by qualifying their content with a first-person indexical. Otherwise stated, in undergoing a bodily sensation one is typically aware of qualities that seemingly qualify a body that one takes to be one’s own. This is what authors in the literature formulate by saying that subjects typically have a *sense of bodily ownership* (SBO).

However, the general notion of a sense of ownership is also used to refer to the fact that subjects typically self-attribute introspectively accessed experiences. Indeed, again, subjects endowed with a conceptual system or language typically express the experiences they undergo by using a first-person indexical in the subject position – that is, they typically take the relevant experiences to be their own. Let us call this phenomenon a *sense of experience ownership* (SEO).

This paper follows in the discussion about the grounds of the SBO. Yet, it finally suggests that such sense is constitutively dependant upon the SEO. As a matter of fact, both phenomena occur in normal proprioceptive experiences, as correspondingly revealed by the two tokenings of first-person indexicals in proprioceptive reports in English, such as “I feel pain in my finger”.

The different positions on the debate about the grounds of the SBO primarily aim at explaining what the awareness of the proprioceived body being one’s own consists of. In the first part of the paper I will propose that their explanatory project should be spelled out as aiming to meet three goals, which I will call *epistemic,*

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1 Bodily sensations include proprioception, sensations of balance, tactile sensations, pain and interoception. I will also use “proprioception” and “bodily experiences” to refer generally to all sorts of bodily sensations.

2 For example, both senses of the notion of a sense of ownership appear, but are not explicitly distinguished, in Gallagher & Zahavi (2008): “[i]n schizophrenic symptoms of delusions of control or thought insertion, the sense of ownership is retained in some form ... The schizophrenic who suffers from these delusions will claim that his body is moving but that someone else is causing the movement; or that there are thoughts in his mind, but that someone else is putting them there” (160).
psychological and empirical goals. In the second part of the paper I will sketch a proposal to be framed within so-called Phenomenal Accounts' (e.g. Martin, 1995; Dokic, 2003; de Vignemont, 2013; Bermúdez, 2015) – namely the accounts that characterize the SBO in terms of a phenomenal dimension of our bodily sensations. In particular, I shall argue that the SBO is grounded on the type of properties that typically are represented in bodily sensations.

Dokic (2003) puts forward a view of this kind – I will make the case for my proposal by critically discussing his arguments and finally supplementing his account. According to Dokic, bodily experiences are reflexive in that the properties they represent bear a constitutive relation with the very instantiation of the experience. However, he takes the relation itself not to be part of the content of bodily experiences. Therefore, his view falls short of grounding the SBO: even granting that the body that a given subject feels in bodily sensations is her own, her awareness that it is remains unaccounted for. As I will put it, Dokic’s proposal thus fails to meet, at least, the epistemic and psychological goals.

In response, I supplement his view by suggesting that, in bodily sensations, subjects are typically aware of the constitutive relation holding between the properties they experience as instantiated in their bodies, and their bodily experiences. Notice that if, for theoretical purposes, in all sensory experiences we distinguish the quale of the experience from what the quale represents, it seems that in ordinary language we refer to the latter when reporting exteroceptive sensations – we generally mean to attribute redness to external objects, for instance –, but to the former in (at least some cases of) bodily ones. If this claim is sound, it can be used as evidence in favour of our typical sensitivity to the fact that bodily sensations are about something that bears a special relation to the experience by which it is felt as instantiated. I will back up this view by arguing that it fares well with the announced goals.

Crucially, a consequence of this proposal is that the following becomes a non-trivial fact about the phenomenology of bodily sensations: when a subject experiences a body as her own, she experiences it as belonging to the very experiencer of the relevant bodily sensation, while being aware that the experiencer is herself. Otherwise stated, I finally suggest that an account of the grounds of the SBO will ultimately lie on an account of the grounds of the SEO. This traces a connection

1 The label “Phenomenal Accounts” is due to Alsmith (2014).
between two obviously related but yet parallel debates, while suggesting a way of making sense of the idea that we feel our bodies as subjects rather than as objects, as well as of the idea that proprioceptively accessed bodily properties are, in a way, also psychological (Brewer, 1995).

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A Counterexample to the Epistemic Theory of Indicative Conditionals

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The purpose of my talk is to present and dismiss a putative counterexample to the epistemic theory of indicative conditionals (Stalnaker 1975, 2014; Kratzer 2012; Yalcin 2007; Weatherson 2009). The epistemic theory’s main tenet is that an utterance of an indicative conditional performs two semantic operations (Yalcin 2007: 998): first, the antecedent restricts a contextually determined set $S$ of live epistemic possibilities. These epistemic possibilities are possible worlds that, for all that the participants in the conversation know, might be the actual world (let us call the value of this set at a context $c$ and world $w$ $S^{c,w}$). Secondly, the consequent introduces universal quantification over the restricted $S$. An indicative is true just in case the consequent is true throughout the restricted $S$. More formally:

$$[[\text{if } A, B]]^{c,w} = 1 \iff \forall w' \in S^{c,w} \cap [[A]] : [[B]]^{w'} = 1$$

For example, an utterance of

(1) If Trump runs for president, he’ll win.

at a context $c$ will be true just in case Trump wins at all the worlds in the intersection of the contextually determined set of epistemic possibilities $S^{c,w}$ and the proposition that Trump runs for president $'$:

$$[[\text{If Trump runs for president, he’ll win}]]^{c,w} = 1 \iff \forall w' \in S^{c,w} \cap [[\text{Trump runs for president}]] : [[\text{Trump wins}]]^{w'} = 1$$

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1 I’m omitting matters of tense for simplicity.
The truth of sentences like the following appear to cause trouble for this theory:

\[ (2) \text{If my coworkers hate me, I'll never know it.} \]

To see how these sentences are problematic, let us make three assumptions: first, let’s assume a simple, text-book semantics for *knows* such as the one to be found in Heim & Kratzer (1998, p. 306). Where \( K_{x,w} \) is the set of worlds that are epistemically accessible for a knower \( x \) at \( w \),

\[
[[\text{know}]]_w = \lambda p \lambda x. \forall w' \in K_{x,w} : [[p]]_{w'} = 1.
\]

Secondly, let’s assume that the contextually determined set of epistemic alternatives \( S_{c,w} \) is a superset of any interlocutor \( m \)'s set \( K_{m,w}^{m} \) of epistemic alternatives at \( w \). This includes the speaker, so that in effect, \( K_{\text{speaker-of-c},w} \subseteq S_{c,w} \). In other words, whatever is known by the interlocutors is known by the speaker (but not the other way around). Finally, let’s assume that the speaker in \( (2) \) doesn’t know whether the antecedent of \( (2) \) is true, so that the proposition in the antecedent cuts across the epistemic possibilities in both \( K_{\text{speaker-of-c},w} \) and \( S_{c,w} \).

With these assumptions in place, consider an utterance of \( (2) \) at \( c \): if the role of the antecedent is to restrict \( S_{c,w} \) with the information *that the speaker’s coworkers hate her*, then by our second and third assumption that information also restricts \( K_{\text{speaker-of-c},w} \). But then the proposition in the consequent, *that speaker-at-\( c \) will never know it*, is false. So, if the epistemic theory is right, sentences like \( (2) \) should be invariably false. However, they can be true, and therefore the epistemic theory is in trouble.

My answer to this challenge will be the following: sentences like \( (2) \) are ambiguous. On their most natural interpretation, they are not real indicatives, but rather they are either *unconditionals* (Rawlins 2013) or embedded questions (Heim 2000). On this interpretation, sentences like \( (2) \) are no immediate threat to the epistemic theory.

On their less natural interpretation however, they are indicatives, and they pose an immediate threat. But the epistemic theory can explain away the problematic interpretations: by our second assumption, everything that is known according

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1 A similar example (‘if Reagan worked for the KGB, no one will ever know’) is discussed by Lewis (1986, p. 86), but in a different context.
to $S^{w}$ is known according to $K^{m,w}$. This means that, for any proposition $p$ that is a live possibility for $S^{w}$ and $K^{m,w}$, updating $S^{w}$ with $p$ entails updating $K^{m,w}$ with $p$ as well. Note however, that knows in the consequent of (2) does not take as its world argument the world of utterance $w$. Rather, it is evaluated at every world $w'$ in the intersection of $S^{w}$ and the proposition that the speaker-at-’s coworkers hate her. So even though an update on $S^{w}$ does effect the corresponding update on $K^{m,w}$, an update on $S^{w}$ need not effect a similar update on $K^{m,w'}$. That is, what the relevant group supposes to know need not be known by those same individuals at the relevant supposition-worlds.

So the reply to the purported counterexample is straightforward: no, the epistemic theory does not predict sentences like (2) to be invariably false; the illusion that they must be false is due to a confusion caused by evaluating the knowledge claim in the consequent at the world of utterance, instead of evaluating it at the worlds determined by intersecting the contextually relevant set of epistemic alternatives and the antecedent. On the reading under which (2) expresses a real indicative and it is true, the speaker is supposing in the actual world that her coworkers hate her and observing that, in such circumstances, she would never learn that her coworkers hate her (even though she is supposing to know this in the actual world)\(^1\).

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Ofra Magidor and The Semantic Problem of Category Mistakes

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In a recent monograph on category mistakes, Ofra Magidor (2013) has widely argued that the traditional view that category mistakes are pieces of nonsense is to be rejected and replaced by an account of their infelicity in terms of pragmatic presupposition failure. In strong terms, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero has expressed approval by saying that some of her arguments “prove how sophisticated tools devised by philosophers of language and linguists allow us to put aside vague Wittgensteinian decrees stigmatizing discourses as nonsense” (2014). In this paper I would like to distance myself from this attitude and argue that whether category mistakes are meaningful should still be open to question. Magidor’s arguments, first, are not without problems (see below); secondly, they fail to take up what strikes me as a basic challenge for those who think atomic category mistakes literally express propositions: if propositions have truth-conditions and to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence or a proposition is to say what must happen for it to be true, what is it that must happen for a category mistake (e.g. ‘The number two is red’) to be true? (I call this ‘the semantic problem of category mistakes’). I argue that unless a precise answer to this question is offered, the view that category mistakes express propositions cannot be said to be established. Magidor fails to answer this question – in fact, she ignores it – so her proposal is defective in this respect.

Magidor distinguishes two semantic approaches to the infelicity of category mistakes: the meaninglessness view and the MBT view. According to the meaninglessness view, category mistakes are infelicitous because they are meaningless. According to the MBT view, they are anomalous because they either

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1 See also Szabò (2015: 292) and Camp (2015) for positive reactions to Magidor’s work.
2 For recent criticism of part of her arguments, see Glock (2015).
3 Shorthand for ‘meaningful but truth-valuless’ view.
4 Magidor (2013: 63).
fail to express a proposition or they do express a proposition but are nonetheless truth-valueless. Magidor describes the meaninglessness view as the most popular and traditional approach to category mistakes. But when it comes to argue against it, it is not entirely clear which notion of meaning she wants to ascribe to those expressions. Often she seems to work with an intuitive, pre-theoretical notion of meaning; but, on one occasion, she explicitly construes meanings as Fregean senses – those senses which, on a Fregean approach, when they are expressed by sentences, may be objects of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires and bearers of truth and falsity. My contention is that if ‘meaning’ is to be equated with Fregean content – and, perhaps, ‘proposition’ is mainly used to refer to “singular propositions” – then none of the arguments against the meaninglessness view succeed. As I show, these arguments rest on intuitive claims that (i) are not easily acceptable anymore once meaning amounts to Fregean propositional (truth-conditional) meaning, and (ii) lose their significance in absence of a provision spelling out the nature of the supposed truth-conditions. If, on the other hand, the notion of meaning in play is neutral as to whether sentence meaning is propositional or not, then (at least) some of the arguments are sound, but trivial and irrelevant. They are trivial because we do not even need arguments in support of the meaningfulness of category mistakes given a liberal notion of meaning. There is no reason for denying that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Two’ can be composed with the meaning of ‘is red’ to determine the meaning of the sentence, if we allow for the fact that the output can be less than propositional (say, a Fregean propositional schema or skeleton). They are irrelevant because they are directed at undermining the meaninglessness view, but, as I show, many of those who Magidor mentions as supporters of the meaninglessness view in fact work with a propositional notion of meaning. More generally, I suggest that the relevant semantic question about category mistakes must be whether they can express propositions: for it is only when we seek to understand which proposition they express – what must happen for them to be true – that we can experience their distinctive phenomenology of infelicity.

In this respect, I argue that Magidor arguments against the MBT view are defective alike. These arguments also fail to address the semantic problem of

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1. This is how the term is, in fact, mostly used in Magidor (2013: ch. 2-3).
2. Here I address issues from the contextualist literature (e.g. Recanati, 2004; Bach (2001); Carston (2002)), where the notion of meaning qua propositional skeleton comes to the fore.
category mistakes. Moreover, they rest on the thought that the MBT theorist is forced to accept propositions that are truth-valueless in this world or in some other possible world. This idea is criticized by Magidor via appeal to a version of an argument from Williamson suggesting that the idea of truth-value gaps easily leads to contradiction. I argue the version of Williamson’s argument is question begging, for it works only if one previously accepts that a proposition that is not true is false. Although I recognize the presence of a wider debate on truth-value gaps, I suggest that appeal to Williamson’s argument is here of no help to reject the MBT view.

Finally, I offer three speculative suggestions on how Magidor could respond to the semantic problem of category mistakes and point out that each one faces a serious difficulty. My conclusion is that the solution to the semantic problem of category mistakes – hence, the understanding of whether they express propositions – can only stem from a proper explanation of the “unity” of the proposition.

References

Can We Become Aware of Our Implicit Biases?

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A growing body of research reveals the prevalence of implicit bias, where individuals systematically disfavour people from (often) stigmatized social groups, even though they do not seem to intend to exhibit such disfavouring treatment. This form of discrimination is pervasive and has been shown to manifest in a great variety of human interaction (for example, see McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Ulhmann & Cohen, 2005; Green, et al., 2007; Rooth, 2007; Jost et al. 2009).

Psychologists and philosophers alike have characterized implicit bias as unconscious, but existing experimental paradigms do not ascertain that we lack conscious awareness of all aspects of our biases, and as Holroyd (2015) suggests, individuals have observational awareness of the manifestation of implicit bias in their behaviour on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Monteith et al. 2001; Hahn et al., 2014). Holroyd argues that observational awareness is an epistemic precondition for moral responsibility, and one that we may meet in the case of implicit bias. However, it might be argued that the restricted and repetitive conditions of the IAT, as well as the direct manifestation of the relevant bias, mean that observational awareness of implicit bias is much easier on the IAT than it is ‘in the wild’. Further, implicit biases sometimes manifest downstream in unconscious inferences in a manner which renders them less obvious to observation than on the IAT, presenting a problem for Holroyd’s (2015) claim.

I argue that we both can be (and from a moral perspective, can be expected to be) aware of the manifestation of our implicit biases in everyday life, but that this requires consideration of a little more conceptual machinery. My aim in this talk is to explain what that machinery is, and to make the case for accepting it. Firstly, our explicit preferences often have implicit signatures which means that they may manifest in behaviour without our awareness or express intention. This is the case with some consumer choices, political inclinations, and sports team
preferences (e.g. Wegner and Brown, 2014). Yet, this does not cause us surprise or alarm, instead, we regularly notice unconsciously initiated, commitment-congruent behaviour, and develop (usually) accurate theories to explain this behaviour. Furthermore, observation of unconsciously initiated behaviour can promote further investigation into the exact nature of the commitment, which may involve both introspective and observational trials, and often, a preference that is first realised through observation can become endorsed introspectively after a period of investigation. As such, we both exert our preferences on the environment, and observe preference-revealing regularities in our environments from which we may infer further information about our preferences. If one accepts that knowledge of our preferences is often integrated into, and interpretable from, our environment in this way, then one has the basis for observing the effects of implicit bias beyond the bounded structure of the IAT, as well as for unpicking the influence of bias in downstream inferences. I give several examples of situations in which individuals are expected to notice (and correct for) the unconscious manifestation of explicit preferences, including in downstream inference, and suggest that these are analogous to at least some cases of the manifestation of implicit bias in circumstances beyond the laboratory. I demonstrate that this vindicates the argument that observational awareness is an (achievable!) epistemic precondition for moral responsibility for at least some cases of implicit bias as it manifests ‘in the wild’.

References


Has Evolutionary Theory Experienced a Scientific Revolution?

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In recent years several authors have claimed that Evolutionary Biology is experiencing a dramatic revolution, similar to the one that took place in Physics at the beginning of the 20th Century. This revolution is supposedly the result of several developments: epigenetic or soft inheritance (Jablonka & Lamb 2005, 2008); niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003, Laland et al. 2015); eco-evo-devo (Gilbert & Epel 2009, Gilbert 2014); and symbiosis (Brucker & Bordenstein 2012; Kiers & West 2015). What is curious about all these developments is that the different authors working in these fields always claim that the revolution is a consequence of the discoveries made in their particular field of inquiry. However, it seems to me that none of those developments taken alone is enough for considering that Evolutionary Biology is suffering an internal revolution, but that this revolution is a consequence of the changes in the three subfields aforementioned. The purpose of this paper, hence, is to explore the importance of the aforementioned developments for the structure of Evolutionary Theory, arguing that, taken all together, they entail a radical shift in the main principles of the theory, thus constituting a case of a scientific revolution.

Roughly speaking, all scientific revolutions share three features, which can be taken as a hallmark of revolutionary science vis à vis normal science: First, scientific revolutions are holistic, altering the entire nature of an extant paradigm and replacing it with a new one with new methodological and ontological commitments (Kuhn 2000: 28-29). Second, scientific revolutions entail a semantic displacement, i.e. a change in the intensional and extensional meaning of the core theoretical terms of the field (Kornmesser 2013). Third, scientific revolutions shift the domain of application of the theory, being usually accompanied by a change in the structures that are seen as analogous and are required to be explained in the same fashion (Kuhn 2000: 30).

The paradigm that the aforementioned developments are supposed to attack is the so-called “Modern Synthesis” (MS, from here on), as it was mainly stated by
Dobzhansky, Mayr and Simpson, and which consisted in the synthesis of Darwinian ideas about evolution and natural selection and Mendelian ideas of inheritance as they were stated in population genetics (Mayr 2000). Roughly speaking, MS consists in the combination of the following six theses (Mayr & Provine 1998; Mayr 2000; Sapp 2003; Jablonka & Lamb 2008):

1. Weismann’s principle: Hereditary information is carried exclusively by genes only transmitted from the germline to the somatic cells, and never the other way around.
2. Random mutation and gene flow (or recombination) are the main mechanisms which can generate evolutionary variation.
3. All evolutionary innovations which appear have to be selected (natural selection), making natural selection the only cause of adaptation.
4. Evolution is gradual: *Natura non facit saltus*.
5. The structure of biological evolution exhibits a tree-like pattern, with all life forms deriving from the same common ancestor.
6. Macroevolution is continuous with microevolution.

I will argue that the different developments mentioned before entail a change in at least one of these principles, and all together entail a shift in the whole structure of Evolutionary Theory:

First, epigenetics and niche construction theory entail a change in the meaning of “inheritance”, and thus an alteration of principle (1). Hereditary information would not depend exclusively on germline cells and genes, but also many other forms of biological information are supposed to be transmitted from one generation to the next one, constituting “hereditary structures” (*semantic displacement*).

Second, against (2), symbiosis research and eco-evo-devo add new possible causes responsible of generating evolutionary innovation, namely, symbiogenesis and inheritance of developmental channels (*shift of the domain of application*).

Third, niche construction theory entails a change in the meaning of “adaptation” and discards natural selection as the only cause of the existence of adaptation. Organisms can construct their own niches and thus alter their environments in order to get adapted, so the match organism-environment is not exclusively unidirectional (*semantic displacement*).
Fourth, symbiosis research entails the existence of saltationist evolutionary events, making possible the existence of “jumps” in nature (ontological shift).

Fifth, concerning (5), symbiosis research and epigenetics concede that all life comes from a common ancestor, but disagree about the tree-like structure of life, metaphor which is replaced by the metaphor of the web of life, in which merges between branches are also allowed (ontological shift) (see Dupré 2012, for a review).

Finally, symbiosis research questions the assumption according to which macroevolution mimics microevolution, since according to symbiogenetic theories of evolution, microevolutionary processes would have their own rules and would have their own causes (mainly mutation), whereas macroevolution would be caused by different evolutionary mechanisms (shift of the domain of application).

I will thus conclude that, if we agree that Evolutionary Theory has suffered a scientific revolution in recent years, this is a consequence of the accumulation of different evidence in at least four fields of inquiry, each contributing in a different manner to this shift.

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—(2000): The Road since Structure, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional. The proposal under criticism moves from the fact that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the claim that the structure of the implicit attitudes is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by structural social injustice, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.
Las reflexiones de Wittgenstein sobre la certeza, *On Certainty*, son actualmente objeto de debate en el mundo académico. Mucho se ha dicho sobre lo genial de estos últimos esbozos de su pensamiento y se intenta incluso considerarlos merecedores de marcar un tercer hito en su producción filosófica, un “Tercer Wittgenstein”.

Sin embargo, la mayoría de estos desarrollos se están haciendo desde una tradición anglosajona de epistemología. Esto puede distraer de la relación con desarrollos semejantes en la tradición continental.

En esta ponencia trataremos de mostrar las similitudes entre algunos aspectos del pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset y Wittgenstein para arrojar algo de luz sobre lo que podrían llamarse “certezas políticas”, un desarrollo hacia el que Wittgenstein no se inclinó. De esta manera tratamos de ahondar en las implicaciones de *On Certainty* bebiendo de una tradición continental.

Ortega sostuvo una distinción entre *ideas* y *creencias* muy compatible con el pensamiento de Wittgenstein. Las *ideas* son los pensamientos que surgen en nosotros o que se nos transmiten, sean sobre lo que sean, tanto sobre cosas banales como verdades científicas, en una vida que *preexiste*. Precisamente las *creencias* constituyen esta vida. Es decir, todo el operar con pensamientos se da sobre unas creencias básicas que constituyen la vida como tal. Las creencias no se tienen, en ellas se está.

Salta a la vista la similitud con la idea de “certezas” de Wittgenstein. Son los goznes que articulan nuestros juegos de lenguaje y acciones. Al igual que destaca Ortega, van presupuestas en nuestro actuar, *contamos con ellas*.

La finalidad de Ortega al trazar esta distinción es *clarificar* malentendidos para alcanzar una mejor comprensión de la vida de un hombre y su historia. Esto enlaza con el análisis de la historia por Ortega. A menudo trata del “hombre” como representante de las creencias de una cultura (“el hombre griego”, “el hombre gótico”). Ortega remarca la importancia de la comprensión de la cultura como unidad
histórica, como parte operante que ha de estudiarse para entender propiamente la historia, pero tratando de no caer en un maravillarse “metafísico”, sino más bien porque pragmáticamente es lo que se encuentra al adoptar la perspectiva adecuada, al estilo de Wittgenstein.

Por tanto, en coherencia con el resto de su obra, en esta ponencia argumentaremos que la cultura se entiende como un conjunto de creencias (con el sentido técnico de *Ideas y Creencias*) y usos basados en estas creencias. Esto se pone además en relación con las menciones de Wittgenstein al “espíritu de nuestro tiempo” y la cultura para mostrar que ambos autores tienen planteamientos similares.

Desde esta afinidad, abordamos el tema de las creencias políticas tal como lo trata Ortega. En concreto, la idea de que la legitimidad política puede sustentarse en una creencia pero tambalearse cuando esta se “resquebraja”. De igual manera trata Wittgenstein de cómo las certezas pueden cambiar, si bien él no lo refiere a este tipo de creencias porque no llega a delimitarlas. Pero los planteamientos son lo suficientemente afines y similares para defender que este desarrollo estaría en línea con el pensamiento de Wittgenstein.
Many philosophers would accept first person thought or belief that involves structured propositional contents with (i) complete truth-predicable thought or reference and (ii) a distinctive first-personal mode of presentation, way of thinking or sense. However, as the seminal controversy between John Perry (1977, 1993) and Gareth Evans (1981) illustrates, theorists of the first person seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept—with Frege—that reference and sense are bound up together as the single object of belief, but then reject that first person belief is shareable from person to person; or else, maintain the shareability of first person belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference (cf. Bermúdez 2005, 172-173). With exceptions, scholars can be seen as persuaded by this dilemma and as working from one of the sides of this profound division.¹

In this paper, I shall argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only analyses at the level of the instantiable type—i.e. the type as constrained by a salient instantiable feature—are relevant for a proper assessment of the interpersonal shareability of first person thought.

When trying to prove Mr. X’s guilt, police investigators would find it especially revealing to determine whether the DNA found in the murder scene is the same as that of Mr. X’s. But only a restricted sense of ‘the same’ will do. Sameness of DNA does not concern the instantiated type (i.e. the samples), or the type simpliciter (i.e.

DNA), but the instantiable type (i.e. DNA as constrained by the instantiable genetic traits of a given organism). Similarly, we must focus on the instantiable type when assessing the question of whether two thinkers share or have the same first person thought. Consider (1) and (2) (cf. Heck 2002):

I am a philosopher. As said by A at $t_1$
I am a philosopher. As said by B at $t_2$

If we assume that referred subjects are the only salient instantiable feature of the ‘I’-thought type, there are three senses in which (1) and (2) describe a situation in which A and B express the same ‘I’-thought. First, it can be sameness at the level of instantiated type (i.e. if $A=B$ and $t_1=t_2$), the type (i.e. if $A\neq B$, whether or not $t_1=t_2$) and the instantiable type (i.e. if $A=B$). It is only in this last sense that A-to-B shareability is an open, philosophically challenging question.

From this angle, it is easy to see that breaking the connection between sense and reference in the way recommended by Perry and many others is no remedy against the possibility of unshareable first person thought (Perry 1977, 1993). Perry’s favoured analysis of the decisive Hume-Heimson case (Perry 1977, 492-493) allows that Hume and Heimson’s beliefs are the same in ways that are not essential to person-to-person shareability. First, Hume and Heimson are said to be able to apprehend the same referential information. But this is so whether or not they have (the same) first person beliefs. Second, they are said to apprehend the same sense understood as the role or reference rule associated with ‘I’-expressions. But this is just to say that Hume and Heimson can both instantiate the same type of first person thought. The really interesting question about the sameness of Hume’s and Heimson first person beliefs (i.e. the question of whether they share the same instantiable type) is left unaddressed.

The perspective of instantiable type also makes it easy to appreciate—as against Evans-like accounts and perhaps as against Frege’s own views—that the traditional Fregean connection between sense and reference as the object of first person attitudes can be maintained without threatening shareability. Evans proposes to supplement Frege’s notion of sense by appeal to the general idea of “what makes it the case that a thought is about the object which it is about”, and goes on to suggest that “two people will then be thinking of an object in the same way if and only if
the account of what makes the one person’s thought about that object is the same as the account of what makes the other person’s thought about that object” (Evans 1981, 294). This suggestion, however, contrasts with Evans’s own refusal to commit himself to a specific account of what it is to have a demonstrative thought which goes beyond token or instantiated thought (Evans 1981, 306), while also putting forward analysis of sameness of first person thought which focus on the type of account (Evans 1981, 315). But neither the token nor the type of account can yield a satisfactory treatment of the question of whether two different subjects can share the same first person thought.

Take then the type of thought, T, the instantiable type or the type as constrained by a salient contextual feature C, T(C), and the instantiated type or the type as instantiated on a particular occasion o, T(C)_o. When the thought is first person thought, the salient instantiable feature C uncontroversially includes a subject who acts as the reference, x, but also one that acts as the thinker of the thought, y, yielding a combined condition, C(x, y). While Fregean strictures do not allow reference to vary without change in instantiable type of first person thought, they certainly allow, at least in principle, different thinkers to instantiate the same instantiable type. Consider the following principles for the individuation of instantiable type:

(Minimal Identity)
If x=x’ and y=y’, then T_1(C(x, y)) = T_2(C(x’, y’)).

(Referential Distinctness)
If x≠x’, then T_1(C(x, y)) ≠ T_2(C(x’, y)).

(Thinker Distinctness)
If y≠y’, then T_1(C(x, y)) ≠ T_2(C(x, y’)).

Whereas (Minimal Identity) and (Referential Distinctness) surely provide unmistakable individuation principles of instantiable first person type, (Thinker Distinctness) is the kind of principle that would thwart person-to-person shareability of first person thought. Further argument from Perrian or Evansian frameworks needs to be added to establish or discard one such principle. Interpersonal shareability may be preserved (or abandoned) whether or not one resorts to the Fregean marriage of sense and reference as the objects of belief and attitudes.
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Wittgenstein and Kant on Pictures and Proofs in Mathematics

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In order to account for the mathematical knowledge’s distinctive method and its conditions of possibility, Kant claims that mathematics is a rational knowledge attained by construction of concepts in intuition. Because mathematics can exhibit a priori its concepts in intuition, mathematical judgments are both synthetic a priori and applicable to experience.

Thus, Kant insists on the need to resort to pictures and intuitive representations (geometrical figures, strokes, dots) so as to ground mathematical propositions. Diagrams and constructed figures, which are placed ante oculos, are regarded by Kant as a fundamental and indispensable part of mathematical reasoning. They are not only heuristic aids to understand best a proof; they are essential and irreplaceable components of the proof.¹

However, many authors have argued that what is visually intuitive as such cannot be a solid and certain guarantee for mathematical truth. In fact, already Leibniz, a conspicuous mathematician himself, considered the “echtetic” manner whereby the Ancient geometers proceed (based on the use of figures and constructions for imagination) something dispensable.² According to Russell, “the whole trend of modern mathematics, with its increased pursuit of rigour, has been against this Kantian theory.”³ Ayer maintained that “the use of diagrams is not essential to completely rigorous geometry. The diagrams are introduced as an aid to our reason.”⁴

In spite of this long-standing prejudice against diagrammatic representation, the situation is nowadays changing. Many mathematicians ask “more visual” approaches in which the importance of pictures and diagrams in mathematical reasoning are heightened. This renaissance of interest in visualization and visual thinking in

¹ See, e.g., Shabel, 2006.
² Leibniz, New Essays, iv, p. 145.
logic and mathematics over recent decades has emerged because of developments in several different areas, including computer science, mathematics, mathematics education, cognitive psychology, and philosophy.

This situation could stimulate us to reconsider and see with new eyes the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. It is well known the Wittgenstein’s fondness for pictures. As Brown remarks, it is no exaggeration to say that “there are as many pictures in Wittgenstein’s published works as there are in all the other great philosophers combined.”

Wittgenstein lays stress on diagrams and pictures in mathematics. Wittgenstein emphasizes the image of the mathematician as inventor or fashioner of models, pictures, and concepts. This raises the interesting problem as to why many diagrams convince and can serve as proof, despite its possible flaws. To Wittgenstein the proof is not a series of sentences meeting purely formal deductive requirements; it involves many other things because it is a complex human activity.

Thus, in this communication I’ll focus mainly on examine and highlight the role and importance that Wittgenstein attributes to pictures and diagrams in mathematics — conceived overall as a practice and activity, not merely as a science of truth or a body of knowledge—, contrasting Wittgenstein’s viewpoint with Kant’s. I aim to raise questions such as: Is the function of diagrams merely heuristic and tentative or rather constitutive in a mathematical proof? Can and should we dispense with pictures in a rigorous proof?

I will compare Wittgenstein’s stand with Kant’s, because “Wittgenstein radicalized Kant’s idea that the laws of logic and/or mathematics require philosophical analysis because of our tendency to misconstrue them as unconditionally true of an ahumanly conceived domain of necessary truth.” Besides, to some extent it is possible to “reconstruct a great deal of the philosophy of mathematics simply in terms of attitudes and reactions to Kant.” And, as I have mentioned before, the German philosopher has placed the pictures in a central position (taking as model the Euclidean diagram) as a constitutive and indispensable element in the mathematical reasoning and method. There seem to be, moreover, similarities between Kant’s critical theory of mathematics and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics, but there exist

3 See Floyd, 2005, p. 112.
4 Floyd, 2005, p. 79.
5 Brown, 2008, p. 120.
certainly profound differences as well, which I’ll try to outline. In the end, I believe
that a confrontation between Kantian view about mathematics and Wittgenstein’s
conception of mathematics could provide as a fruitful outcome a mutual clarification
in some interesting aspects concerning both thinkers’ philosophy.

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Philosophers interested in the nature of linguistic understanding have tended to divide into two camps. On one side the cognitivists maintain, with Chomsky, that language mastery is (partly or wholly) constituted by implicit propositional knowledge. In particular, it consists in knowledge of a system of rules that will deliver, for any sentence of the language that the speaker knows, an interpretation of that sentence. The default alternative put forward by anti-cognitivists, on the other side, is that language mastery is not propositional knowledge of any kind, rather it is irreducibly practical: a form of knowledge how.

The ongoing polemics over knowing-how, first sparked by Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) provocative paper, suggest that the linguistic anti-cognitivist’s appeal to ‘mere know how’ (Devitt 2012) is tendentious in its own right. Following Stanley (2011) the practical/propositional opposition is spurious: both knowledge how and knowledge that are intrinsically practically efficacious states, and both are propositional.—That is, knowledge how is itself a species of propositional knowledge-that, the view known as ‘intellectualism’.

The availability of an intellectualist conception of knowing how is not, however, simply another chink in the armour of linguistic anti-cognitivists. Rather, it opens the way for a kind of compatibilism regarding, if not synthesis of, putatively rival positions on the nature of language mastery. This is the approach pursued in this paper: I will argue that linguistic competence, precisely qua species of know-how, consists in implicit knowledge of linguistic rules.

The paper divides roughly into two parts. In the first part (§§1-3) I explain and motivate the three central theses to be reconciled and integrated, viz. linguistic cognitivism, intellectualism, and the view that linguistic competence is knowing how. The second part of the paper (§§4-6) investigates the upshot of integrating these theses based on two versions of intellectualism: first, the familiar proposal of Stanley and Williamson (2001) according to which knowledge how is knowledge
of a way to φ; second, my own view according to which knowledge how to φ is (implicit) knowledge of the rules, principles, methods or procedures for φ-ing. The final section is concerned with knowing linguistic contents practically, or under a “practical mode of presentation”, and its connection with pragmatics. A schematic overview of the arguments is given below.

1. Linguistic Cognitivism

Cognitivism is the view that speakers’ linguistic competence consists in (implicit) knowledge of rules from which a structural and (on some views) semantic interpretation of any sentence of the language can be derived. It has two central sources of motivation:

(i) Cognitivism explains linguistic productivity, i.e. a speaker’s ability to compose and understand indefinitely many novel sentences of her language. (Chomsky 1965, Davidson 1984)


2. Linguistic Competence = knowing how

(i) Ascriptions of linguistic competence are sometimes made using the construction ‘knows how’, e.g. ‘she knows how to speak now’ (of a toddler); ‘Anne knows how to speak French’.

(ii) Implicitness: often an agent with knowledge how cannot say how they are able to do what they do, or offer verbal instructions for doing it. This is also the case with linguistic competence. We reliably observe linguistic rules but cannot articulate them.

(iii) Linguistic competence, like knowledge how, is acquired through immersion and imitation, not (in the case of a first language) receiving formal instruction.

(iv) Possession of linguistic competence, like other forms of know-how, is ascribed on the basis of performance.

(v) (contentious) Linguistic competence, like knowledge how, does not ‘gettierize’ i.e. is not vulnerable to Gettier-style counterexamples (Pettit 2002).

(vi) Sophistication: unlike brute or unlearned abilities, linguistic competence and other forms of know how are complex capacities exhibited in rule or method-structured behaviour.
3. Intellectualism about knowledge how

(i) ‘Top down’ argument: semantics of knowledge how attributions (but there are familiar problems)

(ii) ‘Bottom up’ argument: Following Ryle, exercises of knowing how are “observances of rules or canons or the applications of criteria” (1949, p.42); they are “governed by principles, rules, canons, standards or criteria” (1945-6, p.8), and indeed to state these rules, principles etc. is to “give the reasons for [the agent’s] actions.” (ibid). But intuitively, an agent cannot do things for reasons he ignores, or be guided by rules/principles he does not know. (I motivate this by appeal to the ‘knowledge view of reasons’ (Hyman 2015, Hornsby 2007, Unger 1975). In fact, even Ryle conceded that someone with know-how “knows the rules in the executive way of being able to apply them”.

(iii) As with linguistic cognitivism, a certain variety of intellectualism (not Stanley and Williamson’s!) explains the creativity/productivity of know-how, and vindicates the conception of it as a rational competence.

4. Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism

knowledge how to φ = knowledge, for some way w, that w is a way to φ. The way to φ is typically thought about under a practical mode of presentation, entailing complex dispositions to action.

Stanley (2005) declares that he does not think semantic competence is a form of knowledge-how, in his (and Williamson’s) sense.

This stance requires his semantic analysis to have exceptions, for as mentioned in §2 linguistic competence sometimes is ascribed with the construction ‘knows how’. But it is true that the application of S&W’s intellectualism to linguistic know-how is implausible and unilluminating: on this view mastery of the French language amounts to knowledge, for some ways w₁ to wₙ, that they are ways for one to speak French.

But this relates to a general objection to Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge how, namely that it does not make sense of the productivity of know-how: the knower’s ability to act correctly in indefinitely many novel circumstances (Hornsby 2011; Toribio 2008; Wiggins 2012). The knowledge must be comprehensive and systematic, it cannot be knowledge of any finite number of ways to.
5. “Knowing a Rule is Knowing How”

Try a different view (developed, ironically, from the anti-intellectualist Ryle 1945-6, 1949):

Knowing how to $\phi = \text{knowing the general rules, principles, procedures or methods that define } \phi\text{-ing, in the executive way of being able to apply them }$ (under a practical mode of presentation)

Applied to the linguistic case:

knowledge how to speak/use $L = \text{knowledge of the rules and principles that define } L, \text{ in the executive way of being able to apply them }$ (under a practical mode of presentation).

This view is equivalent to linguistic cognitivism, if the rules that ‘define’ a language $L$ are those that reveal the syntactic and semantic structure of the language by showing how the interpretation of any string is derived from the semantic value of constituents and their syntactic mode of combination.

6. Concluding remarks: Pragmatics and the Practical Mode of Presentation

Intellectualism’s “practical modes of presentation” (PMP) are postulated to explain why someone with knowledge-how typically expresses their knowledge in action and may be unable to articulate it in words.

In the linguistic context, intellectualism implies that a practical mode of presentation explains the gap between a practical capacity for linguistic communication and a theoretical grasp of syntax and semantics: it is because ordinary speakers engage their linguistic knowledge only under a PMP that they express it in language use but not, e.g., in stating semantic rules.

But this ‘gap’ between pure semantic theory and language use and understanding in practice corresponds closely to the traditional subject matter of pragmatics.

Seems that A cannot be credited with linguistic know-how if A lacks (in principle) the ability to engage in linguistic communication, and this requires ‘pragmatic competences’ e.g. sensitivity to aspects of discourse context, adherence and expectations of adherence to Gricean conversational maxims.
So knowing how to speak/use L under a practical mode of presentation entails pragmatic competences. Pragmatic information mediates the way ‘pure’ linguistic content is thought about or engaged.

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The paper critically discusses two prominent arguments against closure principles for knowledge. The first is the “argument from aggregation”, claiming that multi-premise closure has the consequence that, if one individually knows \( n \) premises, one also knows their \( n \)-fold conjunction—yet, each of the premises might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while the \( n \)-fold conjunction might fail to do so. The second is the “argument from concatenation”, claiming that single-premise closure has the consequence that, if one knows a premise, one also knows each of its remote consequences one arrives at—yet, again, the premise might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while some of its remote consequences might fail to do so. The paper firstly observes that the ways in which these two arguments try to establish that the relevant closure principle has the relevant problematic consequence are strikingly similar. They both crucially involve showing that, given the features of the case, the relevant closure principle acts in effect as a soritical principle, which is in turn assumed to lead validly to the relevant problematic consequence. There are however non-transitive logics of vagueness (“tolerant logics”, developed elsewhere by the author) in which soritical principles do not have any problematic consequence. Assuming these logics, the paper secondly observes that both arguments describe situations in which knowledge is arguably vague, so that a tolerant logic should be used in reasoning about it, with the effect that the relevant soritical principle no longer validly leads to the relevant problematic consequence. This shows an interesting respect in which the gap between validity and good inference that arguably arises in a transitive framework can be bridged in a tolerant one, thereby approximating better certain features of our epistemic lives as imperfect subjects. Moreover, even for those who do not subscribe to tolerant logics, the paper’s two observations jointly indicate that, for all the arguments from aggregation and concatenation show, the status of the relevant closure principles should be no worse than that assigned by one’s favoured theory of vagueness to soritical principles, which only rarely is plain falsity and can indeed get arbitrarily close to full truth.
Subject-Contextualism and the Meaning of Gender Terms

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One desideratum within recent feminist philosophy of language is to strive to give meanings to gender terms like “woman” or “man” in accordance with moral and political goals (see, for example, Sally Haslanger's (2000) “ameliorative project”). In this paper I investigate and criticize Esa Diaz-Leon's (2016) recent proposal for the meaning of such terms. Diaz-Leon's proposal is a contextualist one and seeks to improve on a similar analysis previously put forward by Jennifer Saul (2006). Before moving to discuss the contextualist framework, I first introduce two traditional ways of construing gender terms, as well as their problems. In my discussion I will focus on a specific problem – that of doing justice to pre-sex change surgery trans gender people.

When it comes to gender terms, two ways of conceiving them have been historically prominent. On one hand, gender terms have been construed as biological. According to this conception, a person S counts as a man/woman in virtue of possessing certain biological traits (penis, testicles/vagina, ovary etc.). On the other, gender terms have been construed as social. According to such a view, a person S counts as a man/woman in virtue of fulfilling a certain role in society (provider, protector/child bearer, house keeper etc.).

Neither view, however, is free from problems. To start with the second, the social conception of gender terms is undermined by the fact that it is very hard to identify a unique specific role for men/women. The biological conception of gender terms is undermined by the existence of intersex people, such as hermaphrodites. More importantly, from an ameliorative point of view, the biological conception makes it impossible for pre-sex change surgery trans gender people to count as man/women.

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1 In fact, Diaz-Leon describes her project as descriptive, not ameliorative, but the worries I rise for her view below hold nevertheless.

2 I consider here only “pure” versions of these conceptions. According to “mixed” versions, S counts as a man/woman in virtue of possessing both biological and social traits (in varying degrees). However, mixed conceptions don’t seem to fare better with respect to the issues mentioned below.
In the light of the fact that trans gender people are among the most discriminated in the world, this is an unacceptable result.¹

Although the two views scrutinized before differ significantly, they seem to have in common the idea that gender terms are invariant: that is, a subject S counts as a man/woman independently of context. But perhaps the trouble is more with that common idea than with the two conceptions in themselves. A natural idea then seems to be to understand gender terms as context-sensitive. A common analogy here is with the semantics of “know”, where two mainstream views have been invariantism and contextualism. To have an example to work with, consider sentences like

(G) S is a man/woman.

According to the one of the most prominent contextualist proposals about gender terms, that of Saul (2012), (G)’s truth value in a context is determined as follows:

(G) is true in a context C iff S is human and relevantly similar (according to the standards at work in C) to most of those possessing all of the biological markers of male/female sex.

Saul’s view incorporates biological elements, but due to the fact that what counts as relevantly similar to those elements varies across contexts, we get the needed variation. To apply the view to pre-sex change surgery trans gender people, take S in (G) to be such a person. In a context in which the issue is whether S should use the men/women bathroom, similarity to most of those possessing all of the biological markers of male/female sex is not relevant. In such a context, (G) is true. On the other hand, in a context in which the issue is whether S should get tested for diseases strictly related to possession of male/female genitalia, similarity to most of those possessing all of the biological markers of male/female sex is very relevant. In such a context, (G) is false.

However, as Saul (2012) herself acknowledges, this contextualist view fails short of being sensible to the ethical and political it was designed to be. For, in Saul’s view,

¹ The social conception doesn’t help here much either, since it is hard (if not impossible) to identify a unique social role for trans gender people.
(G) comes out true when uttered by trans gender people or by transphiles; but it also comes out true when uttered by transphobes. It is thus sometimes at the latitude of others to decide whether a person is a man/woman, and not of that person him/herself. This is a highly unsatisfactory result for trans gender people.

Diaz-Leon’s (2016) proposal seeks to correct this flaw in Saul’s version of contextualism. First, Diaz-Leon distinguishes between attributor-contextualism (Saul’s view) and subject-contextualism (her proposal). Here the analogy is with similar views about “know”: speaker-contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism, for example. The intuitive idea behind these two views is that in the former it is the attributor who “calls the shots”, while in the latter it is the subject. In addition, for Diaz-Leon practical considerations (including ethical and political ones) play a crucial role in that they determine the relevant similarity. According to her, (G)’s truth value in a context is determined as follows:

\[(G) \text{ is true [in a context] iff } S \text{ is human and relevantly similar to most males/females, where what counts as relevantly similar to most males/females depends on “objective” features of } S\text{’s context, including instrumental, moral, and political considerations having to do with how } S \text{ should be treated (regardless of who utters the sentence or what their beliefs are).}\]

Although the view is plausible and gets the data right, I believe it is not without flaws. First, given that instrumental considerations are among those determining relevant similarity, Diaz-Leon’s view predicts that sentences like (G) come out false in medical contexts, even if the subject self-identifies, in those contexts, as a man/woman. This seems to me (somewhat) in tension with the pledge of trans people to be recognized as men/women, especially given that there are alternative ways to draw attention to the medical issues at stake. True, this objection is based on my own intuitions, but it seems to me at least conceivable that some trans gender people would want to be called “man”/”woman” even in medical contexts.

More importantly, it seems to me that tensions between the two main ingredients of Diaz-Leon’s view (the subject “calling the shots” and the determination of relevant similarity by the objective features of S’s context) can easily arise. Imagine, for example, that S identifies as a man/woman (and thus (G) is true in such a context), but S doesn’t share the ethical and political ideals of those who consider
that trans gender people and cis gender people should be treated equally. (Perhaps
S is religious, or has been subjected to indoctrination – a situation similar to that a
considerable number of gay people actually find themselves in). Or, in stark contrast,
least where imagination S is part of a community of trans gender people and transphiles, and
has never been discriminated against (an ideal situation, to be sure, but nevertheless
conceivable), and thus S has never attended to ethical and political considerations
regarding his/her gender. We can further suppose than none of the people in S’s
community have attended to such considerations. In both situations described, (G)
is true independently of the ethical and political considerations Diaz-Leon thinks
are crucial in determining whether a person is a man/woman.

Finally, and more generally, although her position is called “subject-
contextualism” (the subject “calls the shots”), Diaz-Leon places a very strong accent
on what *other people, different from the subject* think. In other words, the subject in
subject-contextualism doesn’t seem very autonomous. Assuming that the fight for
justice for trans gender people involves taking them to be as autonomous as they
can be, this leads one to conclude either that the view is not entirely satisfactory or,
at minimum, that “subject-contextualism” is a misnomer.
Skepticism and the Accessibility of Perceptual Epistemic Support

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I am going to explore two different strategies to solve the skeptical argument based on the principle of underdetermination for justification: one is Pryor’s dogmatism and the other is Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism. Both proposals try to refute the skeptical assumption that the content of S’s experience is not enough to favour S’s empirical beliefs over skeptical alternatives. I argue that Pryor’s proposal is insufficient, and Pritchard’s one cannot be coherently sustained. I conclude that a successful anti-skeptical strategy has to reject the internalist assumption that S’s epistemic support needs to be reflectively accessible to S.
Anti-Luck And/Or Anti-Risk Epistemology?

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The concept of luck has been in the spotlight of epistemologists for decades. A combination of bad and good luck has been accused of being what undermines knowledge in Gettier cases (Gettier, 1963), fake-barn cases (Goldman, 1976), and lottery puzzles (DeRose, 1996), among others. But what if we had been chasing the wrong guy?

This possibility has just been put forward, quite strikingly, not by one of the few critics of anti-luck approaches in epistemology (such as Hetherington 2013, or Baumann 2014), but by one of its most prominent champions: Duncan Pritchard (2015, in press), who has claimed that we should mark a transition from anti-luck epistemology (like his own 2005 or 2012) to anti-risk epistemology. In his new view, epistemology should not try to be luck-proof anymore, but risk-proof instead.

In this paper I take issue with Pritchard’s “risk turn”, and hold that epistemology should be both, anti-luck and anti-risk.

In contrast to other accounts available in the market (see Broncano-Berrocal, 2015), Pritchard’s account of luck and risk is made in terms of modality. He introduces no explicit definitions of luck and risk in this recent proposal, but I believe that the following are the ones he is assuming:

**Luck**

An event is lucky (or unlucky) if it has some desirable (or undesirable) outcome and there are—keeping the initial conditions for that event fixed—close possible worlds in which that outcome is not obtained.

**Risk**

An event is risky if there are—keeping the initial conditions for that event fixed—close possible worlds in which it has an undesirable outcome.
I will hold that this account is objectionable in three respects.

First, I hold that Pritchard’s distinction between luck and risk collapses. In Pritchard’s view, those concepts differ as the non-obtention of some desired event differs from the positive obtention of some undesired event. *Prima facie*, this may look as a very important distinction in epistemology, as it mirrors the difference between not achieving a true belief and forming a false one. Thus stated, the latter situation is a case of the set defined by the former (i.e., forming a false belief is a case of non-obtaining a true belief, but there would be ways of non-obtaining true beliefs that do not result in forming false ones). However, that difference does not hold up under scrutiny. In few words, my argument here is that the non-obtention of some desired event may itself be considered as an undesired event.

Second, Pritchard holds that luck and risk are two very similar, and almost co-extensive, properties of events, and one of the few dissimilarities among them he recognizes is their different temporal direction. Although this is an idea he credits to me, I think it is better to tease it out in quite a different way than he does. In Pritchard’s view, luck and risk are properties of events, which occur along stretches of time. He follows the standard trend here, although some authors prefer to take agents are the proper object of luck attributions, instead of events. I will propose a third alternative here: it is states of affairs, or situations, what are the proper object of luck and risk judgments (or, to be fair, agents in those situations, but this is not important for my argument now). This will prove to have some relevance for the epistemic debate.

And third, even if I agree with Pritchard that a proper characterization of risk in modal terms is of crucial importance for epistemology, I will advocate for a more moderate twist than his “risk turn”—what I would call a “half risk turn”. I believe that Pritchard’s arguments for the turn are excellent with respect to lottery cases and fake barns, but I will contend that they work for Gettier cases. In order to show this, I will propose a Gettier-like case where knowledge is undermined by the fact that the agent got it right by pure chance, even if there was no risk of failure (see similar cases in Hiller & Neta, 2007 or Lackey 2008). If I am right, we still need to consider the ability condition for knowledge—or the aptness condition for “animal knowledge”, in Sosa’s (2007) terms—as an exclusion of the relevant kind of epistemic luck.
References


On the normativity of cognition, and the cognition of normativity

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The ‘normative theory of belief’ (NTB) asserts that the act of believing essentially entails the realisation that one may be wrong or right in his or her belief, and that one has the obligation of believing the truth and disbelieving the falsity, where ‘wrong’, ‘right’ and ‘obligation’ are understood in a strongly normative sense. In this paper, several problems of this NTB are analysed and discussed; some of the problems that are discussed are the following:

- The possible metaphoric nature of normative vocabulary.
- The involuntariness of belief.
- The existence of non-(adult)-human beliefs.
- Problems with the notion of constitutive norm.
- Scepticism about normative facts in a naturalist framework.
- The no-guidance argument: it seems that the ‘norm of truth’ (‘you must believe X only if X is true’) cannot be implemented as a practical goal.
- Last, but not least, the circularity problem: realising that one has an obligation is a kind of belief, and so NTB would demand that, in order to counting as having a belief, one is expected to have normative attitudes, which in their turn entail that one is expected to have beliefs.

In the rest of the paper, I elaborate and defend a different approach to what ‘realising that one has an obligation’ would consist in, combining the Sellarsian-Brandomian metaphor of rationality as the ability of being a player in the space of reasons, with David Lewis’ reading of Wittgensteinian language games as governed by a set of scorekeeping rules, and with the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Also, the suggestion is advanced that normative concepts can be understood as ‘theoretical concepts’ in some sense close to the traditional one in philosophy of science.
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SE TERMINÓ DE IMPRIMIR EN LOS TALLERES DE GRAFINSA, EN OVIEDO, EL 8 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2016, DÍA EN QUE SE CUMPLEN 168 AÑOS DEL NACIMIENTO DE GOTTLOB FREGE
Sesiones plenarias/Keynote Speakers

Juan Comesaña (Tucson)
Lucy O’Brien (University College, London)
Francisca Pérez Carreño (Murcia)
José Zalabardo (University College, London)

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